Ante bella punica:
Western Mediterranean Military Development 350-264 BC
By Alastair Richard Lumsden
A thesis submitted in fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Masters of Arts in
Ancient History
The University of Auckland 2016
i
Abstract:
This thesis investigates the military equipment and tactics utilized by Carthaginian, Celtic,
Celtiberian, Iberian, Italic, Libyphoenican, Numidian, Greek, and Sicilian troops that fought in
the Carthaginian, Roman, and Syracusan armies in the century leading up to the First Punic
war. It also specifically examines the methods by which Carthage, Rome, and Syracuse
extended their respective hegemonies and the socio-political power dynamics at work
within them, which appear, like the aforementioned military equipment to have been
remarkably similar.
It intends to illustrate that this similar extension of hegemony and socio-political power
dynamics worked together with their frequent employment of similar troops, who fought
with similar weapons, to create a distinct western Mediterranean military koine.
Therefore, this thesis refutes the traditional Roman-centric literary narratives that
promoted a sense of Roman military exceptionalism during the fourth and early third
centuries BC. Indeed, the corpus of archaeological evidence examined in this work
demonstrates that Roman armies, which in the years following 338 consisted of up to fifty
percent allies (many of whom had served in Carthaginian and Syracusan armies since the
fifth century) were fighting with remarkably similar weapons and tactics as their wider
western Mediterranean contemporaries.
Finally, this thesis also intends to illustrate the central role that Celtic and central and
southern Italians appear to have played in the development and transmission of this
remarkably similar military equipment across the western Mediterranean.
ii
Acknowledgements:
Firstly I would like Dr Jeremy Armstrong for his invaluable input and guidance throughout
this work, in addition to the many lengthy, but always enjoyable discussions that have
added to the breadth of this thesis and beyond.
I would also like to thank Professor Matthew Trundle for always making time to discuss my
ideas and his willingness to lend me his own books.
Finally and most importantly, I would like to thank my parents Richard and Marcia for their
erudite comments and indefatigable proof-reading. Without your unconditional love and
support this thesis would have been severely hindered.
3
Contents:
Abstract
Acknowledgements
Contents
ii
iii
iv
Chapter One:
1.1. Introduction
1.2. The Western Mediterranean Panoply
1.3. Western Mediterranean Tactics
1.4. Carthaginian, Roman, and Syracusan hegemony
1
6
13
15
Chapter Two: The Sources
2.1. The lost fourth century Historians of the western Mediterranean
2.2 Surviving Literary Sources
2.4. Summary
2.5. Archaeological Evidence
17
21
26
28
Chapter Three: Carthage
3.1. Overview
3.2. The Carthaginian State: Political Structure
3.3. Carthaginian Hegemony
3.4 Carthaginian Armies
3.5. Iberians and Celtiberians
3.6. Libyan and Libyphoenician Infantry
3.7. Carthaginian citizen soldiers
3.8 Celtic, Italic, and Greek Mercenaries
3.9. Summary
30
32
34
38
44
51
56
59
60
Chapter Four: Syracuse
4.1 Overview
4.2 Syracusan Tyranny
4.3 Syracusan Armies
4.4 Central and southern Italians
4.5 Celts
4.6 Greeks
4.7 Summary
60
62
65
68
80
87
90
Chapter Five: Rome
5.1 Overview
5.2 The Roman State: Political Structure Extension of Hegemony
5.3 The Roman Army (Etruscans and Latins)
5.4 Summary
93
95
101
121
4
Chapter Six: Conclusions
6.1. Carthaginian, Roman, and Syracusan hegemony
6.2. Socio-political power dynamics
6.3. Military Equipment
6.4. The western Mediterranean military koine
122
123
124
126
Appendix A: Cavalry
129
Appendix B: Balearic Slingers
134
Plates:
136
Bibliography:
Primary Sources
Secondary Sources
Websites
148
150
158
Dates:
All dates are BC unless otherwise stated.
Abbreviations:
All primary source abbreviations follow the Oxford Classical Dictionary, 4 Edition
Abbreviations List
5
Chapter One:
Introduction
Between c.480-264 B.C. the western Mediterranean experienced a series of prolonged
military interactions focused primarily around the Italian Peninsula, North Africa and Sicily.1
These interactions, particularly those between Carthage and Syracuse, were fought with
heterogeneous armies filled with Celtic, Celtiberian, Iberian, Italic, Greek, and North African
soldiers.2 Warfare in the Italian peninsula, was similarly fought with heterogeneous armies
consisting of Celts, the numerous and diverse Italic peoples, in addition to Italiote Greeks,
and Greeks. Indeed, the Roman armies of the fourth and third centuries often contained a
variety of Italic allies, each with their own cultural identities. This thesis will argue through a
comprehensive investigation of the archaeological and literary evidence that these military
interactions may have facilitated the development and transmission of similar military
equipment and tactics across the western Mediterranean. Consequently, a shared military
language or koine developed. Moreover, archaeological evidence further suggests that
during the course of the fourth and third centuries this western Mediterranean military
koine appears to have become increasingly predicated upon the use of javelins, iron bossed
oblong shields, and open faced helmets with flexible cheek pieces, all of which appear to
have been best suited to a flexible skirmish orientated style of warfare.
This argument stands in contrast to the traditional picture painted in the literary narratives
and the majority of scholarly arguments to date which typically stress the uniqueness of the
Roman military system. Indeed, for much of the twentieth century the studies pertaining to
the military development in the western Mediterranean have tended to be very Romancentric. A major contributing factor to this argument is the comparatively disproportionate
amount of Italic evidence, particularly the Roman-centric literary accounts, which often
stressed a sense of Roman military ‘exceptionalism’. Moreover, to date the Italian peninsula
has provided the most widely publicised archaeological evidence pertaining to military
equipment from the western Mediterranean for this period. This evidence has been
1
All dates are B.C. unless otherwise specified.
Italic mercenaries: Diod. Sic.13.44.2, 80.4, 85.4, 87.1, 88.1-4, 110.1-7; 14.8.5, 9.2, 58.2, 61.4-6
Celtic mercenaries: Diod. Sic.15.70.1; 20.11.1, 64.2; 22.12.1; Plut. Pyrrh 26.1, 30.1, 32.1-2; Xeno Hell. 7.1.20, 31
Iberian and Celtiberian mercenaries: 13.80.2, 85.1, 87.1, 110..1-7; 15.70; 16.73.3; Plut Timo 28.6; Xeno Hell. 7.1.20
Greek mercenaries: Diod. Sic. 14.10.1-4, 44.2; 16.66.2, 78.3; 20.11.1, 40-43; Plut. Dion 22.4, 28.4; Polyaneus 5.8.2
2
1
predominantly found in wealthy Italic funerary contexts in such sites as Paestum, Orvieto,
and Tarquinnia and unfortunately outside of the Italian and Spanish peninsulas comparable
paintings from other western Mediterranean cultures are rare. Indeed, iconographic
representations of Carthaginian and Syracusan weaponry remains very scarce and when
combined with a similar dearth of physical weaponry renders any isolated studies into their
military development problematic. Consequently, the lack of literary and archaeological
evidence pertaining to Carthaginian, Celtic, Iberian, Celtiberian, and Syracusan armies, and
the socio-political power dynamics at work within them, has resulted in them being
relatively under-studied. Thus, as scholarly arguments have tended to follow the Romancentric literature, which accentuated a sense of the ‘Other,’ soldiers who did not fight in
Roman armies have been for the most part perceived as employing different military
equipment and tactics. Consequently, the Roman military system and the way in which
Rome extended its hegemony has tended to be viewed as being exceptional and as having
developed in isolation from the wider western Mediterranean, as opposed to having
occurred in conjunction with it.
Without access to the present corpus of archaeological evidence, early twentieth century
German scholars such as Hans Delbrück, Johannes Kromayer, Eduard Meyer, and Georg
Veith argued based on the extant literary model of Roman military ‘exceptionalism.’3 As a
result they perceived the Roman army of the fourth and third centuries as similar to the
highly organized, homogenously equipped armies of the Late-Republic – Early Empire.
Consequently, this German model served to emphasise the uniqueness of the earlyRepublican armies and subsequently formed the basis for many modern arguments
concerning Rome’s military in the fourth and third centuries. More recently, Peter Connolly,
Arthur Eckstein, Plinio Fraccaro, Lawrence Keppie, and Kurt Raaflaub have refined this
model, and postulated a series of dates for the Roman manipular reforms between 406-311,
which they associated with the birth of Rome’s military exceptionalism.4 However, these
dates are again heavily reliant on literary evidence to support their arguments, whilst Adrian
Goldsworthy, in particular, has argued that by the Punic Wars, Rome had already adopted
3
(Delbruck 1990) pp.272-296; (Kromayer 1928b) pp.288-373; (Meyer 1924) pp.231-285
(Eckstein 2006) p.145; (Fraccaro 1975) pp.41-58; (Keppie 1998) pp.19-20; (Raaflaub 1996) p.297; (Cornell 1995) p.354
implies this.
4
2
the manipular system.5 However, the question remains what did the manipular system
evolve from?
Since the turn of the twenty first century, a number of scholars have begun to reassess
these views and have increasingly adopted a more critical approach to the literary narratives
and the arguments predicated upon them. For example, Michael Burns, Gary Forsythe, John
Rich, Louis Rawlings, Nathan Rosenstein, Fernando Quesada Sanz, and Michael Sage
collectively re-examined the literary narratives describing Roman military development
during the fourth and third centuries.6 Collectively, they argue against the traditional
narratives that portrayed the manipular reforms as occurring instantaneously and instead
argue that Roman military development should be viewed as evolving in a gradual and
piecemeal way. Consequently, the previous models of classical warfare in the western
Mediterranean have begun to be abandoned by some scholars in favour of a more critical
approach that acknowledges the nuances of ancient societies and the warfare they engaged
in. These arguments have been aided by the publication of the wide range of iconographic
and physical evidence which illustrates that, during the fourth century, Roman weaponry
was not as homogenous, nor were their unit formations and battlefield tactics as unique as
once thought.
This thesis will critically discuss a wide range of military equipment finds and types from
across the western Mediterranean in order to illustrate how the supposedly different
Carthaginian, Roman, and Syracusan armies actually fought with remarkably similar tactics
and weaponry. Indeed, it is the intention of this thesis to illustrate that by the outbreak of
the First Punic War (264) the Carthaginian, Roman, and Syracusan military systems were
surprisingly similar because they were part of a wider military koine that had been steadily
developing from the fifth century onwards. This thesis will also contend that during the
fourth and third centuries the tactical organization of Roman units did not necessarily differ
from their western Mediterranean contemporaries, nor were they easily delineated as
represented in the anachronistic literary narratives written centuries later (Livy 8.8; Polyb.
6.21-23).
5
6
(Goldsworthy 2001) pp. 36-62
(Burns 2003) pp.61-74; (Forsythe 2005) p.286; (Koon 2011) p.79; (Rawlings 2007b) pp.52-59; (Rich 2011) pp.16-20;
(Rosenstein 2010) pp.299-301; (Quesada Sanz 2006) pp.245-252; (Sage 2013) pp.220-225
3
Furthermore, it will argue that Carthage, Rome, and Syracuse utilized a remarkably similar
form of hegemony and the socio-political power dynamics at work within them also shared
common characteristics, and that these helped to facilitate the development of the western
Mediterranean military koine. The actual extent of Carthaginian, Roman, and Syracusan
hegemony is a contentious argument, but for the purpose of this thesis, hegemony, will be
used to describe a general sphere of influence that one polity was able to exercise over
others. A key factor in the creation of this koine was the increasing frequency with which
central and southern Italians, Celts, and to a lesser extent Celtiberian, and Iberians served as
allied auxiliaries and mercenaries in the Carthaginian, Roman, and Syracusan armies from
the fifth century until the end of the Second Punic war.7
The wide range of archaeological evidence now available strongly suggests that Celtic and
Italic mercenaries were a major driving force in the development of a wider western
Mediterranean military koine. In the northern Mediterranean, archaeological evidence
suggests that the Celts of the La Tène I-II periods (c.400-100) were influential in spreading
similar military equipment from Northern Italy across southern France and down into the
Iberian and Celtiberian regions of the Spanish peninsula.8 These same military
developments were then likely transported back westwards into Carthaginian and Syracusan
armies through mercenary service in North Africa and Sicily. Whilst in the southern
Mediterranean, the presence of Italic military equipment also suggests that central and
7
App. Hisp.28; Hann.52; Diod. Sic. 13.44.2, 110.5, 14.8.5, 15.70, 16.73, 19.12, 20.11.1, 22.12, 25.2; Livy 21.21, 38-39, 48, 52,
59, 22.46-47, 24.15, 25.9, 27.38, 48, 28.46, 30.33; Frontin. Strat. 16.3; Livy 10.26; 21.22-23, 38,57,59; 27.38-39, 48, 28.36,
30.33; Poly 1.17.4, 19.2, 43.4, 48.2, 66.7, 2.67.7, 3.33, 113-115; Plut. Dion.27; Pyrrh. 16.10, 26.1, 30.1, 32.1-2; Xeno Hell.
7.12, 30.
For Mercenaries in Carthaginian armies see: (Ameling 2011) p.49;(Connolly 1981) p.148; (Goldsworthy 2001) pp.32-33;
(Hoyos 2010) p.157; (Lazenby 1996) p.46; (Picard 1968) p.168; (Salimbeti 2014) pp.21-22; (Scardigli 2011) p.33; (Scullard
1989) p.20; (Scullard 1990) p.495; (Warmington 1969) p.121, 126.
For Mercenaries in Syracusan armies see: (Champion 2010) p.18, 25, 101; (Cunliffe 1997) p.76, 143; (Ellis 1997) p. 52, 93;
(Frederiksen 1984) p.106, 139, 143; (Hannah 1990) pp.275-276; (Lewis 1994) p.129, 131;(Lomas 2006) pp.111-112;
(Meister 1984) p.407; (Parke 1933)p.68, 71, 88; (Westlake 1994) p.708; (Zambon 2008) p.37, 45, 66,268.
For central and southern Italians in Roman armies see: (Cornell 1995) pp.367-377; (Erdkamp 2006) p.283; (Frederiksen
1984) p.106; (Forsythe 2011) pp.36-37; (Goldsworthy 2001) p.39, 49; (Koon 2011) p.79; (Lomas 2006) p.103; (Patterson
2006) p.610; (Rawlings 2007b) pp.46-48, 50-52; (Sage 2013) p.224
8
For Celtic influence in the Spanish Peninsula see: (Quesada Sanz 1997b) P.257,259, 262-266; (Quesada Sanz 2011a)pp.140156; (Quesada Sanz 2011c) pp.214-216, 222, 225, 227
For Celtic influence in Northern Italy see: (Bishop 2006); (Burns 2003) p.64; (Connolly 1981) p.99; (Ellis 1998) p.87,91;
(Paddock 1993) p.469,482-483; (Schneider-Herrmann 1996) pp.45-46 (Small 2000) p.230; (Stary 1979) p.187, 198-201;
(Tomcazk 2012) p.47, 56 fig9, 57 fig.10;
4
southern Italians provided a similar vehicle for transmitting military technology through
their frequent service in Carthaginian, Roman, and Syracusan armies.9
With regard to tactics, this thesis will also argue against Roman exceptionalism, particularly
in relation to the advent of the manipular legion described by Livy and Polybius in the fourth
century (Livy 8.8; Polyb. 6.21-23). It will instead seek to support and build upon Fernando
Quesada Sanz’ and Ted Lendon’s models of a ‘‘cloud/cluster’ battlefield unit as the most
common tactical unit across the western Mediterranean.10 The ‘cloud’ consisted of a
mixture of light and heavy troops, which was able to expand or contract like fingers from
clenched fist depending on the particular phase of battle.11 This flexible tactical unit
formation stands in stark contrast to the supposedly rigid maniples of the later Roman
manipular Legion with its division of specialised troop types (velites, hastati, principes,
triarii) and its seemingly well-defined three lines of infantry (triplex acies) in a quincunx
(checkerboard) formation (Livy 8.8; Poly. 6.21-23). The literary sources also problematically
attributed the adoption of the manipular legion to a variety of dates between 406-311 and
this assumption has been upheld by several modern scholars who generally have attributed
its adoption to sometime during the Samnite wars (Dion. Hal. Ant Rom. 14.9; Livy 4.59; Plut.
Cam. 40.4).12 This thesis contends that the literary accounts detailing military development
during this period are anachronistic and as such cannot be relied upon as accurately
portraying the nuanced details of warfare in the fourth and third centuries. Rather, the
presence of similar archaeological evidence from across the western Mediterranean,
together with a similar light handed extension of hegemony and socio-political power
dynamics, suggests that heterogeneous Carthaginian, Roman, and Syracusan armies were,
for the most part, not fighting with radically different equipment and tactics.
In order to support these conclusions this thesis will critically examine and analyse the
problematic and often anachronistic literary narratives provided by the primary sources,
particularly those of Diodorus Siculus, Livy, and Polybius. Additionally, physical and
iconographic archaeological evidence will be critically assessed from across contemporary
9
(Connolly 1981) p.111, 150; (Salimbeti 2014) p.37
Also see: App. Hann 8.31; Diod. Sic.13.44.2, 80.4, 85.4, 87.1, 88.1-4, 110.1-7; 14.8.5, 9.2, 58.2, 61.4-6;Dion. Hal. Ant. Rom.
9.22; Polyb. 3.107.12, 6.26.7, 30.2; Livy 2.49.4, 9.30.3; Plut. Dion 27.1
10
(Lendon 2005) pp.179-191; (Quesada Sanz 2006) pp.245, 258-263
11
(Quesada Sanz 2006) pp.245, 258-263
12
(Adcock 1928) p.601; (Keppie 1998) pp.18-19; (Potter 2004) pp.70-73; (Salmon 1967) p.232,236
5
western Mediterranean cultures and regions that interacted with each other militarily
during this period including the; Carthaginians, Celts, Celtiberians, Etruscans, central and
southern Italians, Italiote Greeks, Iberians, Greeks, Latins, Libyans, Libyphoenicians,
Numidians, Romans, and Sicilians.13
1.2. The western Mediterranean panoply:
The purpose of the following three sections is to provide a basic overview of western
Mediterranean military equipment, tactics, and hegemony during the fifth to third
centuries. They will briefly illustrate that during this period soldiers throughout the western
Mediterranean were contemporaneously developing and fighting with remarkably similar
panoplies, which appear to have been utilized in a common form of flexible and
predominantly skirmish orientated warfare. The intention is also to highlight the similarities
between Celtic, Celtiberian, Iberian, Italic, and North African weaponry and to further
suggest that these soldiers did not operate in vastly different tactical units.
Two way military interactions across the western Mediterranean (Authors own map)
13
Central and southern Italians will be used as an encompassing term for the Osco-Umbrian speaking communities of the
central and southern Italy such as the four major Samnite tribes; Caraceni, Caudini, Herpini, Pentri, in addition to; Apuli,
Alfaterni, Aurunci, Aequi, Bruttii, Campanians, Hercini, Fallisci, Frentani, Lucani, Marsi, Messapii, Paeligni, Picentes, Sabini,
Sidicini, Umbrians, Vestini, and Volsci.
6
Javelins:
The weight of physical and iconographic evidence suggests that javelins, together with
spears constituted the dominant offensive weapons in the western Mediterranean
throughout antiquity.14 Javelins varied widely in shape and size, but they can be distilled
into two broad categories; the shanked javelin which is commonly attested in the northern
regions of the western Mediterranean and the shankless javelin which evidence suggests
was more widely utilized in the south by Greeks, North Africans, and Sicilians.15
Archaeological evidence further suggests that the shanked javelin can be distilled into two
distinct types. The heavy shanked javelin appears frequently in Etruria, Latium, and the
Celtic occupied areas of modern day Austria, northern Italy, southern France, and
Switzerland.16 The physical examples of these heavy shanked javelins discovered at
Montefortino, Montericco, Monte Bibele, Latium, and Vulci, predate similar weapons in
central and southern Italy (Plates 1-3).17 In southern Italy a lighter shanked javelin appears
to have been preferred.18 Furthermore, a similar division of heavy and light shanked javelins
also appeared in the Celtiberian and Iberian regions of the Spanish peninsula; the falarica
and the solid iron soliferrea (App. B Civ. 5.82). The former Livy associated as proto-pila and
bears common characteristics with the Celtic and Italic heavy shanked javelins (Livy 21.8).19
There is no evidence as yet to indicate that the shanked javelin was developed in
contemporary Greece, North Africa, and Sicily. Indeed, archaeological evidence seemingly
indicates that the shankless javelin was the common javelin amongst Greeks, North
Africans, Numidians, and Thracians (Sil. Pun. 3.250; Xen. Hunt. 10.3).20
14
(Burns 2006) pp .174-186; (Connolly 1981) pp. 95-119; (Quesada Sanz 2011c) pp. 207-232; (Small 2000) pp. 231-232;
(Tomcazk 2012) p.45
15
(Brunaux 1987) p.91; (Cunliffe 1997) p.94; (Ellis 1998) p.100; (Goldsworthy 2001) p. 31,57; (Hoyos 2015) p.21; (Quesada
Sanz 2011c) p.209, 214, 234; (Rawlings 2007b) p.54; (Sage 2013) p.218; (Small 2000) p.221, 226; (Stary 1979) pp.184-197
16
For the purposes of this thesis, the terms Celt and Celtic will refer to the tribes and peoples living in the Po Valley as well
as modern day Austria, France, Switzerland who shared cultural and linguistic bonds.
17
Burns notes that there was a lighter shanked javelin typed javelin in use in southern Italy from the fifth century as well,
but this should not be confused with the heavier Celtic/Northern Italian version. (Connolly 1981) p. 92. fig.14, 98 fig.9;
(Lejars 2008) pp.127-128, 140-142, 146-147, 167-157 fig. 5A, 6,9; (Small 2000) pp.224-226; (Tomcazk 2012) 56 fig.9, 57
fig.10
18
(Small 2000) p.231
19
(Connolly 1981) pp.150-151.150 fig.1-2; (Gabriel 2002) p.200; (Lazenby 1996) p.26; (McCartney 1912) p.76; (Quesada
Sanz 2011c) p.211; (Salimbeti 2014) p.3
20
(Connolly 1981) p.49, fig.1; (Lendon 2005) p.95; (Salimbeti 2014) p.38; (Wary 1980) p.50
7
Spears:
The heavier thrusting spear constituted one of the main forms of offensive weaponry in the
western Mediterranean and it appears in the archaeological record with relative
frequency.21 Throughout the western Mediterranean thrusting spearheads can differ in size
and shape rather dramatically, consequently it is difficult at times to identify what exactly is
a spear or a javelin head.22 Some of these spears can be discerned as thrusting spears due to
the size of their heads and, at times, the presence of a spiked butt (sauroter). The presence
of heavy spears likely suggests that, although the javelin may have become the dominant
weapon in the western Mediterranean, some soldiers expected to engage in melee combat
(potentially in addition to skirmishing). What is interesting is that there are numerous
depictions of heavily armed warriors carrying two-spears, which may indicate that it was
common for soldiers armed with thrusting spear to also carry a lighter possibly dual-purpose
spear or javelin into battle so that they could still effectively participate in the exchange of
missiles (Plates 4-6).23 This is seemingly corroborated with archaeological evidence from
southern Italy where there are tombs containing, or depicting both a heavy spear alongside
a lighter spear or javelin.24
There is also ample evidence indicating that a multi-purpose throwing and thrusting spear
was popular in the Italian peninsula.25 Indeed, the hasta from which the hastati of the
Roman manipular legion derived their name is described as being designed for use as multipurpose weapon (Polyb. 6.23). Furthermore, it appears that whilst the heavy and light
shanked javelins were popular in Etruria, Latium, and southern Italy the multi-purpose spear
was the weapon of choice amongst the peoples of the central Apennines.26 The multipurpose spear was likely to have been a popular weapon for many soldiers in the western
Mediterranean because, although warfare may have been predominantly skirmish
orientated, it still retained the potential to escalate into melee encounters where such a
21
(Brunaux 1987) p.91; (Burns 2006) pp .174-186; (Connolly 1981)pp. 95-119; (Quesada Sanz 2011c) pp. 207-232; (Small
2000) pp. 231-232; (Tomcazk 2012) p.45
22
(Brunaux 1987) fig.39; (Burns 2006) p.177; (Small 2000) p.231
23
(Burns 2006) pp.189-190; (Small 2000) p.225
24
(Burns 2006) Tomb 421 Branzi p.185, Tomb 53 Andriulo, Paestum 190 (Small 2000) p.225
25
(Burns 2006) p.181-182; (Small 2000) p.231
26
(Small 2000) p.231
8
weapon would have been useful. This then may account for the frequent depiction of
soldiers equipped with two spears such as on the Väce Clasp and Arnoaldi situla (Plate 6).27
Swords:
Archaeological evidence suggests that swords in the western Mediterranean conformed to
two dominant types; the single edged cutting and thrusting sword (antennae), and the
single edged curved slashing sword (falcata, kopis, machaira). However, it appears that by
the fourth century the antennae sword had become the dominant sword in the western
Mediterranean. Indeed evidence indicates that there was a remarkable similarity in design
and length (c.60-70cm) among contemporary Celtic, Italic, and North African examples until
the emergence of the La Tène II culture (c.250).28 Single edged curved swords potentially
present another example of military interaction leading to assimilation and adoption of
military equipment in the western Mediterranean. These swords are rarely found outside of
Etrusco-Latin, Graeco-Macedonian, or specific Iberian contexts in the western
Mediterranean.29 Thus, it is possible that the Iberians initially encountered falcata type
weapons during their service with Italic and Greek mercenaries in Carthaginian and
Syracusan armies in Sicily. Consequently, the falcata potentially illustrates another example
of a military interaction resulting in a transmission of weaponry in the western
Mediterranean.
Helmets:
Evidence indicates that, although western Mediterranean helmets demonstrate distinct
regional variations, they can be broadly distilled into two general categories; open faced
helmets with cheek pieces such as the Etrusco-Thracian, Samno-Attic, and Montefortino and
open faced helmets without cheek pieces such as the Negau and pilos types (Plates 7-11).30
27
(Connolly 1981) p.103 fig.12,13
(Bishop 2006) p.56; (Burns 2006) p.195; (Connolly 1981) p.116 fig.1-8;(De Navarro 1972) Pl. 1-3; (Hubert 2006) pp.88-90;
(Quesada Sanz 2011a) pp.151-152; (Quesada Sanz 1997b) p.262-264; (Quesada Sanz 2011c) p.211, 218
29
(Burns 2006) p.194; p.63, 77, 78 fig.2, 98 fig. 12-13, 107 fig.7; (Quesada Sanz 2011c) p.49;
30
(Connolly 1981) pp.96-112, 121,122; (Paddock 1993) Etrusco-Thracian pp.320-365; Negau pp.174-265; Montefortino
pp.469-600; Pilos p. 365-400, Samno-Attic pp.400-469; (Salimbeti 2014) p,33, 34, 40
28
9
Furthermore, like javelins and shields, the contemporary development of these remarkably
similar helmet types appear highly suited to the demands of warfare dominated by missilebased skirmishing that retained the potential for melee combat.
Archaeological evidence further suggests that, by the end of the third century the
Montefortino had become dominant helmet type in the western Mediterranean, appearing
frequently in Carthaginian, Iberian, and Celtiberian contexts.31 The development of these
similar helmets and the eventual widespread adoption of the Montefortino helmet suggest
that soldiers in the western Mediterranean were participating in a common style of warfare
that primarily revolved around missile orientated skirmishes, where the retention of
peripheral vision was important.32
The apparent speed with which the Montefortino was adopted must be contextualised
within a larger picture of Celtic, and Italic development of open faced bronze helmets with
flexible or fixed check pieces such as the Samno-Attic and to a lesser extent the EtruscoThracian. It must be noted that there are only three examples of Etrusco-Thracian helmets
that have been found with cheek pieces, however it appears that they could be fitted.33 The
hinged cheek pieces could be tied alongside the head, which allowed the soldiers to retain
their peripheral vision, and could also be tied down to protect the face from blows if the
encounter escalated into melee combat. The Samno-Attic and Etrusco-Thracian helmets
evidently developed concurrently with the Montefortino, and their similar design, and
presumably functional purposes matched those sought by contemporary Italic warriors,
who were utilizing comparable equipment and tactics. Consequently, the suitability of the
Montefortino helmet for skirmish orientated warfare resulted in it becoming rapidly
adopted throughout the Italian peninsula and ultimately the western Mediterranean.
Shields:
Shields in the western Mediterranean also demonstrate a degree of regional variation and
as previously noted they, like the shanked javelin and Montefortino helmet, appear to have
31
(Burns 2003) p.64,70,73; (Connolly 1981) pp. 121-122 (Paddock 1993) p.470;, 473-484, 487 fig.125 (Quesada Sanz 2011a)
p.156; (Quesada Sanz 2011c) p.216; (Salimbeti 2014) p.40
32
(Paddock 1993) p. 487, 498-506 tlb.3, 797
33
(Paddock 1993) pp.345-346
10
become largely standardized by the end of the Second Punic War. For example, during the
third century the iron bossed oblong shield appears to have become the dominant shield
type in the western Mediterranean and is well attested in Carthaginian, Celtic, Celtiberian,
and Italic contexts (Plate 12).34 Whilst the circular clipeus or hoplon shield is also attested in
Italic contexts in the fourth century, it appears with less frequency thereafter, although
iconographic evidence suggests it remained popular amongst some North African soldiers
(Plate 13).35 Furthermore, a similar sized circular shield (without the antilabe and porpax)
together with a smaller buckler type shield (caetra) appeared to have been a popular in
Iberia during the early fourth century but, like the hoplon, they appear to have begun to be
largely replaced by the oblong shield during third century (Plate 14).36
The widespread adoption of the oblong shield during the fourth and third centuries may
have occurred because it offered greater protection from missiles than offered by the
circular shields (Livy 9.19; Polyb. 6.23).37 The horizontal hand grip of the oblong shield would
have enabled soldiers to punch the shield outwards, and wield it at arm’s length. This level
of manoeuvrability increased the empty space between the soldier’s body and his shield,
which would have increased its effectiveness against missile weapons (Polyb. 6.23).38 The
widespread adoption of the iron bossed oval or rectangular wooden shield coincides with
the widespread utilization of javelins, or dual-purpose spears. Thus, it is likely that the
oblong shield constituted an effective defensive weapon against enemies armed with
shanked javelins, the design of which indicates a penetrative purpose, akin to the medieval
bodkin arrow.39 Although it cannot be proven whether the shanked javelin or the oblong
shield has developmental primacy, there remains a high possibility that the shanked javelin
was designed primarily to negate the increased space created between man and the oblong
shield. This development may correspondingly account for the seemingly tandem
34
(Bishop 2006) pp.61-62; (Burns 2006) pp.157-161; (Connolly 1981) p.95,95 fig.1,2, 103,107, 109 fig.1, 118-119 fig.3,4,5,
150 fig, 11,12,14,16; (Cunliffe 1997) p.p.96-97; (Hubert 1934) pp.92-93; (Quesada Sanz 2011c) p.215, 221-227; (Salimbeti
2014) pp.28,29,36; (Stary 1979) p.200, Pl 26
35
Clipeus will be used to denote the circular shield equipped with a antilabe and porpax in Italic contexts, whilst hoplon will
be used to denote the shield in non-Italic contexts. (Connolly 1981) p.147; (Burns 2006) p.161; (Salimbeti 2014) p.21-22,
35-36
36
(Quesada Sanz 2011c) p.213,227
37
(Burns 2006) p.157, 233; (Connolly 1981) pp.120, 150-151, (Hubert 2006) p.92; (Rawlings 2007b) p.58; (Quesada Sanz
2011c) pp.220-221; (Stary 1981b) p.287
38
(Burns 2003) p.75; (Quesada Sanz 2011a) p.142
39
(Bishop 2006) p.51 (Burns 2006) p.186
11
development and eventually widespread adoption of shanked javelins and the oblong shield
across large parts of the western Mediterranean by the end of third century.
Cuirasses:
Archaeological evidence suggests that from the end of the fifth century onwards, body
armour in the western Mediterranean was primarily light weight and appears to have
allowed the soldiers considerable upper body manoeuvrability. This evidence, particularly
from the Italian peninsula, suggests that between the fourth and third centuries the three
most commonly attested pieces of body armour were; the bronze square/ rectangular
breastplate (cardiophylax) which was suspended over the chest by a leather harness, the
Italic triple disc cuirass (spongia) consisting of three bronze discs joined together and
protected both the front and back of the soldier’s chest and a cuirass constructed of layers
of dense linen (linothorax) which protected the entire torso (Plates 15-19, 21-22).
The development and transmission of light body armour, like shanked javelins and open
faced helmets with cheek pieces, suggests that a high degree of exchange with regard to
military equipment was occurring in the western Mediterranean from the fifth century
onwards. Moreover, it appears likely that this transmission of military equipment was
facilitated by the increasing numbers of heterogeneous armies fielded by states like
Carthage, Syracuse, and Rome, particularly in the fourth century. For example, a spongia
dated between the fourth-third centuries and most likely produced in Campania, was
discovered at Ksour es Saf in Tunisia. This spongia is strikingly similar to a number of
examples represented in artistic ware and tombs in central and southern Italy (Plate 18).40
The heavier bronze Greek and Italic muscled cuirass still appears in the archaeological
record during the fourth century, but becomes increasing rare thereafter (Plates 19-20).41
This potentially suggests that, although there was a growing trend towards lighter body
armour suited to skirmishing, some soldiers may have retained heavy body armour and as
such may not have participated in the skirmishing phases of battle. Presumably these
40
(Burns 2003) p.71-72, 79 fig.7; (Burns 2006) pp.56-79, 293-305, 351-357; (Connolly 1981) p.108, 110, 111; (Salimbeti
2014) p.35; (Salmon 1967) p.130
41
(Connolly 1981) pp.98, 100 fig.4, 109, 110 fiig.8; (Burns 2006) pp.82-101, 306-320; (Salimbeti 2014) pp.32-33
12
heavily armed soldiers represented the wealthier sections of society and as such did not
constitute the majority of troops on the battlefield. If they did appear on the battlefield in
large numbers without supporting light troops, they would have been extremely vulnerable
to large numbers of lightly armed skirmishers as the Spartans discovered at Sphacteria
(Thuc. 4.32-36).
Summary:
In conclusion, physical and iconographic evidence suggests that the most common offensive
weapons during the fourth and third centuries were javelins (both shanked and shankless),
multi-purpose spears, and thrusting spears, with the sword being a specialist secondary
weapon largely confined to the wealthy.42 Furthermore, iron bossed oval shields were
adopted with an ever- increasing frequency, although there is evidence to suggest that large
circular shields were also likely used by some soldiers.43 In terms of body armour the
spongia and its simpler predecessor the cardiophylax, together with the linen cuirass
(linothorax) appear to have been the most prolific forms of body armour.44 Helmets also
appear to share remarkable similarities regardless of cultural or geographical origin. These
open faced helmets when viewed in conjunction with the aforementioned arms and armour
appear to indicate that warfare in the western Mediterranean was being fought in a more
flexible and open formation where threats could come from multiple directions.
1.3. Western Mediterranean Tactics:
The archaeological dominance of javelins, spears, oblong shields, together with light
relatively non restricting body armour (cardiophylax, linothorax, spongia) appears to have
facilitated a flexible ‘cloud’ based battlefield unit filled with a mixture of light and heavy
42
(Burns 2006) p.175; (Connolly 1981) 37-64, 91-121; (Goldsworthy 2001) pp.31-32, 57; (Quesada Sanz 2011c) pp.210-219;
(Sage 2013) p.218; (Salmon 1967) p.110; (Small 2000) p.221,231; (Stary 1979) pp.198-201
43
For Italic examples see: (Connolly 1981) pp. 94-96, 98 fig.3, 99-100 fig.4,5,7, 103; 119-120; (Hubert 2006) p.92; (Salmon
1967) pp.106-107; (Stary 1979) p.192, fig3, 197, pl.20
For Carthaginian examples see: (Connolly 1981) p.147; (Charles-Picard 1957) Pl. VI; (Salimbeti 2014) p.13, 21- 23, 36,58
44
(Aldrete 2013) p.166; (Burns 2003) p.73; (Burns 2006) pp.55-79, 253-257, 292-306; (Champion 2010)p.60; (Connolly
1981) p.98 fig.3, 99, 101 fig.9-14, 108 fig.1, 111; (Gelba 2012) pp.45-46, 48-55 fig.5.2 -5.10; pp.28, 34-35; (Hannah 1990)
p.272; (Salmon 1967) p.109; (Stary 1979) p.188-191 fig.4;
13
soldiers. This tactical unit would have then been able to facilitate extended skirmishes, but
could also compress in order to face melee combat if required.45 Corroborating
archaeological evidence from across the western Mediterranean supports this theory and
raises serious questions over the accuracy of the literary material and subsequent scholarly
application of the manipular reform occurring in the fourth century. For example, in Livy and
Polybius’ account of the First and Second Punic Wars, the majority of engagements appear to
have been minor skirmishes or raids, not grand and decisive set piece battles (Livy 22.9 9;
23.48; 23.46; 24.49; 25.32; 28.12.9; 29.36.4-12; 29.6; Polyb. 1.24.9; 1.25.6; 1.57.1-3).46 If the
general outlines of the events within these narratives are correct then it is possible that
skirmishing constituted the primary form of military encounter, and may have occurred
because soldiers were being utilized in a manner that best suited their equipment and
tactics. Furthermore, the physical weaponry attested in the archaeological record, when
viewed in conjunction with the lengthy duration of the three Samnite wars (343-341, 326304, 298-290) together with the first two Punic Wars (264-241; 218-202) and the extended
struggle between Agathocles and Carthage in Sicily and North Africa (311-307) suggests
that, although decisive melee encounters like Crimisus (341), Heraclea (280), and
Beneventum (275) could occur, extended skirmishes were likely the predominant form of
western Mediterranean military encounters in the fourth and third centuries.
As previously discussed, the majority of twentieth century Roman historians tended to place
the manipular reforms to sometime between 406-311.47 These reforms have been
traditionally associated with the standardization of infantry into the velites, hastati,
principes, and triarii, in addition to the division of the army into the triplex acies and
adoption of the quincunx (checkerboard) formation. However there are difficulties with
associating the manipular reforms with these dates. For example, it appears that the
Ineditum Vaticanum an anonymous work composed in the first century seemingly became
the template, upon which historians such as Livy, predicated their understanding of the early
Republican army (Livy 8.8).48 The work noted that before the Samnite wars the
45
(Koon 2011) p.83; (Quesada Sanz 2006) p.251; Lendon suggests this, but does not make it implicit: (Lendon 2005) p.172191
46
(Rawlings 2016)
47
(Delbruck 1990) pp.272-296; (Kromayer 1928a) pp.288-373; (Eckstein 2006) p.145; (Keppie 1998) pp.19-20; (Meyer
1924) pp.231-285; (Raaflaub 1996) p.297; Whilst this is implied by (Cornell 1995) p.354
48
Ineditum Vaticanum see: (von Arnim 1892) pp.119-122
14
Romans fought in a phalanx, and without the shanked javelin and oblong shield. This is
problematic for two major reasons; first archaeological evidence from Etruria and Latium
illustrates that the shanked javelin and oblong shield have been attested as far back as the
eighth century and begin to appear with an increased frequency after the Celtic incursions
of the fifth and early fourth centuries.49 This evidence likely suggests that some Roman or
Latin soldiers were utilizing the shanked javelin and the oblong shield before the outbreak of
the Samnite Wars. Second, it has been widely debated whether the Etruscans or the Romans
ever fought in a Greek styled phalanx.50 Consequently, if the Etruscan and Roman adherence
to a Greek styled hoplite phalanx can be disputed, on account of their social
structure and available archaeological evidence, then it is similarly plausible to dispute that
Carthaginian and Syracusan armies, who fielded large numbers of Celtic, Iberian, and Italic
troops and whom are not mentioned as fighting in phalanxes, did so as well.
1.4. Carthaginian, Roman, and Syracusan hegemony:
The nature of Carthaginian, Roman, and Syracusan hegemony played an important role in
the development of the western Mediterranean military koine. Although the precise forms
of Carthaginian, Roman, and Syracusan hegemony could vary, it remained in essence very
similar. For example, Roman hegemony usually revolved around the establishment of a
military alliance which gave Rome access to the manpower of its allies, but they retained
their local autonomy and civic institutions.51 Whilst, Carthaginian hegemony differed from
Roman in a number of ways; for example they imposed a financial tax on their allied
communities, colonies, and clients, the two systems appear to have shared certain
characteristics.52 Carthaginian power in western Sicily was exercised through the epikrateia
49
(Burns 2003) p.75; (Connolly 1981) 92, fig.14, p.96 fig.1-3,98 fig.9; (Stary 1979) p. 184 fig.3, 200-204 Pl. 26-27
(D'Agostino 1991) pp.59-82; (Harris 1990) p.508; (Momigliano 1963) p.119; (Rosenstein 2010) p.291, 294-300; (Smith
2006b) pp.286-290:
For an alternative view in which the Servian Roman army is postulated as fighting in two lines, one a true phalanx with the
other consisting of lightly armed troops armed with a variety of weapons and armour see: (Connolly 1981) p.95; (Saulnier
1980) pp.105-115
51
(Cornell 1995) p.349-352; 365 (Eckstein 2006) p.252; (Forsythe 2011) p.37; (Goldsworthy 2001) p.38; (Forsythe 2005)
p.308; (Pallottino 1991) p.144; (Lomas 2014) p.201; (Oakley 1993) p.33; (Sherwin-White 1980) pp.47-58,73; (WallaceHadrill 1989) p.74
52
(Dyson 2007) p.117; (Hoyos 2010) p.41
50
15
system, a Greek term for a self-governing territory.53 These communities, like Roman allies,
maintained their own civic administration and no Carthaginian official was appointed as a
provincial governor.54 Despite the lack of evidence to indicate how Carthage exercised her
hegemony over North Africa, it is highly probable that a similar civically and politically
unobtrusive system was applied.
A similar lack of evidence as to the nature of Syracusan influence over her fellow eastern
Sicilian communities unfortunately frustrates any direct comparisons with Carthaginian and
Roman hegemony. Although Syracusan tyrants frequently interfered with the demographics
of Sicilian communities through a combination of forced migration and the settlement of
mercenaries, it appears that Syracuse, like Carthage and Rome, did not exercise direct
control over the local governments or existing civic structures of Sicilian communities (Diod.
Sic. 11. 49, 72-8; 14 .15, 58, 78, 96; 20.71).55 Consequently, the common denominator in
Carthaginian and Roman hegemony, appears to have been that they were relatively ‘light
handed’, communities were given local autonomy and were not expected to conform to a
uniform language and set of customs (although adherence to a general set of laws appears
to have been utilized).56 This light handed extension of hegemony appears to have been
transferred to military service. For example, allied and mercenary units retained their own
unit commanders and were expected to equip themselves. Indeed, the Roman army of the
fourth century was a citizen militia in which individual soldiers were responsible for
equipping themselves, they fought in their own units with their own low-level commanders
and there is evidence to suggest that this was also true in Carthaginian and Syracusan
armies (Diod. Sic. 19.21.1; Dion. Hal. Ant. Rom. 4.16-21; Livy 1.43; 25.34; 37.5; Plut. Pyrrh.
16.10).57
As previously noted, a considerable number of the mercenaries in Carthaginian and
Syracusan armies were either Celtic or Italic. Consequently as the fourth century progressed
and Rome’s hegemony came to encompass the entire peninsula south of the Po Valley, a
large percentage of the potential manpower from these regions was incorporated into
53
(Ameling 2011) p.49; (Hoyos 2010) p.49
(Ameling 2011) p.51
55
(Lomas 2006) pp.98-100 tlb.7.1
56
(Ameling 2011)pp.47-51; (Bridoux 2014) p.186; (Cornell 1995) pp.295-297,349-352; (Eckstein 2006) pp.251-253;
(Forsythe 2005) p.308; (Hoyos 2010) p.49; (Lazenby 1996) p.24
57
(Bishop 2006) p.65; (Drogula 2015) p.27; (Drummond 1989) p.107; (Eckstein 2006) p.254; (Goldsworthy 2001) p.34;
(Rawlings 2007b) p.52, 58; (Rich 2011) p.17; (Rosenstein 2005) p.29; (Scullard 1990) p.495
54
16
Roman armies. It is difficult to imagine that these soldiers, be they former or future
mercenaries, would immediately abandon their existing military equipment and fight
according to a strict Roman panoply and it appears a similar model can be also applied to
those who fought in the Carthaginian or Syracusan armies.58 Thus, the traditional model of
Roman military exceptionalism appears open to further investigation. However, before this
investigation can proceed the reliability of both the archaeological and literary evidence
requires analysis in order to address and qualify their problematic nature.
Chapter Two: The Sources.
2.1. The lost fourth century Historians of the western Mediterranean:
The literary evidence for the western Mediterranean during from the fifth to third centuries
is problematic. Firstly, there are no surviving Carthaginian, Celtic, Celtiberian, or Iberian
literary accounts to counter the Greek or Roman-centric works of Diodorus Siculus, Livy,
Plutarch, or Polybius. Without this evidence there are no alternate perspectives of their
political and military systems. Indeed, apart from Aristotle’s and Polybius’ brief descriptions
of the Carthaginian political system there is little else to go by (Arist. Pol.1272b-1273b;
Polyb.51). Moreover, Aristotle likely gathered this information second hand and Polybius
does not discuss it in any real detail. Furthermore, there are no Carthaginian sources
detailing their military system and as such the main source of literary evidence on this
subject between the fifth and third centuries appears in the works of Diodorus Siculus, Livy,
and Polybius. Secondly, whilst there were a number of contemporary Greek and Sicilian
historians such as; Ephorus of Cyme, Philistus of Syracuse, Philinus of Agrigentum, and
Timeaus of Tauromenium who paid attention to the western Mediterranean, their original
works exists only in fragments.59 However, these works appear to have become the sources
for later writers, whose works now constitute the major literary sources for the period
covered in this thesis.60 Finally, native Roman historiography only began during the later
58
(Burns 2006) pp.232-246
For Ephorus see: (Parker 2016); For Philistus see:(Pownall 2016); For Philinus see: (Champion 2016a)For Timaeus see:
(Champion 2016b)
60
(Baron 2013) p,52,57-59, 63; (Champion 2011) p99; (Davidson 2009) p.123; (Dillery 2009) p.79; (Gabba 1991) p.62;
(Goldsworthy 2001) p.22; (Hoyos 2007) p.263; (Mineo 2011)p.118; (Lazenby 1996) pp.2-3; (Rhodes 2007) pp.61-62; p.13;
(Stylianou 1998); (Scardigli 1995) p.9, 62, 62, 64; (Von Wilamowitz-Moellendorf, 1995 #293) pp.67-68; (Walbank 1957) p.27
59
17
years of the third century with Fabius Pictor, although it is possible that Rome may have
featured a historical consciousness previously.61 Although some Greek historians did record
a small amount of the history of the Italic peoples, it appears to have remained sparse in
comparison to their treatment of Greece, Sicily, and the eastern Mediterranean.62
Consequently, before the accuracy of the major surviving literary sources can be evaluated,
the reliability of their sources they used requires inspection.
Timaeus:
Timaeus was a Sicilian exile and a contemporary of Agathocles and it appears that his work
chronicling western Mediterranean events down to 289, particularly those in North Africa,
Sicily, and to a lesser extent Italy, was widely utilized by later historians, particularly
Diodorus Siculus, Plutarch, and Polybius even though he is subjected to criticism (Diod. Sic.
13.90.6-7; Polyb. 12.2-28a ).63 Polybius in particular was very scathing of his methods as he
appears to have not interviewed people first hand, but gathered his evidence from books
(Polyb. 12.25e.26-28). Whilst Timaeus seems to have carried an inherent bias against
Agathocles, who forced him into exile, he remained a first- hand witness to the tyrants rise
to power and as an aristocratic Sicilian (albeit writing in Athens) was likely to have been well
informed of the events surrounding the on-going Carthaginian and Syracusan conflict (Plut.
De exil. 14.605C; Polyb. 12.25h.1, d.1).64 Indeed, Timeaus appears to have been the primary
source for Plutarch’s life of Timoleon and Diodorus’ account of the western Mediterranean
between the fifth and third centuries.65 Regardless of later historians’ misgivings towards
Timeaus, he also appears to have constituted the dominant literary source for Polybius’
work in the years leading up the First Punic War (Polyb.1.5.1).66 Therefore, whilst Timeaus’
works may have carried some flaws, particularly in regard to foreign geography and the
nuances of military affairs, his widespread use by later historians suggests that his work was
otherwise viewed as generally useful.
61
(Bispham. E.H. & Cornell 2013b) p.161; (Oakley 1997) p.22; (Ungern-Sternberg 2011) p.119
(Gabba 1991) p.15; (Ungern-Sternberg 2011) p.122,126
63
(Baron 2013) p.18, 28-51; (Rhodes 2007) p.62; (Jacoby 1950) IIIb pp.539-46; (Pearson 1987) p.7; (Stylianou 1998) p.2, 52,
54, 62-65, 75;(Wilamowitz-Moellendorf 1995) p.67
64
(Champion) BNJ 556 T 4b; BNJ 566 T 4c; BNJ 667 4e
65
(Champion) BNJ 566 T 3b Commentary; (Stylianou 1998, Champion 2016b) pp.52-65
66
(Champion 2011) p.99; (Walbank 1957) p.27
62
18
Ephorus:
Ephorus appears to have been used frequently by Diodorus, Plutarch, and Polybius
(Polyb.5.33.2).67 Indeed it appears that he, along with Timaeus provided the two major
sources on the western Mediterranean between the fifth and third centuries, although
unlike Timaeus, many ancient historians praised Ephorus for his knowledge (Diod. Sic. 4.1.23; Joseph. Ap. 1.67; Polyb. 5.33.2; 6.45.1; 12.28.10; Strabo 1.1.1).68 Earlier modern scholars
such as Jacoby and Wilamowitz-Moellendorf have tended to treat Ephorus harshly, but
more recently Schepens and Parmigianni have argued for a softening of this view.69 It seems
as though Ephorus together with Theopompus of Chios adhered to a strict methodology
which targeted educated readers and set the platform for assembling historical
“compilations and summaries” like Plutarch.70 Although it does appear that Ephorus was not
at times as critical of his sources as he could have been, his accounts of military campaigns
appear to have been adequately reported.71 For example, Polybius praised his accounts of
the naval battles of Cnidus and Salamis (Cyprus) and Diodorus utilized his work regarding
the interactions between Dionysius I and Sparta (Diod. Sic. 14.10; 44.2; 70.1-3;
Polyb.12.25f).72 There are some chronological errors regarding events in Sicily, which may
reflect either Ephorus’ error, or as appears more likely, be a result of Diodorus failure to
revise his own work in which his chronology frequently errs.73 Furthermore, Ephorus’ could
be prone to exaggerating army and navy casualties and strengths, particularly when dealing
with non-Greeks.74 For example, his numbers of the Carthaginian invasion force of Sicily
(409) numbered 200,000, which is double that given by Timeaus, whose numbers are
generally accepted as more creditable (Diod. Sic. 13.54.5).75 On the whole however, such
discrepancies should be considered separately to the general events of his narrative, which
67
(Rhodes 2007) pp.61-62; (Scardigli 1995) p.14; (Stylianou 1998) p.52,62,75,80,84, 129
(Parker) BNJ T1 14A, BNJ 70 T13, BNJ 70 T8; (Pearson 1987) pp.34-35; (Stylianou 1998) p.123
69
(Jacoby 1950) IIA 70, IIC pp.23-30; (Luraghi 2014) p.147; (Parmeggiani 1999) pp.111-115; (Schepens 1977) pp.106-110;
(Tully 2014) p.153; (Wilamowitz-Moellendorf 1908) p.10
70
(Gabba 1991) p.62; (Scardigli 1995) p.13
71
(Stylianou 1998) p.121,124-132
72
(Stylianou 1998) p.125
73
(Stylianou 1998) pp.136-137
74
(Parker) BNJ 70 F 201 Commentary
75
(Parker) BNJ 70 F 201; (Stylianou 1998) p.62
68
19
was unlikely to have been so widely employed and praised if it was considered substandard.76
Philistus:
Philistus was a native of Syracuse and also a contemporary of Dionysius I, and a close
confidant of the Dionysius II who wrote a history of Sicily, the Sikelika (Cic. De or. 2.57; Dion.
Hal. Pomp. 11.5.1; Diod. Sic. 13.91.4).77 He was also entrusted with commanding the fleet
during Dionysius II’s struggle with Dion and thus it appears likely that his work deemed
sufficiently creditable to be utilized by Plutarch for his works on Dion and Timoleon (Diod.
Sic. 16.11.3, 16.1-4; Plut Dion 25.2, 35.3-4).78 Additionally he probably provided the
evidence for Campanian mercenaries in Sicily, which in turn appears to have been used by
Ephorus and Timeaus, both of whom Diodorus later drew upon (Diod. Sic. 13.44.1; 13.62.5;
13.80.4).79 Whilst ancient historians were somewhat divided over Philistus’ precise worth as
a historian due to his compositional style, support of tyranny and his failure to record
military numbers, it does appear that on the whole he was regarded as a fairly reliable
historian.80 His close proximity to Dionysius I and II as well as his direct involvement in
Syracusan affairs likely rendered him a reasonably accurate source regarding events in Sicily
during the late fourth to mid-third century (Diod. Sic.15.89.3; Plut. Nikias 19.5).
Fabius Pictor:
Fabius Pictor was the first Roman historian and composed his work in the late third
century.81 He was a member of the prominent Roman gens, the Fabii, whose ancestors
included M. Fabius Maximus Rullianus a “hero” of the Samnite wars, whilst he himself
76
(Stylianou 1998) p.129
(Pearson 1987) p.79 (Pownall) BNJ 556 T 3 Commentary & Biographical Essay; (Rhodes 2007) p.62; (Scardigli 1995) p.13
78
(Gabba 1991) p.62;(Jacoby 1950) IIIB 556; (Pownall) BNJ 556 T 9c Commentary; (Scardigli 1995) p.13;
79
(Stylianou 1998) p.62
80
For the debate amongst Philistus value amongst ancient historians see: Cic, QFr. 2.11.4 BNJ 556 T 17a; Dion. Hal. De imit.
9.3.4–8 BNJ 556 T 16a; Pomp. 5.4 BNJ 556 F 5, also see Commentary; Dion. Hal., Pomp. 11.4.1–5.6 BNJ 556 T 16b; Plut. De
Herod. 3.855c BNJ 556 T 13b; Quint. Inst. 10.1.74–75 BNJ 556 T 15 c; Theon, Progymnasmata 80.30-32 BNJ 556 T 20b; All
quoted from (Pownall);(Pearson 1987) pp.24-25
81
(Bispham. E.H. & Cornell 2013b) p.161; (Cornell 1995) p.5; (Oakley 1997) p.22; (Ungern-Sternberg 2011) p.119
77
20
reportedly fought at Telamon (Etrop. 3.5; Oros. 4.13.6).82 Thus, Pictor likely conveyed within
his works some degree of accuracy in regards to Rome’s military operations during the
fourth century and third centuries. Pictor would also have had access to his family’s oral
histories which, although they held potential distortions, provided the broad outlines of
events such as victories and names of generals.83 Additionally, he likely had access to the
Annales Maximi, the priestly records which recorded key public events and the names of
magistrates which provided a base of evidence that was unlikely to have been contaminated
for later historians to draw upon such as Polybius and Livy.84 Indeed, Polybius stated that
Pictor and Philinus of Agrigentum provided the best accounts for the years immediately
leading up to the First Punic war and that they were also likely to have formed the basis of
Diodorus’ now fragmentary account of the period (Polyb. 1.14-15).85
Summary:
Therefore, it is likely that the basis of evidence for the later historians, whose accounts now
constitute the most coherent works regarding the western Mediterranean between the fifth
and third centuries, were at times generally useful, particularly in regard to the broad
outline of events and the heterogeneous composition of the armies fighting in North Africa
and Syracuse. As useful as these works appear, it is important to now analyse the later
historians and how diligently they themselves used this information.
2.2. Surviving Sources:
Polybius:
Polybius wrote his histories in the first half of the second century and provides the fullest
description of the Roman military system during the middle Republic (Polyb. 6.19-42).86
While Polybius composed his work close enough to the Second Punic War to have been able
82
(Bispham. E.H. & Cornell 2013a) p.33
(Mineo 2011) p.111
84
(Bispham. E.H. & Cornell 2013b) p.161-163, 169 (Rich 2013a) p.142-158
85
(Dillery 2009) p.79; (Rich 2013b) p.114; (Stylianou 1998) p.9
86
(Astin 2008) pp.3-4; (Champion 2011) p.96; (Goldsworthy 2001) p.20; (Hoyos 2015) pp.281-282
83
21
to speak with its participants, he would have had to rely on second hand evidence for the
period 350-264. It appears that while Polybius utilized generally reliable sources for this
such as Ephorus, Philinus, Pictor, and Timeaus, he was not shy of criticising them where he
felt they fell short of his own standards, (something he did not always live up to himself),
but which included a heavy reliance on direct inquiry (Polyb.12.2-28a; 12.4c.7-8).87 Indeed,
as mentioned he was scathing of Timeaus and dismissed Ephorus’ account of the battle of
Mantinea as illogical, which as a former hipparchus for the Achaean League, was quite
possibly correct (Polyb. 12.25.3-5).88
Polybius focused his work from 264 onwards and consequently the first-hand interviews he
conducted and geographical sightseeing are of marginal importance when investigating the
fourth century (Polyb. 3.33.34-43, 56.1-12; 12.4c.7-8). Despite this, as previously stated,
military technology developed slowly in the western Mediterranean particularly between
the fifth and second centuries. Thus, some aspects of Polybius’ accounts of Carthage, Rome,
and Syracuse’s military forces from the mid-third to mid-second centuries may be applicable
to the fourth century (although this thesis will argue his description of the manipular legion
for this period is anachronistic) (Polyb. 6.19-42). Therefore, Polybius can be considered a
fairly reliable source of evidence from the later third century onwards in regard to military
matters, but less so before then. Additionally, his close association to the Scipiones who
were at the forefront of Roman politics and military operations during the Punic Wars
renders him a competent source from which to draw a picture of Rome’s political structure
and how it operated.89 Consequently, while Polybius’ work did not cover the years 350-264,
his generally diligent methodology (albeit self-reported), combined with the slow
development of military equipment and tactics in addition his proximity to the Roman
political system renders his work valuable (although not above suspicion at times) for this
investigation.
87
(Champion 2011) p.99; (Davidson 2009) p.123; (Dillery 2009) p.79; (Schepens 2007) p.51; (Stylianou 1998) p.2, 123-124;
(Walbank 1957) p.13, 27, 33
88
(Rawson 1971) p. 13;(Stylianou 1998) p.124; (Walbank 1957) p.13,28
89
(Champion 2011) p.96, 101; (Walbank 1957) p.31,32
22
Diodorus Siculus:
Diodorus Siculus was a first century historian whose Bibliotheca Historica constitutes the
most complete surviving narrative account of the western Mediterranean down to the end
of the fourth century, but unfortunately, his work survives only in fragments thereafter.
Consequently, Diodorus remains the major source for Carthaginian and Syracusan affairs.
Indeed, as previously discussed, it appears that a large amount of Diodorus narrative on
Sicilian affairs was derived from either Timeaus, or Ephorus (at times possibly both), and
Philistus.90
However, Diodorus’ work remains problematic for several reasons. First, it has been argued
that he did not revise his work, nor did he correct the errors that he apparently was aware
of.91 Second, he is very brief with his accounts of events and, although he at times makes
this clear to the reader, it is likely that this tendency to truncate evidence led to his accuracy
being variable (Diod. Sic. 13.104.8; 15.1.5.3).92 Oakley reasonably argued, that due to his
brevity in comparison to Livy, Diodorus omitted many details and is often confused which
leads to many mistakes especially in regards to “chronological errors and the compression
of events.”93 Moreover, Lewis noted that due to this brevity his account of Dionysius I’s
struggle with Carthage is “inadequate.”94 Finally, in a similar manner to Livy, Diodorus
appears to have been more concerned with conveying the moral lesson or entertainment
value of events rather than strict adherence to detail.95 This resulted in very repetitive
accounts of military encounters, which like Livy renders him a dubious source for the
nuanced details of military development.96 Therefore, whilst Diodorus’ work remains
problematic, it is the only comprehensive surviving account of the western Mediterranean
covering the fifth and fourth centuries, it thus useful as a guide to the broad outline of
events and historical figures.
90
(Lewis 1994) p.121,123; (Rhodes 2007) pp.61-62; (Stylianou 1998) p.2,9, 52-58, 62-65, 84, 129
(Stylianou 1998) p.2
92
(Lewis 1994) p.120-121; (Stylianou 1998) p.80
93
Oakley p.108; (Stylianou 1998) p.80
94
(Lewis 1994) p.153
95
(Stylianou 1998) p.15
96
(Stylianou 1998) p.15
91
23
Livy:
Livy’s annalistic and at times anachronistic account of Rome and Italy in his books VI-X
remains the only continuous surviving source pertaining to the events of the Italian
peninsula for the fourth century.97 However, Livy’s work during this period is very
problematic, particularly in regards to his description of military equipment, tactics and
battle narratives.98 Indeed, P.G. Walsh argued that Livy illustrates “ignorance over military
matters” particularly in regard to military equipment, although this view is not held by all.99
However there are clear examples where Walsh’s statement is validated. For example, Livy
described the Samnite shield as having broad shoulders tapering towards the bottom, which
is at odds with those found in the archaeological record and it appears that he is describing
the Samnite gladiators’ shield of the first century A.D (Livy 9.40.2-3).100 Additionally, Livy’s
description of the manipular legion is highly likely to have been an anachronistic, designed in
part to illustrate Roman exceptionalism and consequently “very little of which, if any at
all, can be accepted as historical” (Livy 8.8-9). 101 His description of the Samnite linen legion
as being equipped with shields and scabbards inlaid or lined with gold and silver is almost
certainly fanciful (Livy 9.40.3-5).102 Accordingly, Burns argued in his comprehensive
investigation into southern Italy military equipment that “only a few items were inlaid with
silver and none with gold.”103 Yet, in the same passage Livy describes the Samnites as
wearing a spongia and crested helmets, which are both frequently attested in the
archaeological record and thus appear creditable (Livy 9.40.3). These attestable aspects
however do not appear frequently in Livy’s work regarding the fourth century and
consequently when regarding the finer details of military matters he requires the utmost
caution. When Livy’s narrative resumes in books XXI-XXX it is likely that Polybius constituted
a major source so there may be a core portion of reliable information imbedded within his
narrative pertaining to general military affairs, but it is unknown how strictly he followed
Polybius in this field.104
97
(Forsythe 1999) p.12
(Oakley 1997) p.33; (Walsh 1961) p.197, 279-281
99
(Koon 2010) pp.24-26; (Walsh 1961) p.197;
100
(Salmon 1967) p.103, 105
101
(Forsythe 2005) p.68; (Oakley 1997) p.75,85
102
(Burns 2006) p.31; (Salmon 1967) pp.102-105
103
(Walsh 1961) pp.110-111, 119-122, 143-153
104
(Briscoe 2013)p.85-87; (Miles 1997) p.9
98
24
The value in Livy’s work for this investigation is that he heavily relied on the Annales Maximi
and the fasti triumphales which allowed him to produce a generally reliable outline of
Roman events during the fourth century.105 These sources of information included the
names of major magistracies, who commanded which Legion, as well as information on the
outcomes of battles, in addition to laws, treaties and triumphs, which due to the
competition between Roman families were unlikely to have been perverted.106 However,
Livy’s use of these sources is contested by Walsh.107 Furthermore, it must be noted that Livy
also drew upon familial histories that he himself admits were notoriously pitted with
misinformation which tended to take the form of exaggerations and misappropriations of
their ancestors achievements (Cic. Brut. 62; Livy 8.40.1-6).108 In conclusion the raw data
outlining the major events of the fourth century transferred to Livy by the Annales Maximi
and Fasti appear generally credible. However the remainder of Livy’s narrative, particularly
in regard to military matters must be approached with a great sense of scepticism.109
Plutarch:
Plutarch differs from the majority of the ancient writers utilized in this thesis in that he was a
biographer rather than a historian (Plut. Alex. 1.2-3).110 Although, Plutarch’s Lives were
intended as moralizing and ethical works, which often resulted in them focusing on the
personal details of characters at cost to the length of the historical narrative, he read widely,
utilized multiple sources and applied a generally good sense of critical awareness.111
Consequently, Plutarch’s intentions should not detract from him being viewed as a
conscientious biographer and generally historically reliable.112 Therefore, his works on Dion,
Pyrrhus, and Timoleon are of value to this investigation, particularly as comparative
reference points for Diodorus’ account of their lives. This is important as Plutarch appears to
have employed similar sources as Diodorus, namely Ephorus, Philistus, and Timeaus for his
105
(Cornell 1995) p.100; (Oakley 1997) p.38, 72, 96, 100; (Salmon 1967) p.6; (Walsh 1961) p.280
(Astin 2008) p.10; p.14(Cornell 1995); (Goldsworthy 2001) p.22; (Hoyos 2015) p.285; (Koon 2010) p.28; (Oakley 1997)
p.24,31, 38; (Salmon 1967) p.6, 103-105; (Walsh 1961) p.110-112, 277
107
(Walsh 1961) p.110-111, 119-122
108
(Astin 2008) p.8; (Goldsworthy 2001) p.22; (Oakley 1997) p.67; (Walsh 1961) p.112
109
(Astin 2008) p.10; (Oakley 1997) p. 24, 33, 100;
110
(Mehl 2011) p.185; (Schettino 2013) p.417
111
(der Stockt 2013) p.323, 328 (Nikolaidis 2013) p.353; (Pelling 1995) p.143, 151; (Rhodes 2007) p.65; (Schettino 2013)
p.417-418.
112
(Scardigli 1995) p.2; (Schettino 2013) p.417
106
25
works on Dion and Timoleon.113 Thus, where Plutarch’s and Diodorus’ narratives converge,
it may be reasonably assumed to be as reliably relayed evidence from Timaeus or Philistus.
Plutarch also produced an account of the life of Camillus, but as previously discussed there
were no contemporary Roman accounts from which he could draw upon and as such
Dionysius of Halicarnassus and Livy appear to have constituted the major sources for this
work.114 Thus, like his use of Ephorus and Timaeus for Sicilian events, it is probable that his
Roman battle narratives are not wholly accurate outside of who won and the death of major
figures. In conclusion, whilst his military narratives between 350-264 are questionable,
particularly in regard to military equipment and tactics, Plutarch like the previously
discussed historians, appears to be at times generally useful (but not totally infallible) when
recording the broad strokes of the major events pertaining to the years 350-264.
2.3. Summary:
Whilst the literary evidence is problematic and requires a cautious approach, especially in
regard to the small and nuanced details of military equipment and tactics, it can be relied
upon to present a generally accurate picture regarding the broad outline of events, names,
places, and eventual outcomes such as the Carthaginian defeat at the battle of Crimisus or
Himera. That said, figures are often exaggerated and impossible to definitively discern
especially in regard to Greek accounts of non-Greek forces which were frequently
exaggerated.115
Moreover, the detailed battle narratives, and at times the description of military equipment
should be viewed with the utmost suspicion and cannot be utilized without rigid
justification. There were few ancient historians that actually fought in the battles examined
throughout this thesis and it is unlikely that the battle narratives that included speeches,
individual acts of valour, and battle tactics alongside other minor details such as the length
of battles were accurately portrayed. Indeed, it is hard to see that the majority of battle
descriptions were accurate outside of the general outline of events such as who won,
whether the battle was hard fought and the deaths of notable figures. Furthermore, it
113
(Pelling 1995) p.151; (Scardigli 1995) p.13; (Schettino 2013) p.420, 422; (Wilamowitz-Moellendorf 1995) p.67
(Schettino 2013) p.422
115
(Parker) BNJ 70 F 201 Commentary; (Stylianou 1998) p.130
114
26
would be difficult even for those writers who were present at such battles namely Philistus,
to have had absolute clarity over the entirety of events as they unfolded on the battlefield.
Indeed, once the battle started the soldiers fighting in their units would likely have had a
very myopic experience of events.
With regards to the political accounts of the period, the lack of indigenous Carthaginian
literature renders any account of their political system and extension of hegemony difficult
to precisely quantify. Indeed, as previously discussed, the most detailed description was
composed by Aristotle who constructed his account from secondary evidence and appears
to have drawn parallels with Greek political institutions in order to better explain or
understand Carthaginian political entities. For example, his comparison of the Carthaginian
council of 104 with the Spartan gerousia may not have been totally accurate (Arist.
Pol.1272b). Furthermore Polybius, who provides the other major (albiet brief) account of
Carthaginian politics, noted the differences with that of Rome, yet upon closer inspection
they appear remarkably similar (Polyb. 6.11-18, 51-6). Thus, one must be aware of the
literary biases at work within many Greek and Roman historians that sought to stress a
sense of the ‘Other’ when describing foreign peoples which may or may not have been
accurate. On the other hand there is a useful source of information pertaining to Roman and
Syracusan politics, although it too is not without its own biases and flaws.
Furthermore, although at times the literary evidence appears to be corroborated by
archaeological discoveries, this too has the potential to be misleading. For example, the
Roman military equipment described by Polybius writing in the second century appears
remarkably similar to the previously discussed equipment found in in the fourth century
(Polyb. 6.22-23). This then suggests a relatively slow evolution and as such may be an
accurate description of Italic weaponry. However, this too cannot be wholeheartedly
applied to all descriptions of weaponry. Diodorus and Polybius described the swords of the
Celts at Telamon as long slashing swords, which evidence suggest only entered the
archaeological record around c.225 and were unlikely to have been widely utilized, if at all,
at this time (Diod. Sic. 5.30.3; Polyb. 2.29-33).116 Moreover, the literary tradition records
that the Romans adopted the oblong shield and pilum sometime during the second Samnite
war, yet archaeological evidence suggests that they had been present in Etruria and Latium
116
(Connolly 1981) pp.115-116 fig.1-12; (Hubert 2006). pp.89-90,128
27
from the eighth and sixth century respectively (Diod. Sic. 23.2; Livy 8.8).117 Indeed, ancient
historian’s descriptions of military equipment can often be anachronistic or fancifully
inaccurate. For example, Livy’s description of the Samnite linen legion and the Samnite
shield (Livy 9.40.2-5). Consequently, inaccuracies such these require the literary evidence to
be approached diligently.
2.4. Archaeological Evidence:
Physical examples of military equipment are extremely beneficial as they constitute “direct
and uncontaminated” evidence, however despite this value, it too must be approached with
caution as it is representative of long term trends and is potentially “too clumsy” to reveal
the nuances of development.118 It is important to recognise that a healthy percentage of the
physical and iconographic evidence utilized in this thesis, dates both one century either side
of the fourth and third centuries. However, remarkably similar evidence from across the
western Mediterranean indicates a slow rate of development regarding military technology.
For example, a shanked javelin found in Latium from the eight century is remarkably similar
the fourth century examples from Montefortino as a well as the third century examples
discovered at Castelruf and Numantia.119 This slow rate of development can also be seen in
the oblong shield which appears to have remained largely unchanged from the eight century
until sometime during the first century where it becomes curved.120 Consequently, military
equipment discovered in both fifth and second century contexts were likely to have been
similar to that in use during the fourth and third centuries.
Military equipment found in funerary contexts must also be approached with caution,
because it is largely representative of the equipment used by the upper levels of society and
thus may not necessarily represent the arms and armour employed by the lower levels of
society who could rarely afford to be buried with their weaponry.121 For example, the
complete panoplies discovered at Lanuvium and Vulci and Tomb 43 at Narce in Etruria were
117
Ineditum Vaticanum see: (von Arnim 1892) pp.119-122; For oblong shields in early Etruscan & Latin contexts see:
(Connolly 1981) p.63; (Stary 1979) p. 183 fig 3 187; For shanked javelins in early Etruscan & Latin contexts see: p. 92. Fig 14,
98 fig.9, 100 fig.8
118
(Goldsworthy 2001) p.19; (Holloway 1991) p.11
119
(Bishop 2006) p.51 fig5, 52
120
(Bishop 2006) p65,.91; (Stary 1979) p.184 fig.3; (Tomcazk 2012) p.56 fig.9, 57 fig.10
121
(Burns 2006) p.50
28
likely to have been very expensive.122 Thus, there is ample evidence to suggest that while
some wealthy soldiers, could and did go into battle similarly armed to classical Greek
hoplites, it may not have been worn by all wealthy soldiers and some apparently opted to
fight with other forms of cuirasses.123 Moreover, examples of equipment such as the bronze
cuirass discovered in tomb 43 at Nacre has been argued by Spivey and Stottard as never
being intended for battlefield use rather it was constructed for “conspicuous display.”124
Consequently, some military equipment derived from funerary contexts appears to have
been decorative or ceremonial and therefore has the potential to distort the interpretation
of what exactly was functional military equipment.
The financial investment in military equipment also likely resulted in a large percentage of
equipment being re-used inter generationally and as such was potentially not deposited in a
funerary context. Consequently, although there is a useful corpus of military equipment
deposited in funerary contexts, particularly in the Italian peninsula, this evidence may not
necessarily reflect the arms and armour utilized by the large majority of troops. However,
this should not prevent the use of the cuirasses, helmets, javelins, shields, spearheads, and
swords attested in the archaeological record contributing to the study of military equipment
as some of it may represent actual battlefield equipment.
Artistic representations of military equipment also constitute an important basis of
archaeological evidence and can be distilled largely into two groups which are not without
their own interpretational difficulties. This evidence is largely from a number of Italic tomb
paintings and provides evidence of a wide range of military equipment in use over a range
of Italic communities such as; The Françios tomb (Vulci), the Amazon Sarcophagus, the
Tomba del Orco II, Giglioli tomb (Tarquinia), Falerii Veteres (Falerii), and Paestum
(Lucania).125 These tombs provide a wealth of pictorial evidence on Italic infantry and
cavalry equipped with various combinations of cuirasses, helmets, javelins, spears, and
swords.
122
(Connolly 1981) pp.96-112
(Connolly 1981) p.97 fig.1-2, 98 fig.14, 99-100 fig.4, 101 fig.9-14, 108 fig.1-10, 109, 108 fig.1,8, 111; (Burns 2006) p.56108, 292-321; (Salimbeti 2014) p.28,32-35, 58; (Schneider-Herrmann 1996) Pl.3, 5, 10, 21-23, 67, 69, 70a-b, 72-75, 81a-b
124
(Spivey 1990) p.129
125
(Briguet 1986) p.162 fig. 96 (Connolly 1981)p.97,105; (Burns 2006) p.335, fig3-5, 345 fig1-3, 399 fig.5, 371-377; (Gelba
2012) p.50 fig.52-.4, 51 fig 5.5-6, 52 fig 5.7, 55’ (Pedley 1990) p.102-105
123
29
Moreover, tomb and vase paintings together with cinerary runs and reliefs importantly
illustrate images of military equipment that have not survived due to the perishable
material used in their construction, such as the linothorax and the amentum, a leather
throwing thong.126 Although these paintings appear only in wealthy tombs that again predate the third century, the depiction of equipment and the techniques in which they were
used are unlikely to have differed during the period covered by this thesis.
Further evidence of military equipment can also be found depicted on a variety of artistic
wares and monuments, particularly in the Italian peninsula and North Africa. For example, a
number of vases depicting military equipment have been found in Italy and Gisela
Schneider-Herrmann’s work pertaining to the Samnites is of immense value in this regard.127
Whilst the majority of what little evidence pertaining to Carthaginian military equipment
appears on stone reliefs such as those found at Chemtou and Kbour-Clib.128
Chapter Three: Carthage
3.1. Overview
By 350, Carthage had been the greatest economic and hegemonic power in the western
Mediterranean for the previous two centuries. Its sphere of influence stretched across the
North African coast from the Altars of the Philaeni to the Straits of Gibraltar and into the
Atlantic seaboard of Morocco (Sal. Iug. 19).129 In North Africa its hegemony appears to have
been maintained through a combination of allied communities, colonies, and trading posts
that appeared to have varying legal rights in addition to differing military and financial
obligations to Carthage herself.
In southern Spain, Carthage inherited the former Phoenician trading posts and colonies
(Aldbera, Gades, Malaca) and subsequently conquered the indigenous kingdom of
Tartessus, which brought control over the lucrative tin route that passed through the Straits
126
(Aldrete 2013) p.28, 167; (Briguet 1986) p.93, 118-119 fig.32-34, 120-121 fig. 36-37, 162 fig.96; (Burns 2006) pp.103-108,
178-179, 331, 351; (Connolly 1981) p.99,100 fig.5,7, 105; (Gardiner 1907) p.253, 255 fig.3, 261 fig.7;(Gelba 2012) p.46,4849, 50 fig5.2-4, 51 fig.5.6, 52 fig. 5.7, 53 fig.58, 59; (Salimbeti 2014) p.22, 28, 35, 58; (Schneider-Herrmann 1996) Pl.5, 15,
52, 199
127
(Schneider-Herrmann 1996)
128
(Connolly 1981) p.147; (Salimbeti 2014) p.21, 22,28,36, 58
129
(Bridoux 2014) pp.180-183; (Lazenby 1996) p.24; (Papi 2014) p.202; (Quinn 2014) pp.169-179;
30
of Gibraltar all the way up to Brittany and Cornwall, as well as the vast agricultural and
mineral wealth of the Baetis valley.130 A mixture of allied communities, colonies, military
garrisons, and trading posts further extended Carthaginian influence over a network of
islands, namely the Balearic Islands (Ibiza), Corsica (Aleria), Malta (Tas Silġ), Sardinia (Caralis,
Nora, Olbia, Tharros), and western Sicily (Drepana, Lilybaeum, Panormus, Motya) to the river
Halycus.131 These islands provided crucial staging points for Carthaginian maritime trade,
in addition to an abundance of agricultural, mineral, and manpower resources. Thus,
it appears that Carthaginian hegemony played a major factor in the inter-connectivity of the
southern regions of the western Mediterranean, which as this thesis will demonstrate
helped to facilitate the development of a shared military koine.
However, the extent of Carthaginian hegemony has been increasingly questioned and the
traditional model of Carthaginian imperialism has begun to be reassessed in favour of a
more nuanced form of influence that in many places, despite the appearance of
Carthaginian styled buildings, inscriptions, and material goods, may have merely meant a
common commercial and material koine.132
Although, as this thesis will illustrate, Carthaginian, Roman, and to a lesser extend Syracusan
hegemony operated in largely similar ways, there were nuanced differences that reflected
the mercantile and martial ambitions of Carthage and Rome in particular. For example,
Carthage appears to have been largely focused on the extraction of financial revenues and
trading rights from the communities within its sphere of influence, whilst Rome preferred to
extract the military manpower of its allies. That is not to say that Carthage did not utilize the
manpower of its allies, for indeed it did, but apart from the Libyphoenicians, and Numidians,
who appear to have been obligated to provide troops through the varying terms of their
relationships, Carthage preferred to access the manpower of its allies by recruiting
mercenaries from within their territory. This appears remarkably similar to the agreement
between Syracuse and Sparta which granted the Dionysius I and his son Dionysius II the right
(possibly exclusively with regards to the western Mediterranean) to recruit mercenaries
from the Peloponnese (Diod. Sic. 14.44.3, 58.1, 62.1; 16.17.3).
130
(Hoyos 2015) p.15; (Horden 2000) p, 134, 349; (Scullard 1989) p.17,19-20; (Scullard 1990)
(Hoyos 2015) p.16; (Scullard 1989) p.19-20
132
(Bridoux 2014) pp.180-202; (Papi 2014) pp.202-219; (Roppa 2014) pp.257-282; (Wallace-Hadrill 2014) pp.302-304;
(Whittaker 1978) p.60
131
31
Literary evidence suggests that, following the rise of Dionysius the elder in Syracuse (405367), warfare between Carthage and Syracuse became endemic throughout much of the
fourth century (Diod. Sic. 13.43-63, 79.8-90; 14.41-78, 95-96; 16.67-84; 19.102-110; 20.3-18;
Plut. Tim. 17-34). It is in Sicily that Carthage appears to have focused the majority of its
military efforts, and as such the Sicilian theatre of war became a major factor in the
development of a western Mediterranean military koine. During these conflicts both
Carthage and Syracuse readily employed Iberian, Celtiberian, Italic, and Greek mercenaries,
in addition to Balearic Islanders, Carthaginian citizens, Libyans, Libyphoenicians, Numidians,
and Sardinians. Consequently, the frequency with which Carthage brought together allied
and mercenary soldiers from across the western Mediterranean played a pivotal role in the
development of the western Mediterranean military koine.
3.2. The Carthaginian State: Extension of Hegemony and Political Structure:
In order to illustrate the similarities between the Carthaginian, Roman, and Syracusan
military systems it is necessary to first understand how close their supposedly different
political systems and extension of hegemony appear to have been. The following section will
outline the Carthaginian political system and the way in which Carthage extended its
hegemony. Its intention is to illustrate how this did not radically differ from Rome and to a
lesser extent Syracuse. Furthermore, it will discuss how these political systems affected the
recruitment of soldiers together with the equipment and tactics with which they fought.
The surviving sources for the political structure of the Carthaginian state are few, and there
is no Carthaginian literature to provide direct uncontaminated evidence on their political
system. Instead, scholars are forced to rely on the Greek and Roman writers for detailed,
but problematic evidence, on how the Carthaginian governmental system functioned.
Aristotle provided the fullest description of Carthaginian politics, but the praise he extended
to their mixed constitution was derived from second hand information, which is of unknown
accuracy (Arist. Pol. 1272b-1273b).133 For example, Aristotle compared many Carthaginian
institutions to Greek ‘equivalents’ and gave them Greek names.134 The Carthaginian council
133
134
(Picard 1994) p.374
(Picard 1994) p.374
32
of 104 is compared to the ephors of Sparta, and Polybius commented that the council of 30
was populated by elders, which carries implications of being similar to the Spartan gerousia,
which was in fact a small council of elders (Arist. Pol. 1272b; Polyb. 10.18.1).
As previously noted the Carthaginian governmental system was portrayed as being a mixed
constitution, which Aristotle praised for being the perfect combination of monarchic,
aristocratic, and democratic institutions (Arist. Pol. 1272b-1273b; Polyb. 6.51-6). The
monarchic element came from the strong executive power of the suffetes, followed by the
Senate which acted as the deliberative council and represented the aristocratic element,
and finally a popular assembly that held elective and a few legislative rights which can be
attributed to democracy.135 Although in reality Carthage was controlled by an oligarchic
senate (Arist. Pol. 1273b).136 In this light the political systems of Carthage and Rome appear
markedly similar. The Carthaginian senate, like its Roman counterpart, (which will be
discussed in detail later) held power over foreign relations and can be seen as the decisive
element in the declaration of war in 218 (Livy 21.18-19; Poly 3.33.1-9).137 Under the suffetes
sat a council of one hundred and four judges, a smaller privy-like council of thirty and
somewhat mysterious councils of five, known as the pentarchies, existed along with a
senate of around 300 members who served for life, but the specific details of how they
obtained entrance into the senate are uncertain.138
The suffetes acted as the heads of state, and were elected annually, and, like the consuls in
Rome, they shared power in an attempt to diffuse any attempt by ambitious men to gain
total control of the state (Livy 30.7.5).139 However, the suffetes differed from Roman consuls
in that the office was completely divorced from having any military power.140 The
Carthaginians appointed their generals (Rab Mahanet/ “army head”) independently from the
civil administration of the state.141 Unlike the Roman consuls who commanded with civic
and military imperium for a term of one year, Carthaginian generals served for the duration
135
(Warmington 1969) p.139
(Lancel 1995) p.116; (Lazenby 1996) p.20
137
(Lazenby 1996) p.21;
138
(Lazenby 1996) p.21; (Scullard 1955) p.104; (Scullard 1990) p.491; (Warmington 1969) pp.140-141
139
(Ameling 2011) p.47
140
(Ameling 2011) p.48; (Lazenby 1996) p.20; (Warmington 1969) p.140
141
(Hoyos 2015) p.17; (Picard 1994) p.374
136
33
of the campaign.142 This was advantageous for Carthage in two ways; first by allowing their
generals to maintain constant command in the field it provided them with valuable
continued experience in leading troops, and second it allowed successful generals to be kept
distanced from the political structures of the state whilst in command.143
Carthage, like Rome and Syracuse was also equipped with the popular assembly (citizen
assembly). Membership of the popular assembly was probably, like in Rome, restricted to
male citizens that had reached a specific age, and as was the case with most Carthaginian
institutions, also included a certain financial qualification. However, as Hoyos stated,
“nothing is really known about the qualifications.”144 One of the major functions of the
popular assembly that is known is that like the Roman comitia centuriata the body had the
power to elect generals, or at least ratify their election.145 This appears to have been the
case when Hannibal obtained command of the army in Spain in 221 (Polyb. 3.13.7-12; Diod.
Sic. 25.8; Livy 21.3.4-5).
3.3 Carthaginian Hegemony:
By the end of fourth century Carthage, Rome, and Syracuse appear to have been the
dominant hegemonic powers in the western Mediterranean. As previously stated, the
extent of control that Carthage, in particular, was able to enforce through her hegemony
has increasingly been questioned, but what is apparent is that in its most basic form it
appears to have been merely a common commercial and cultural koine, whilst in other
regions they were able to extract troops and tribute (in various forms) from the communities
within their particular sphere of influence (Polyb. 3.33.8, 12-13; Sil. Pun. 3.
259).146 Therefore, it is important to examine the nuances of Carthaginian hegemony in
order to illustrate how this system enabled it to become the dominant power in the western
Mediterranean by the fourth century, and ultimately how this affected her ability to field
soldiers from across the region.
142
For Carthaginian commanders see: (Goldsworthy 2001) p.30,35; (Hoyos 2015) p.17; (Lazenby 1996) p.20; (Scullard 1990)
p.490; (Warmington 1969) p.142
For Roman commanders see: (Drogula 2015) p.14,56; (Eckstein 2006) p.181; (Keppie 1998) p. 19; (Rawlings 2007b) p.51
143
(Lazenby 1996) p.20
144
(Hoyos 2015) p.491
145
(Warmington 1969) p.119
146
(Bridoux 2014) pp.181-182, 200; (Papi 2014) pp.202-218; (Wallace-Hadrill 2014) pp.302-304
34
Carthage, like Rome, appears to have maintained her hegemony primarily through limited
state interference in local autonomy, economic unity, military levies, taxation (in various
forms), and adherence to a common set of laws. However, at her core, Carthage, unlike
Rome, did not seek to be an inclusive power as she was seemingly reluctant to extend
citizenship to the communities under her hegemony, and as her sphere of influence spread
over the western Mediterranean, it correspondingly did not increase her citizen body.147
The Carthaginian refusal to act as an inclusive state would prove costly during the wars with
Rome as she was unable to raise the large numbers of troops that Rome was able to.
Carthaginian citizens were exempt from paying taxes and from military service outside of
Africa; however, citizens could be levied into service if there was a threat.148 Conversely,
neighbouring Libyan and Libyphoenician communities appear to have been subjected to
similar conditions as Rome’s Italic allies. They were likely self-governing communities that
retained their own civic autonomy, and appeared to have had varying degrees of legal rights
according to their specific relationship with the city itself, and their own individual make up
whether it was a city, village, or tribe.149 These communities also appear to have had certain
obligations, such as military service or payment, either in direct taxes or in produce, which
reportedly could amount to between a third and half of their agricultural produce being sent
to Carthage.150 Furthermore, like Rome’s Italic allies they constituted the majority of
Carthage’s non-mercenary military manpower, and they were denied full citizen rights but
appear to have been afforded the same legal rights as citizens (Polyb. 7.9.5).151
The Libyphoenicians were a mixture of native Libyans and Carthaginian colonists and seem
to have modelled their governing bodies and officials on those at Carthage.152 Diodorus
records that the Libyphoenicians were also granted intermarriage rights with Carthaginian
citizens (Diod. Sic. 20.55.4). This appears likely as the Numidian elites also had intermarriage
rights with the Carthaginian aristocracy. For example, Sophonisba the daughter of Hasdrubal
was married to the Numidian prince Syphax, whilst the young cavalryman Naravas is also
147
(Goldsworthy 2001) p.29; (Lazenby 1996) p.25
(Hoyos 2010) p.144; (Lazenby 1996) p.25; (Scullard 1990) p.504
149
(Ameling 2011) p.47,48; (Lazenby 1996) p.24
150
(Ameling 2011) p.48; (Lazenby 1996) p.24
151
(Ameling 2011) p.48; (Hoyos 2010); (Hoyos 2015), p.15
152
(Lazenby 1996) p.24; (Jiménez 2014) pp.221-224
148
35
recorded as having some Carthaginian ancestry (Polyb. 1.78.1-4, 13.14-15, 29.23, 30.12.7;
Livy 29.29.12).153
Carthage’s hegemony over its communities in western Sicily was exercised through a system
known as epikrateia, a Greek term for a self-governing territory.154 The epikrateia was a
loose organizational instrument of Carthaginian control; it was not a permanently defined or
unified territory, nor was it unified in its administration or ethnic composition.155 The
communities of the epikrateia, like Rome’s Italic allies, maintained their own civil
administration and there was no Carthaginian official in the role of provincial governor.156
The individual cities and tribes that constituted the epikrateia paid tribute to Carthage and
served as garrisons for Carthaginian troops in order to provide security from the
encroachment of ambitious Sicilian communities. The use of the epikrateia as a defensive
barrier against the Greeks hints at Carthaginian policy in Sicily as a whole; that is to say after
the defeat at Himera (480) Carthaginian actions appeared not to have been directed
towards aggressive expansionism, but rather they sought to maintain the status quo. The
lack of evidence pertaining to other regions under Carthaginian hegemony excludes any
direct comparisons being drawn between the epikrateia system utilized in Sicily, but the
previously discussed evidence pertaining to North Africa appears to indicate that a similar
system, if not exactly the same, was employed.
Carthaginian presence in Sardinia appears to have been mainly confined to colonies with
military garrisons dotted around the coastal regions that served to export the agricultural
wealth of the island; additionally the island likely acted as a fruitful recruiting ground for
mercenaries. This may have been a similar template for other islands with a Carthaginian
presence, such as Corsica and the Balearic Island.157 Thus, as was the case in Sicily, Carthage
seemed content to maintain her trading enterprises without seeking to forcibly conquer the
parts of the island that were opposed to her.
The political relations between Carthage and her Iberian territories are difficult to define
precisely due to the lack of native sources on the subject. Furthermore, Greek historians’
153
(Bridoux 2014) p.181; (Hoyos 2015) p.15
(Ameling 2011) p.49; (Hoyos 2010) p.49
155
(Ameling 2011) p.50
156
(Ameling 2011) p.51
157
(Ameling 2011) p.49; (Dyson 2007) p.114, 116, 121; (Hoyos 2010) p.47; (Hoyos 2015) p.16; (Lazenby 1996) p.24
154
36
knowledge of Carthaginian Spain was limited and their level of recorded information suffers
in a corresponding manner.158 The Iberians were likely afforded the civic freedoms as were
other far western North African communities such as Lixus and Siga. Indeed the extent of
Carthaginian influence in these regions may have merely been a shared cultural and
material koine, or the right to recruit mercenaries.159 However, Carthaginian colonies, like
Gades, may have been extended certain special rights and privileges.160 Scullard suggested
that, until the military conquest of Spain by the Barcid family in the second half of the third
century, Carthaginian Spain “should not be regarded as part of the Carthaginian Empire…
but rather as a sphere of influence or a protectorate.”161 There certainly seems to be very
little evidence of any attempt by Carthage to create a similar system to the epikrateia in
Spain as they did in Sicily, and even less evidence of military activity with expansionist aims
in the centuries leading up to the Barcid conquests.162
Conversely, the treaty between Carthage and Rome dated to 348 may indicate that by this
time the Carthaginians had begun to exert some form of formal rule in southern Spain
(Polyb. 3.24).163 However, the exclusion of Romans from colonizing or trading in Spain as far
south as Mastia, may in fact reflect a Carthaginian attempt to maintain her grip on Iberian
manpower, whose mercenaries had, during the fourth and fifth centuries, become an
important element in their military activities in Sicily. Taxes were likely levied from their
trade colonies, but it is unknown whether tribute was paid from the Iberian settlements
surrounding Carthaginian territory. The immense wealth extracted from Spain, along with
the importance of her mercenary manpower seems to have led Carthage to exert her
influence over the Iberians with a relatively light hand, lest either of these important
resources became threatened. Indeed throughout the literary sources there is only one
small passage by Justin stating that Carthage intervened militarily against the Iberians, soon
after the foundation of Gades in the sixth century, but there is no evidence to corroborate
this other than Justin’s solitary record (Just. Epit. 44.5.2-3).164
158
(Scullard 1989) p.21
(Bridoux 2014) pp.181-182, 200; (Papi 2014) pp.202-218; (Wallace-Hadrill 2014) pp.302-304
160
(Scullard 1989) p.20
161
(Hoyos 2010) p.50; (Scullard 1989) p.20
162
(Hoyos 2010) p.50; (Scullard 1989) p.21
163
(Ameling 2011) p.50
164
(Hoyos 2010) p.50
159
37
In conclusion, and as this thesis will later illustrate in its discussion of Rome, the two political
systems shared remarkable characteristics (albeit it with slight differences). Furthermore, it
appears that Carthaginian and Roman hegemony also operated in comparable ways. As the
subsequent chapters will begin to demonstrate, these similarities in governance helped to
facilitate the development of the western Mediterranean military koine.
3.4. Carthaginian Armies:
The following section will examine the archaeological and literary evidence relating to the
military equipment and likely tactics of the most the commonly recorded soldiers that were
within Carthaginian armies. It will also illustrate how these ethnically diverse soldiers were
involved in the development of the western Mediterranean military koine. Indeed, as the
subsequent discussion of Carthaginian armies will illustrate they played a pivotal role in the
development of this shared military koine. Between 350-264 Carthage frequently employed
Celtic, Celtiberian, Iberian, Italic, Greek mercenaries, in addition to Libyans, Libyphoenicians,
Numidians, and their own citizen troops.165
Literary sources generally portray the Carthaginians as being more concerned with
mercantile activities than serving military service, which led to their dependence on
mercenaries, and allied auxiliaries (Diod. Sic. 5.38; Plut. Timo. 28.11; Polyb. 6.52.5). Polybius
noted that the Carthaginians neglected their infantry, and scarcely cared more about their
cavalry (Polyb. 6.52.3). This sentiment is echoed by Diodorus who recorded that the
Carthaginians did not place much faith in the martial abilities of their own citizens and, after
the defeat at the river Crimisus in 341, pursued a deliberate policy of utilizing mercenary
manpower, particularly Greek (Diod. Sic. 5.38; 16.81.4). Furthermore Plutarch, commenting
on the defeat at Crimisus, adds that the Carthaginians preferred to use Iberians, Libyans,
and Numidian’s in order to “sustain their defeats at the cost of other nations” (Plut. Tim.
165
App. Hisp.28; Hann. 52; Diod. Sic. 13.44.2, 110.5, 14.8.5, 15.70, 16.73, 19.12, 20.11.1, 22.12, 25.2; Livy 21.21, 38-39, 48,
52, 59, 22.46-47, 24.15, 25.9, 27.38, 48, 28.46, 30.33; Frontin. Strat. 16.3; Livy 10.26; 21.22-23, 38,57,59; 27.38-39, 48,
28.36, 30.33; Poly 1.17.4, 19.2, 43.4, 48.2, 66.7, 2.67.7, 3.33, 113-115; Plut Dion 27; Pyrrh. 16.10, 26.1, 30.1, 32.1-2; Xeno
Hell. 7.12, 30.
(Ameling 2011) pp.48-49; (Connolly 1981) pp.148-151; (Goldsworthy 2001) pp.30-34; (Hoyos 2010) p.157; (Lazenby 1996)
p.46; (Picard 1968) p.168; (Salimbeti 2014) pp.21-22; (Scardigli 2011) p.33; (Scullard 1989) p.20; (Scullard 1990) p.495, 504;
(Warmington 1969) p.121,126
38
28.6).166 Recently scholars have expanded upon this evidence suggesting that on the whole
Carthaginians did not find military service attractive for two major reasons; first it prevented
their exclusive citizen body from being depleted by warfare, and second, as the Carthaginian
citizens were merchants it also prevented the state from economic depletion should they
either lessen their profits through physically being away on campaign, or through their
deaths.167
The Carthaginian reliance on mercenaries and subject troops to fight their wars is by no
means unique in the Classical World. In the eastern Mediterranean the use of Greek
mercenaries has been attested from the eight century onward, and had become prolific
during the fourth and fifth centuries.168 Additionally, Greek and Macedonian mercenaries
provided the backbone of the Hellenistic successor kingdoms. This is particularly evident in
Ptolemaic Egypt who employed large numbers of Graeco-Macedonians, whilst Celtic and
Italic mercenaries were frequently employed by Syracusan tyrants.169 The use of large
numbers of troops in the capacity of allies, auxiliaries, or as soldiers raised by a specific
individual, family, or political faction with allegiance to either a specific Carthaginian or the
state is also not unique to the Carthaginians. Indeed, Rome offers many parallels to this. For
example, the Fabii, a prominent Roman gens fought and lost a private war with the Etruscan
city of Veii and after the defeat of the Latins in 338, Roman armies at times consisted of up
to fifty percent allied troops (App. Hann. 8.31; Dion. Hal. Ant. Rom. 9.22; Polyb. 3.107.12;
6.26.7, 30.2; Livy 2.49.4. 9.30.3).170 Consequently, the Carthaginian dependence on auxiliary,
client, and mercenary troops to constitute the bulk of their armies was not a
unique phenomenon.
The suggested reluctance of Carthaginians to participate in military service should not be
seen as a unique phenomenon either. Carthaginian citizens could, and did, serve as officers
in the army and citizens contributed if there was a situation dire enough to necessitate it.171
ἀλλοτρίαις βλάβαις ἀνεδέχοντο τὰς ἥττας
(Goldsworthy 2001) p.30; (Scullard 1990) p.496;
168
(Quesada Sanz 1999) bp.17; (Trundle 2004) pp.6-7, 41
169
(Bagnall 1976) p.117 (Bar-Kochva 1976) p.53,201,202; (Dyson 2007) p.114; (Frederiksen 1984) p.143;(Stefanou 2013)
pp.111-113 tbl.7.1, 118-119; (Trundle 2004), pp.4-7
170
(Cornell 1990c) p.386; (Eckstein 2006) p.230, 254; (Gabba 1989) p.222; (Keppie 1998) p.22; (Rawlings 2007b); (Sage
2013) p.52; p. 218; (Serrati 2011) p.9,24
166
167
171
(Goldsworthy 2001) p.30
39
For example, citizen soldiers are recorded fighting against Carthage’s two greatest threats in
the second half of the fourth century; a contingent of 10,000 was recorded fighting against
Timoleon and his Syracusan force in 341 (Plut. Timo. 28.10).172 Carthaginian citizens also
fought during Agathocles invasion of North Africa between 310-307 (Diod. Sic. 10.10). Aside
from these two events there is no mention of citizen soldiers serving across Carthaginian
territory in a permanent or garrison role, but this does not necessarily discount the
possibility that there were some Carthaginians who did fulfil this role.
The large area of Carthaginian influence meant that if citizens did serve in the armies they
were likely to serve overseas. Roman soldiers during the fourth century on the other-hand
served in campaigns solely in Italy, and thus were never far away from their homes. It is also
interesting to note that in the second century the Roman army suffered recruitment
problems as soldiers served overseas for long periods of time without the prospect of
obtaining land in Italy. 173 This phenomenon may hint at the issues that dissuaded large
numbers of Carthaginian citizens from fighting in their armies after 341. The loose epikrateia
system the Carthaginians utilized in Sicily resulted in the Carthaginian citizens fighting over a
region in which they had little prospect of gaining further land, which is a direct contrast to
the benefits that Roman citizens and its allies were afforded through the establishment of
colonies. 174 Therefore, the withdrawal of Carthaginian citizens after the heavy defeat at
Crimisus may also represent a refusal to fight outside North Africa because of the lack of
direct benefits that they could attain. Furthermore, the wealth of Carthaginian citizens may
have also led many to find military service unattractive.
As the majority of Carthaginian armies appear to have been constructed of a mixture of
troop types, the varying methods of recruitment need to be examined. Allied troops were
likely either levied as a form of tribute or as a requirement of their specific treaty
obligations.175 Mercenary forces were also likely to have been recruited with different
methods. They could be recruited either as whole contingents, or individuals serving under a
specific chieftain or captain who was paid by ambitious individuals, family units, political
172
(Hoyos 2010) p.154; (Picard 1968) p.168; (Warmington 1969) p.115, 120, 122,125
(Nicolet 1994) p.619; (Keppie 1998)p.58; (Lintott 1994) pp. 36-37
174
(Cornell 1995) p.352, 367; (Rich 2011) p.19
173
175
(Goldsworthy 2001) p.33
40
factions, or the state itself. Within these recruitment parameters there also seem to have
been differences; first, mercenaries could be sent to fight as part of an alliance between
communities, powerful individuals, families, or states. This illustrates that mercenaries, like
subject troops could be recruited through diplomatic alliances, and friendships.176 Whilst
there are no direct examples of this occurring in the scant Carthaginian sources, there are
parallels of this occurring in Syracuse. For example, Sparta frequently permitted the
Syracusan tyrants Dionysius I and II to recruit mercenaries from the Peloponnese, whilst
Timoleon arrived in Syracuse with 700 hundred Greek mercenaries after an appeal for help
to Corinth was issued (Diod. Sic. 14.44.1-2, 58.1, 16.66.; Xen. Anab. 1.4.3).177 Alternatively
mercenaries could be recruited privately for personal gain in the form of glory, plunder, and
pay as was the case with Xenophon, or in the case of the Ptolemaic Egypt, the opportunity
to own land as mercenary settlers (cleruchs).178
Numismatic evidence suggests that Carthage permitted some Sicilian communities to mint
local coinage for the purpose of paying soldiers.179 A mercenary’s loyalty generally was to
their paymasters, indicating that these Sicilian communities were responsible for hiring
mercenaries, and they may have financed the more permanent garrisons in western Sicily.180
Therefore, Carthaginian recruitment of mercenaries as individuals, or in larger contingents,
appears similar to that practiced in other regions of the Mediterranean.
The various recruitment methods employed by the Carthaginian army, in conjunction with
the wide geographical territory from which they drew their soldiers, resulted in a diverse
body of troop types fighting for a variety of reasons. These reasons were likely to be similar
to those that compelled service in Roman and Syracusan armies and could include; personal
desire for plunder and land, personal, collective allegiance or debt to an individual, family
unit, political faction, or the Carthaginian state itself, and the defence of one’s own land.
This heterogeneous army, despite their cultural and geographical differences, still fought
primarily with the same weapons (javelins, thrusting spears, and swords), and it appears
176
(Trundle 2004) p.43
(Trundle 2004) p.43, 106-107; (Hoyos 2010) p.171; (Warmington 1969) p.113;
178
(Quesada Sanz 1999) p.9; (Trundle 2004) p.42.
179
(Frey-Kupper 2014) p.81
180
(Ameling 2011) p.50
177
41
that they utilized these weapons in a largely similar manner. For example, Libyan, Numidian,
and Spanish troops generally fought as javelin armed skirmishers, whilst heavier troops
could also be fielded in a less mobile formation that sought to close and engage with their
spears or swords at close quarters. These common elements allowed the heterogeneous
Carthaginian army to integrate a variety of troops into a cohesive fighting force that, as will
be discussed in the following sections, did not operate with vastly different equipment and
tactics from contemporary Roman and Syracusan armies.
There is little direct evidence for the command structure of the Carthaginian army. It seems
likely that generals (Rab Mahanet) were elected suggesting that they were either
aristocratic, or at the very least wealthy enough to have been well renowned.181 However,
literary evidence indicates that the overall command of Carthaginian armies, like Roman
armies could be held by both an individual generals or in pairs (Diod. Sic. 16.81.3, 16.67.2,
19.106.8 20.12, 20.10.5-6; Plut. Timo. 17.3, 25.3; Polyb. 1.56.1).
Literary evidence also suggests that military command could be monopolized by particular
families, such as the Magonids (409-396) in Sicily, and the Barcids (241-202) in Spain and
Italy.182 A likely factor in the ability of these families to retain command of the military is the
Carthaginian policy of appointing generals to command for the duration of a campaign, or at
least without a definite time limit.183 This consequently allowed generals such as Hamilcar
and Hannibal Barca the ability to gain invaluable experience in the art of command.184
Consequently, these generals were likely to have taken other members of their clients,
family, and political faction on campaign with them which then resulted in the transfer of
command skills to them, whilst excluding other families and factions with their clients from
gaining these skills. Hamilcar Barca campaigned in Iberia with his son-in law Hasdrubal and
son Hannibal, who then assumed command after his death.
Like Rome and Syracuse, familial ties and client relationships were likely to have been major
influences on the ability of specific families to be able to monopolize the command of the
Carthaginian armies. Additionally, these familial ties and client relationships were likely to
181
(Goldsworthy 2001) p.35; (Hoyos 2010) p.32,33; (Lazenby 1996) p.20
(Hoyos 2010) p.33, 132; (Picard 1968) p.143; (Scullard 1990) p.490; (Warmington 1969) p.143
183
(Goldsworthy 2001) p.35; (Hoyos 2010) p.34; (Warmington 1969) p.142
184
(Goldsworthy 2001) p.35; (Lazenby 1996) p.20, 29; (Warmington 1969) p.143
182
42
have played a major part in the ability to recruit soldiers. Furthermore, like Rome and
Syracuse, the more talented commanders may have then been incorporated into the great
families by marriage or adoption. This may account for Hasdrubal’s ability to marry into the
Barcid family, and assume control of the armies in Spain after the death of Hamilcar in 228
(Diod. Sic. 15.12.1; Polyb. 2.16-17). However, this system also held potential disadvantages.
For example, when a family such as the Magonids, who had held military commands for long
periods of time, fell from grace and were excluded from command by other factions, the
new factions that assumed control potentially had no experience in military command.
Whereas Polybius noted, that during the second century, a Roman politician required a
minimum of ten campaigns before becoming eligible for office and subsequent military
commands (Polyb. 6.19.1-5).185 Consequently, Roman armies were able to draw upon a
wider pool of military experience for leadership.
Moreover, like Roman and Syracusan armies, Carthage probably allowed mercenaries and
allied auxiliary contingents, such as the Numidians to retain their own commanders. The
Numidian prince Massanissa, who fought for the Carthaginians during the last quarter of the
third century, commanded his own cavalry (Livy 35.34.3-6; 37.5.30).186 Additionally, the
particular loyalty of the mercenary and Numidian forces is attributed in the sources as
belonging to their specific commander which would further suggest that they were under
that individual’s command. For example, in the closing stages of the Second Punic War when
both Syphax and Massanissa switched their allegiance to the Romans their troops
accompanied them (Livy 28.18-19; 35-36). A similar occurrence can also be seen in Spain
where after capturing Nova Carthago, Scipio Africanus released the Iberian and Celtiberian
hostages, which resulted in a reduction of their manpower in Carthaginian armies (Polyb.
10.34-37).
Unfortunately there is little evidence pertaining to the actual command structure of the
individual units in Carthaginian armies, but it is likely that they varied according their
weaponry and formation. If they fought in a phalanx it is probable that they had a similar
command structure to the Greek phalanx, but lack of evidence makes discerning how strictly
185
(Goldsworthy 2001) p.40
(Goldsworthy 2001) p.33; (Scullard 1990) p.495
186
43
they adhered to this command structure impossible. Other units like skirmishers and
slingers, may not have had a concrete command structure outside of a unit commander and
his subordinate. Alternatively, they may have fought in mixed units as part of a larger ‘cloud’
type unit consisting of heavy and light troops in a manner potentially similar to other
western Mediterranean armies.187 The following sections will now isolate and discuss the
evidence pertaining to Carthaginian, Celtiberian, Iberian, Libyan, and Libyphoenician
infantry.
3.5. Iberians and Celtiberians:
The Iberians, and Celtiberians serving as mercenaries in the Carthaginian armies until the
Barcid conquests in Spain (241-218), fought predominantly as either javelin armed
skirmishers (caetrati), or heavy infantrymen equipped with thrusting spears and possibly
also javelins (scutati) (Plates 13, 24.). During the period c.400-230 it appears that bronze
helmets were not generally employed by Iberian and Celtiberian warriors and Quesada Sanz
noted that there is as yet no proof that bronze helmets were used during this period.188 This
absence of evidence does not automatically translate to a total absence of bronze helmets
and it is possible that some were employed.
Like Rome, there was no centrally organized state armoury in Carthage, or the Celtiberian,
and Iberian regions of the Spanish peninsula during the third and fourth centuries.
Therefore when these troops were fighting for Carthage, they fought with the equipment
that they could afford. Plundering was a common occurrence and a may have been a
motivating factor for troops, as it constituted one of the few ways in which soldiers could
supplement their income and upgrade their equipment with pieces they otherwise would
not been able to afford.189 For example, Hannibal was able to equip his troops with the arms
and armour of slain Romans after the victory at the river Trebia (Polyb. 3.87.3, 114.1). The
ability to equip his soldiers with Roman equipment suggests, when viewed together with
comparable archaeological evidence found throughout the western Mediterranean that
Hannibal’s troops were likely fighting with broadly similar military equipment to the Romans
187
(Lendon 2005) pp.178-; (Quesada Sanz 2006) pp.245, 258-263;(Rich 2011) p.17(Rosenstein 2010) p.292
(Quesada Sanz 2011c)
189
(Keppie 1998) pp.54-55; (Rawlings 2007a) p.67,140,149-54; (Rawlings 2013a) p.5; (Rosenstein 2004) p.100; (Roth 2009)
p.27,71; (Trundle 2004) p.99; (Van Wees 2004) pp.26-7
188
44
and their Italic allies. Moreover, after two decisive defeats it does not make sense for the
Carthaginian army to have exchanged their familiar equipment for the different equipment
of the defeated unless it was perceived to be useful in their pre-existing combat style. The
following examination of the archaeological evidence indicates that the Iberian and
Celtiberian mercenaries fighting for Carthage in Sicily or Africa fought with similar
equipment to their Celtic and Italic contemporaries. That is not to say however that this
homogenization of military equipment was not without its regional variations, because
there most certainly was, but that this variation was generally confined to spears and
javelins. The Celtiberian’s were influenced primarily by the Celtic La Tène I and II culture,
whilst among the Iberians weapons like the falcata which has Italic (machaira), and Greek
(kopis) parallels developed in isolation.190
Unfortunately there is very little information pertaining to the hierarchy of command for
Spanish armies and units. It is conceivable to propose, that whilst they surely had some
command structure, it was not as rigidly defined or adhered to as that of the Romans or
Greeks and that command was governed by a looser tribal hierarchy where loyalty was
given to their chieftains. Consequently, it may have been a combination of familial ties,
client-patron relationships as well as the commander’s strength of personality which
ensured discipline and formation among Iberian and Celtiberian units.191 This thesis will
illustrate that in the fourth century the various units in Carthaginian, Roman, and Syracusan
armies fought in a less rigid formation akin to a ‘cloud’ that was able to expand and contract
depending on the phase of the battle and therefore did not require the tactical discipline
and thus the hierarchy of command to maintain their battlefield effectiveness.192
Goldsworthy noted that the scutati fought in a “dense phalanx formation.”193 In light of
recent academic studies and archaeological evidence the density of the Celtiberian and
Iberian units and their adherence to the Greek styled phalanx should be questioned. For
example, Hannibal placed himself in amongst the ranks of Celtic, Celtiberian and Iberian
troops at the battle of Cannae where they steadfastly absorbed the full force of the Roman
190
(Quesada Sanz 2011c) p.215
(Goldsworthy 2001) p.33
192
(Quesada Sanz 2006) pp.250-51,260
193
(Goldsworthy 2001) p.32
191
45
Legions, who were themselves likely arranged in close order (Livy 22.46; Polyb. 3.113-116).
Although they were able to fight in close order when the situation required, it is unlikely
that Celtiberian and Iberian troops generally fought in a tactical unit that resembled the
rigidly organized Greek phalanx, with its sub units the enomotai, pentekostyes, and
lochos.194 Indeed, as the following examination of archaeological evidence suggests,
although Celtiberian and Iberian troops, like their Celtic, Italic, and North African
contemporaries could and did fight in a dense unit when the situation called for it, they
generally fought in a much looser formation consisting largely of light troops armed with
javelins.195
Certainly if Celtiberian and Iberian troops fought largely without body armour, as the
archaeological record indicates, then fighting at close quarters would have rendered them
extremely vulnerable to spear and sword wounds. Initially the Greek hoplite’s heavy
panoply developed in order to facilitate melee combat, but Iberian and Celtiberian troops do
not appear to have had the same degree of defensive armour and thus were as physically
not suited to close quarter combat.196 They were likely able to contract into a dense
formation, but it seems likely that this was used as a defensive not offensive formation akin
to the medieval shield-wall. Archaeological evidence of weaponry suggests that Iberian and
Celtiberian troops, like their Italic counterparts, were organized along familial or tribal lines
with those troops who could afford the heavier panoply occupying the centre of the ‘cloud’,
with lighter troops equipped with javelins surrounding them.197 A consequence of the
economic realities and social hierarchy of Iron Age societies was that only a small
percentage of the population were able to equip themselves with expensive, heavy armour.
Consequently the majority of troops were likely to be equipped with less expensive lighter
weaponry such as the javelin. Therefore, if the majority of the Iron Age Iberian and
Celtiberian armies fought with javelins, then fighting in a Greek styled phalanx would make
194
(Lee 2006) pp.483-484
(Salmon 1967) p.49
196
For the Greek hoplite see: (Connolly 1981) pp.51-63; (Hanson 2000) p.27; (Hunt 2000) pp.111-117; (Rawlings 2013b)
p.18
For Iberians and Celtiberians see:(Connolly 1981) pp.150-152; (Goldsworthy 2001) p.32; (Quesada Sanz 2011c) pp.211213, 234
197
(Quesada Sanz 2006) pp.250-51, 260
195
46
little sense because it would present an easy target for enemies to launch their missiles into,
and would not provide adequate room for them to hurl their own missiles.
Iron Age battles in the western Mediterranean did not seem to solely consist of a furious
initial melee. It appears they more commonly developed as a series of long drawn out
skirmishes intended to whittle the enemies’ numbers and morale down to such a state
where the soldiers were willing to engage in melee combat.198 In the Hellenistic regions of
the eastern Mediterranean, battle practice also generally commenced with skirmishing,
although this may not have lasted for as long as in the west.199 The perception of missiles
dominating certain sequences of battles is corroborated by the evidence of javelins in the
physical archaeological evidence, and within artistic representations such as the tombstone
of the Spanish mercenary in Tunisia, depicting heavy and light armed troops as equipped
with javelins of some sort.200 It then becomes difficult to justify the appearance of javelins if
they were not used during battle, and as such it can be reasonably argued that as heavy
infantry also engaged in the exchange of missiles then this activity did constitute the
dominant battlefield action. The physical exertion of fighting in close quarter combat meant
that encounters of such a nature would rarely have lasted for more than fifteen minutes and
in all probability were often shorter.201 In some cases, if the first melee clash did not prove
decisive the two bodies of troops would likely have retired to catch their breath and resume
hurling what missiles they had left, before ultimately engaging again if both sides retained
the will to fight.202
Archaeological evidence suggests that the Iberian and Celtiberian caetrati, possibly fought
as lightly armoured skirmishers armed with javelins, as suggested by their weaponry;
javelins and a small circular buckler-styled shield (caetra) from which they derived their
name (Plate 14).203 Representational evidence of the caetra from Osuna, depicting two
Iberian warriors holding their shields aloft, along with a physical example has been
198
(Goldsworthy 2001) pp.57-58
(Wheeler 2007) p.203
200
(Connolly 1981) p.150
201
(Goldsworthy 2001) p.59
202
(Goldsworthy 2001) p.59
203
(Goldsworthy 2001) p.32
199
47
discovered in the Necropolis of Griegos in Catalonia.204 As the caetra was light and small it
would have not afforded the soldier adequate missile protection like the oblong shields,
however, its relative lightness would have afforded the warrior excellent mobility, a key
factor for skirmishing.205 Nor was the caetra an effective defensive weapon when used in
melee combat against heavily armed troops as it did not protect enough of the soldier’s
body as the larger oblong and circular hoplon were able to. Therefore, it is likely that the
caetra was a shield, not primarily designed for melee combat .Indeed, its iron boss, which
could be used to deflect missiles, or close order blows together with its comparatively small
size may suggest that is was particularly suited to raiding or skirmishing. Consequently,
soldiers equipped with a caetra do not appear to have had the sole purpose of engaging in
close quarter combat, unless it was advantageous or necessary.
Although oblong shields were common throughout the large parts of the Mediterranean,
from Gaul to the Near East, the frequent association of the shield with Celtiberian and
Iberian scutati is somewhat erroneous.206 For example, the oblong shield with iron boss was
originally confined to north of the Ebro river in the “heavily Celticized panoply” of Catalonia
where there was close contact with the La Tène culture and only appeared after 350. 207
Polybius describes the Italic scutum as consisting of two layers of wood laid across each
other in differing grains similar to today’s plywood, and glued together with bull’s hide glue
together with an iron boss and rim (Polyb. 6.23). The physical dimensions of the scutum is
further described by Polybius as measuring four feet (1.18m) by two and a half feet wide
(0.74cm), and a palms breadth wide at the rim (Polyb. 6.23). Additionally a second century
scutum discovered at Kasr el-Harit in Egypt measured 1.28m long by 0.636cm wide, which
roughly corroborates Polybius description.208
Archaeologically, the oblong shield is attested in the Iberian southwest of the peninsula only
after 225, but with parallel edges. Furthermore, iron rimmed oblong shields are only
204
(Slinging.org)http://slinging.org/wiki2/index.php/Main/IberiansAndCarthaginians accessed March 12, 2015. Also see:
(Garcia 1972)Pl.56; (Harrison 1988) p.119 fig.75;
205
(Quesada Sanz 2011c) p.213, 227, 228
206
(Connolly 1981) p.96 fig.1-2,103 fig.12-13 118 fig.1-4; (Ellis 1998) pp.114-115; (Quesada Sanz 2011c) p.254 fig.26;
(Quesada Sanz 2011a) p.138 fig.77
207
(Quesada Sanz 2011c) p.225, 227
208
(Bishop 2006) pp.61-62; (Burns 2006) p.157
48
occasionally identified in burial contexts and did “not become widespread.”209 These shields
appear to have been introduced through an increased exposure to the shield during the
fourth century when Carthaginian armies brought them into contact with Celtic and Italic
soldiers who widely utilized them.210 Therefore, the Spanish troops serving in Carthaginian
armies between 350-264 who were equipped with the oblong shield were probably
Celtiberians. It is uncertain how widely the oblong shield was adopted between 350-264
therefore the shields for spear wielding infantry appear to have been predominantly a larger
wooden caetra with the average diameter being 60 cm and a central handgrip attached to
the shield by long triangular iron wings.211
Archaeological evidence of javelins from the Spanish peninsula suggests that they tended to
be either solid iron darts (saunion/soliferrea) or a heavier falarica with a wooden shaft,
which is similar to the Celtic and Italic examples from Montefortino, Monte Bibele,
Montericco, and Vulci in addition to a bronze socket javelin from Latium, as well as the
javelin described by Livy (Livy 21.8).212 The evidence of heavy, long and socketed javelin
heads from Almedinilla appears to corroborate Livy’s description of a heavier wooden
hafted javelin.213 The soliferrea was a slender solid iron javelin that could reach up to two
metres in length and weigh c.800 grams with a small barbed pyramidal head, examples of
which have been discovered in Almedinilla near Cordoba (Plate 14).214 Its weight and thin
shank would have made it easy to throw multiple times by a soldier without too much
physical exertion, thus making it suitable for the extended skirmishing that characterised
western Mediterranean warfare. The dart-like design of the soliferrea may have been a
result of the relative lack of armour used by Celtiberian and Iberian troops and other tribal
peoples of Europe, most notably the Celts who are frequently depicted as fighting
unarmoured or naked (Livy 2.28.7-8, 3.11 4.4).215 Consequently, a soliferrea would be
209
(Quesada Sanz 2011c) p.225
(Quesada Sanz 2011c) p.227
211
(Quesada Sanz 2011c) p.213
212
Spain: (Connolly 1981) p.150 fig. 1,2; (Quesada Sanz 2011c) p.214. For in depth examinations of the Italic examples see
chapter three: Montefortino: (Tomcazk 2012) p.57 fig. B-E; Montericco: (Small 2000) p.225; (Tomcazk 2012) p.56 fig.10;
Latium: (Connolly 1981) p.92 fig.14; Vulci: (Connolly 1981) p.98 fig.9; (Tomcazk 2012) p.56 fig.9
213
(Quesada Sanz 1992) p.123,135
214
(Connolly 1981) p.150 fig.1; (Quesada Sanz 1992) p.124
215
(Lazenby 1996) p.26
210
49
adequate when fighting opponents who were equipped with light armour or none at all,
although it may have lacked the weight to penetrate oblong shields.
A similar misrepresentation of Celtiberian and Iberian military equipment can also been
seen in the general tendency to regard the falcata as the most common sword type in the
Iberian Peninsula. The falcata was almost exclusively confined to use by the Bastentani and
Contestani peoples in the south east, and was relatively rare amongst the other people’s
living in Iberian territory.216 The falcata is practically an unknown weapon among the
peoples in the north and west of the Spanish peninsula.217 The falcata had a heavy head
which distributed a large amount of the sword’s weight towards its tip, allowing it to be
utilized as a slashing weapon, examples of which have been discovered at the cemeteries of
Almedinilla, El Cigarralejo, and burial 48 at the ‘El Poblado’ cemetary of Comibra.218 Similar
shaped swords such as the Italic machaira and Greek kopis are well attested across the
Mediterranean, and their appearance in Iberia may have resulted from exposure to the
weapon through mercenary service in Sicily.219 The antennae type sword was the dominant
sword design in the Celtiberian north east, and the central Meseta of the Spanish
peninsula.220 It was a long atrophied sword with an average length of between 34.4cm –
50cm suitable for both cutting and thrusting.221 Quesada Sanz has recently shown that,
although there was a relative homogeneity of the standard panoply consisting of; javelins,
spears, and to a lesser extent swords, between 400-325, strong regional differences began
to appear around both offensive weaponry such as swords (antennae type, falcata, and
fronton), and defensively in terms of shield types (caetra/ oblong shield)
A number of spear heads were discovered in the graves of Almedinilla ranging from 15.9 to
57.5 cm in length, with an average of 33.44 cm, and when viewed with other examples from
Iberia illustrate that they were primarily elongated leaf shaped.222 The funerary context in
which these spears heads were discovered may indicate that the thrusting spear was the
offensive weapon of wealthy members of society. A soldier equipped with a thrusting spear
216
(Quesada Sanz 2011b) p.49
(Connolly 1981) p.150; (Quesada Sanz 2011b) p.49; (Quesada Sanz 2011c) p.213,214, 215
218
(Connolly 1981) p.150 (Goldsworthy 2001) p.32; (Quesada Sanz 2011c) p.214; (Quesada Sanz 1992) p.134 (Quesada Sanz
2014) p.88,89; (Quesada Sanz 1998)) p.15,16; (Slinging.org)
219
Kopis see chapter two Greeks; Machaira see: Chapter two Oscans, and Greeks, and Chapter three Etruscans and Latins.
220
(Quesada Sanz 2011c), p.211-212, 214
221
(Quesada Sanz 1997a) p.255
222
(Connolly 1981) p.150 fig.3 (Quesada Sanz 2011c) p.214; p.249 fig.21 (Quesada Sanz 1992) p.122, 135;
217
50
would have expected to enter into close quarter combat, and thus would have likely sought
body armour in order to protect themselves. Whilst metallic body armour is rarely attested
in the archaeological record during the fourth century, it is likely that some Celtiberian and
Iberian mercenaries were equipped with either leather or linen body armour.223 This
illustrates that it is likely that heavy Celtiberian or Iberian troops were armed in a similar
manner to contemporary Italic, Greek, and Carthaginian soldiers, and that they could
similarly function as both heavy skirmishers and line infantry.224 Indeed, examples of similar
weaponry from among Italic soldiers suggests that Celtiberian and Iberian troops likely acted
as dual purpose infantry, who were able to launch volleys of javelins, and were equally
adept when the situation required, to engage with their opponents in close quarter combat.
This fighting style and their adoption of the Montefortino helmet and oblong shield
by the end of the third century strongly suggests that mercenary service in Carthaginian and
Syracusan armies with Italic troops worked together with their proximity to the Celtic La
Tène culture and may have facilitated the transmission of such military equipment into the
Spanish peninsula.225 Thus, it appears that the frequent employment of mercenaries by
Carthage and Syracuse over Sicily facilitated the development of a western Mediterranean
military koine from the fifth century onwards.
3.6. Libyan and Libyphoenican Infantry:
The Libyan and Libyphoenican infantry appear to have formed the backbone of Carthaginian
armies.226 At the battle of Crimisus they contributed 10,000 troops and during the struggle
against Agathocles they again provided 10,000 troops for Hamilcar’s force that landed in
Sicily in 311, as well as likely providing a large percentage of the 30,000 troops raised
towards the end of the campaign (Diod. Sic. 19.106.11; 20.59-60). It is difficult to discern the
precise conditions with which Libyan and Libyphoenicians were recruited into Carthaginian
armies and some may have served as mercenaries whilst others may have been sent by
their communities to fulfil treaty obligations with Carthage. Indeed, it is likely that this
223
(Quesada Sanz 2011c) p.213
(Quesada Sanz 2011c) p.215
225
Connolly, 1981 #2) p.150 fig.11, 12,14; (Cunliffe 1997) p.143 fig.114,115; (Quesada Sanz 1997b) P.257,259, 262-266;
(Quesada Sanz 2011a)pp.140-156;(Quesada Sanz 2011c) pp.214-216, 222, 225, 227; (Salimbeti 2014) p.40
226
(Ameling 2011) p.48; (Connolly 1981) p.148; (Lazenby 1996) p.26; (Picard 1994) p.379; (Salimbeti 2014) p.17; (Scullard
1990) p.504
224
51
varied depending upon the soldier’s personal circumstances and their patrons or
communities specific relationship with Carthage. However, the Libyans and Libyphoenicians
probably supplied both light skirmishers and heavy infantry in a similar manner to the
Iberian and Celtiberian mercenaries.227
The light infantry (lonchophoroi) were likely armed similarly to the Celtiberian and Iberian
caetrati with a small round buckler type shield, together with several javelins, and thus are
likely to have fought in a skirmishing role.228 Whether these light troops wore armour is
unknown, but it is likely that there would have been some who either could afford to, or
had looted some form of light armour from their campaigns in Sicily. If this was the case,
due to their role as skirmishers, which required mobility and hurling multiple javelins and
thus a degree of upper body freedom, it is likely that their armour, if any was worn,
consisted of a cardiophylax, linothorax (λινοθώαζ), or spongia.229 The linothorax constituted
a popular piece of body armour in Italy and Greece from the Archaic period through to the
Hellenistic and it consisted of four panels, of linen, two sides and a front and rear (Plates 2123).230 It was constructed by multiple layers of “linen glued together to form a stiff shirt
about 0.5cm thick,” and modern reconstructions have shown that it could weigh 3.5kg as
opposed to the 13-18 kg of a metallic cuirass.231 This significant discrepancy in weight would
have allowed the wearer greater mobility and flexibility, which helped facilitate a lighter
more mobile method of warfare. Pteryges are also “regularly found on linen corselets.”232
Pteryges were stiffened linen or leather strips that were attached to the bottom of the
cuirass in order to protect the legs from missiles. Xenophon advised that these flaps be
constructed of a material, and such size to provide adequate protection against missiles
(Xeno Art of Horsemanship 12.1.3). The addition of pteryges to light linen cuirasses
illustrates that protection from javelins was as important for the Italian soldier as mobility.
Representational evidence from the reliefs at Chemtou and votive-stelae from ‘the island of
227
(Bagnall 2005) p.9;(Scullard 1990) p.494; (Goldsworthy 2001) p.32; (Trundle 2013) p.340
(Goldsworthy 2001), p.32
229
The cardiohylax and spongia will be discussed in depth in chapter two (see pp.77-80)
230
(Aldrete 2013) pp. 73-85; (Burns 2006) p.104; (Gelba 2012) P.54
231
(Burns 2006) p.106; (Connolly 1981) p.58
232
(Burns 2006) p.90
228
52
the Admiral’ in Carthage itself depict cuirasses fitted with pteryges (Plate 23).233 In the end,
however, it would also have come down to personal preference.
In Greece the hoplite had been gradually adopting lighter body armour from the fifth
century onwards, and the popularity of the linothorax in representational evidence may also
reflect this general trend.234 The lower cost of the linothorax compared to its bronze
counterpart may also account its popularity. Furthermore, the heavy and restrictive metallic
cuirass was likely rendered redundant by the flexible, skirmishing orientated warfare in the
western Mediterranean facilitated by the widespread use of javelins.
Second century javelin heads from Es-Soumaa point to different types of shankless javelins
in use some, with long slender rounded heads akin to the medieval bodkin arrow, were
probably used for longer distances and armour piercing, whereas the presence of four sided
heads are likely to have been more of an impact weapon at closer range (Plate 26).235 These
shankless javelins match the description given by Silius Italicus of Libyphoenician javelins
and have physical similarities to those described by Xenophon in addition to those
associated with Numidian cavalry and Greek peltasts (Sil. Pun. 3.250; Xen. Hunt. 10.3).236
The Libyan and Libyphoenician heavy infantry were possibly armoured in a similar manner
to the Greek hoplite, with a bronze cuirass or linothorax and a hoplon type shield together
with a bronze helmet and a heavy thrusting spear with a leaf shaped head.237 It is also
probable that some, if they could afford it, carried a short sword similar to the ‘cut and
thrust’ sword found in the Es-Soumaa grave for a close quarter combat weapon.238
The possibility of every soldier being uniformly armed is unlikely due to the financial costs
involved, or presence of inherited equipment, and the lack of a state armoury. For example,
a southern Italic triple disc cuirass (spongia) was discovered at Ksour Essaf dated between
the third and fourth century and indicates the possible variation of body armour
233
(Connolly 1981) p.147; (Salimbeti 2014) p.28,33
(Krentz 2013) p.135; (Krentz 1985) p.61; (Schwartz 2013) p.169
235
(Salimbeti 2014), p.39
236
(Connolly 1981) p.49 fig.1,6, 149-150; (Goldsworthy 2001) p.32; (Salimbeti 2014) p.38,39
237
(Goldsworthy 2001) p.32; (Lazenby 1996) p.26; (Salimbeti 2014) p.59
234
238
(Connolly 1981) p.150
53
available.239 It also illustrates that North African troops were not being solely influenced by
Greek or Hellenistic military trends, but rather that they were active participants in the
transfer of western Mediterranean military technology. This phenomenon is seemingly
corroborated by a third century fragmentary stelae from Carthage which depicts a
Carthaginian war-god Adad wearing a Montefortino helmet.240
Consequently, although some North African heavy troops may have fought in a formation
similar to the Greek phalanx, their equipment may have varied from soldier to soldier and
some may not have worn body armour. There is also representational evidence that
provides further examples of the arms and armour utilized by soldiers fighting in
Carthaginian armies. In Sicily, a bronze statuette of a Carthaginian soldier dating to the fifth
century wears a crested metallic helmet with what resembles hinged cheek pieces, a leather
or linothorax, and is holding a circular shield.241 A jasper scarab ornament dating to the
fourth century from Kerkouane (Tunisia) shows a file of four hoplite-styled soldiers marching
in unison.242 Additionally, a sixth century bronze proto-Corinthian helmet from Sulcis
(Sardinia) together with an image of a Thracian helmet found on a Carthaginian coin in
Carthago Nova in Spain dating to the third century indicates that some North Africans had
adopted Greek arms and armour in the centuries prior to their frequent military interactions
with the peoples of the wider western Mediterranean.243 Furthermore, representational
evidence of the hoplon styled shield where multiple images can be found on the monument
at Chemtou (Tunisia) and also on the third century monumental relief at the Numidian
sanctuary of Khbour-Clib.244
Diodorus, and Polybius describe the North African heavy infantry as fighting in a phalanx
against Agathocles in 310,and the Romans in 255 (Diod. Sic. 20.10.38; Polyb. 1.33.17).
However, the phalanx is a frequently used term for any dense body of soldiers fighting with
a spears or sword. Therefore the application of the term phalanx has the potential to
become an overly simplified general term which does not reflect the reality of the
239
(Hoyos 2010) p.160,162; (Salimbeti 2014) p.34
(Salimbeti 2014) p.45
241
(Salimbeti 2014) p.13
242
(Hoyos 2010) p.159,162
243
(Salimbeti 2014) p.21,22, 36
240
244
(Connolly 1981) p.147; (Salimbeti 2014) p.21-22,36
54
battlefield as has already been noted with the Iberian and Celtiberian troops. The previously
discussed archaeological evidence from Chemtou, Sicily, and Sardinia seems to indicate that
the infantry could have fought in a dense formation in which the hoplon shield and thrusting
spear were suited, but it cannot be proved that they used this formation as their primary
tactic.
Libyan soldiers have tended to be viewed as having provided the “steadfast and most
disciplined element” in Carthaginian armies.245 This may have been due to the equipment
that they were able to arm themselves with. For instance, archaeological evidence of North
African soldiers suggests that they were able to equip themselves similarly to Greek
hoplites, which possibly substantiates this view. By the middle of the fourth century military
developments in both Greece and Macedonia had led to the gradual lightening of hoplite
equipment. This resulted in the bronze cuirass being gradually replaced with the linothorax,
or none at all.246 For example, the Athenian public military training program the ephebeia
had after 335 begun to issue graduates of this program with only a spear (doru) and shield
(hoplon).247 This possibly illustrates that the cuirass was no longer considered a vital
element for a hoplite to serve effectively in the phalanx, which now derived its strength
through the adherence to a dense formation.248 The tactical consequence was that the
individual soldier was less suited to fighting outside of the phalanx and thus the need to stay
in a rigid and dense formation became paramount to the phalanx’s effectiveness, and
survival of the individual.249 Therefore, if North African soldiers were armed similarly to
their Greek contemporaries, it is quite possible that they were seen as the most disciplined
element in Carthaginian armies because their effectiveness and survival was dependent
them maintaining their formation.
The hoplon styled shields and linothorax of the Chemtou reliefs illustrate that, unlike the
Iberians and Celtiberians, it is possible that some wealthy troops wore armour that
facilitated fighting at close quarters. However, similar evidence from Etruria and Latium also
245
(Goldsworthy 2001) p.32
(Snodgrass 1967) pp.90-96; (Lee 2006) P.503; (Van Wees 2004) p.48
247
(Bertosa 2003)p.361,363; (Lendon 2005) p.109
248
(Rawlings 2013a) p.22-3; (Van Wees 2004) p.197
249
(Van Wees 2004) p.197
246
55
suggests that some wealthy troops could equip themselves in a manner similar to Greek
hoplites, but it is widely argued that they were not fighting in classical Greek phalanxes.250
Consequently, the degree to which Libyan and Libyphoenicians adhered to the Greek
phalanx is uncertain and they may have fought with some soldiers armed in a similar
manner to Greek hoplites in the front with lighter skirmishers filling the rear ranks.
Alternatively, as Quesada Sanz has argued in regard to second century Iberian, Celtiberian,
and Roman armies may have fought in a ‘cloud’ like unit where the heavily armed troops
potentially have formed a core around which the lighter javelin armed troops expanded and
contracted depending on the phase of battle.251 Thus, when engaged in melee combat the
heavier troops possibly did contract into a phalanx like formation, with the lighter units
retreating behind them and offering support. Asclepiodotus writing in the first century
refers to light troops being integrated into the phalanx in precisely this manner, naming the
tactic parentaxis (Asclep. Tact. 6). Therefore whilst it cannot be proved that the North
Africans did not fight in a phalanx, the available archaeological evidence in conjunction with
methods of warfare from Greece and Italy supports that this was at least possible in some
circumstances.
3.6. Carthaginian citizen soldiers:
Polybius believed that the Carthaginians tended to ignore their citizen infantry, and this
statement is usually interpreted as an illustration of the Carthaginian citizenry not serving in
the armies (Polyb. 6.52.7) but a closer inspection of the literary evidence suggests
otherwise. Carthaginian citizens and the elite infantry unit, the Sacred Band, appear to have
served in the war against Agathocles in North Africa and Syracuse (310-307). Diodorus,
reported that Hamilcar, son of Gisco, sent an army to besiege Syracuse, which included
2,000 citizens in an army of 10,000; albeit many of whom were reported as being aristocrats
(Diod. Sic. 19.106.9-10). If the majority of this citizen contingent was made up of aristocrats,
the remainder must have been drawn from the lower ranks of Carthaginian society, and
possibly may have been willing to fight overseas for pay or plunder. In 307 Carthage
250
(D'Agostino 1991) pp.59-82; (Harris 1990) p.508; (Momigliano 1963) p.119; (Rich 2011) pp.7-20; (Rosenstein 2010)
pp.290-299
251
(Lendon 2005) pp.178-192; (Quesada Sanz 2006) pp.245-263
56
equipped 30,000 men and split them into three separate armies of 10,000 men each.
Diodorus noted that they were dispatched from Carthage. However, Diodorus also recorded
that the city was full of refugees from the surrounding area which renders it possible that
armies were a mixture of Libyans, Libyphoenicians, and Carthaginian citizens (Diod. Sic.
20.59-60).
In general, however, Carthaginian citizens are not frequently mentioned as serving in the
army after 307 until a brief mention by Polybius of Hanno, son of the suffete Bomilcar,
illustrates that some aristocrats accompanied Hannibal in 218 (Polyb. 3.42.18-19). It seems
unlikely that, apart from populating the officer corps, no Carthaginian citizen fought in the
army between the years 307-218, and it may only reflect that outside of the officer corps
the citizens fighting were not of sufficient social status to be deemed worthy of mention.
However, if Carthaginian literature was available, this Roman-centric picture may change. If
Hannibal was accompanied by fellow aristocratic citizens, it was probably as clients of the
Barcid family. The factionalism and patron-client relationships in Carthaginian politics
appears to have been similar to that operating in Rome.252 Therefore, Barcid supporters
were likely to have been expected to serve alongside their benefactors to whom their
fortunes were tied. Consequently, it is likely that any Carthaginian officer would have been
accompanied on campaign by his client retainers, and this may be the reason why Polybius
remarked that the Carthaginians only slightly cared about their cavalry (Polyb. 6.52.7-8) as
they were the section of Carthaginian society most able to afford horses. As Carthage was
adept at hiring mercenaries, there is a possibility that some Carthaginian citizens from the
lower levels of society chose to serve for pay, but the lack of information available cannot
prove this assumption beyond doubt.
The Sacred Band is the most widely recognised citizen element in our sources, but it is not
recorded as specifically serving as a unit after the defeat at Crimisus, and this may in fact
represent the withdrawal of only the aristocratic infantry. Indeed evidence suggests that
after Crimisus many Carthaginian elites became owners of large estates and thus possibly
began to replace their military presence with Libyan/Libyan-Phoenician levies from their
252
(Denuaix 2006) pp.401-416; (Drogula 2015) pp.22-23; (Drummond 1989) pp.89-110; (Goldsworthy 2001) pp..42-44;
(Sage 2013) p.218; (Wallace-Hadrill 1989) pp.66-85
57
estates, or alternatively personally paid for the recruitment of mercenaries to fight in their
place.253 Literary descriptions of the Sacred Band indicated that they were wealthy enough
to equip themselves with expensive Greek hoplite-styled panoplies (Diod. Sic. 16.80.4-5;
Plut. Timo. 28.1-2). Similar evidence of aristocratic warriors from Etruria and Latium
suggests that some Carthaginian elites were likely able to arm themselves with panoplies
consisting of bronze helmets, bronze cuirass or linothorax, possibly greaves, together with a
thrusting spear, hoplon styled shield, and a short sword for close combat. Evidence from
Greece and Italy also indicates that spears varied between 1.8 to 2.5 metres in length with
the average being 2.25m, and weighed around one kilogram.254 The shields, if they were
closely modelled on the hoplon were rounded and slightly convex with a flat rim, and a
diameter of between 80cm- 100cm, with a bronze covering sheet of around 0.05cm.255
Modern reconstructions of the hoplon shield have shown that the shield weighed between
seven and nine kilograms.256
A fifth century bronze statuette of a Carthaginian warrior depicting a soldier in classical
Greek hoplite panoply, together with a proto-Corinthian helmet, and bronze greaves from
Sulcis (Sardinia), may have led to a distorted view of uniformity in Carthaginian armour and
an adherence to the Greek hoplite panoply.257 In a similar manner to Italic and Greek heavy
infantry, it is likely that the arms and armour of the Sacred Band varied greatly due a
number of factors such as; financial concerns, the competition of status among the elites
which manifested itself in the expense one could afford to spend on their equipment and
the inheritance of equipment, together with battlefield spoils.
Diodorus’ account of the battle of Crimisus provides the best example of the Sacred Band in
action recording that they were recruited from the ranks of citizens “who were
distinguished for their valour, reputation, and wealth” (Diod. Sic. 16.80.4).258 This selection
criteria indicates they were experienced fighters and sufficiently socially respected to be
positioned on the right hand side of the battle-line. This was traditionally the position of
253
(Goldsworthy 2001) p.33
(Connolly 1981) p.63; (Matthew 2009) p.400
255
(Burns 2006) p.149; (Connolly 1981) pp.52-53; (Schwartz 2013) pp.157-158
256
(Connolly 1981) pp.52-53; (Krentz 2013) p.136; (Schwartz 2013) p.169
257
(Salimbeti 2014) p.5,13,32
258
ταῖς δ᾽ ἀρεταῖς καὶ δόξαις, ἔτι δὲ ταῖς οὐσίαις
254
58
honour granted to the best units.259 The Scared Band is recorded as fighting bravely even
when their surrounding forces are routed (Diod. Sic. 16.80.4). If correct, they are likely to
have been exposed to extensive military discipline and training. Therefore, it is possible that
the Carthaginians who fought in the Sacred Band may have devoted a large amount of time
to military training in order to fight and die without breaking ranks. Yet, in 310, the Sacred
Band was easily routed along with a largely citizen army by Agathocles which may reflect the
withdrawal of wealthy Carthaginian citizens from military service between 341-310.
Consequently, Polybius’ remark that the Carthaginians did not devote much time to the arts
of war cannot readily be applied to the Carthaginian army pre-341 but is possibly applicable
to the army thereafter (Polyb. 6.52.7-8).
The archaeological evidence from Chemtou suggest that, if Carthaginian citizens did serve in
the armies outside of the Scared Band or the cavalry, then they were likely equipped
similarly to the heavy Celtic, Celtiberian, Iberian, Italic, Libyan, and Libyphoenician infantry
with thrusting spears, linothorax, bronze helmets, hoplon, and a possibly either a short
sword, or axe. Furthermore congruencies across the western Mediterranean suggests that if
poorer citizens did indeed serve in the army, they were likely to have been equipped in a
similar manner as light javelin armed skirmishing troops; with whatever armour they could
either afford or have looted.
3.8. Celtic, Italic, and Greek Mercenaries:
Celtic, Italic, and Greek mercenaries are also recorded as fighting at various times in
Carthaginian armies, but they do not appear to have served with much greater frequency as
Celtiberians and Iberians discussed previously in this chapter (Diod. Sic. 13.110.5, 14.8.5,
16.73.2; 25.2; Polyb. 1.17.4). Therefore, they will be examined in detail in the following
chapters that focus on Roman and Syracusan armies where they appear more regularly.
259
(Connolly 1981) p.32; (Hanson 1988) p.194; (Lendon 2005) p.69,80,107,121; (Pritchett 1974) p.192
59
3.9. Summary:
In conclusion, although there were apparent differences within the Carthaginian and Roman
political systems, such as the suffetes being denied military commands, and the
Carthaginian council of 104, they appear to have operated in remarkably similar ways.260
Furthermore, Carthaginian hegemony, like Rome’s and Syracuse’s, appears to have been
similarly light-handed and although it differed from Roman hegemony, in that it was
primarily focused upon extracting financial revenues in lieu of military manpower, this
enabled Carthage to acquire the money to employ large numbers of mercenaries from
across the western Mediterranean.261 Indeed, it is likely that the extent of Carthaginian
hegemony was a major factor in the inter-connectivity of the western Mediterranean and
helped account for the diversity of mercenaries serving in Carthaginian armies. Additionally,
common evidence suggests that the large scale of mercenary service in Carthaginian armies
helped to facilitate the transmission of Celtic and Italic military technology into Iberia, North
African, and Sicily.262 Thus, Carthaginian hegemony and their use of Celtic, Celtiberian,
Iberian, Italic, and to a lesser extent Greek mercenaries appears to have been a major
influence in the development of the western Mediterranean military koine. Finally, the
congruencies of evidence discussed in the following chapters on Rome and Syracuse will
further demonstrate that Carthaginian armies were not fighting with radically different
military equipment, nor were their military systems or hegemonies able to drastically alter
the tactics with which they naturally fought.
Chapter Four: Syracuse
4.1. Overview.
This chapter will examine the role that Syracuse played in the development of the western
Mediterranean koine from the fifth century onwards. It intends to illustrate that this
occurred through its employment of similar foreign mercenaries to those who also served in
contemporary Carthaginian armies. Indeed, it appears that from the fifth century Sicily
260
(Goldsworthy 2001) p.30,35; (Hoyos 2015) p.17; (Lazenby 1996) p.20; (Scullard 1990) p.490; (Warmington 1969) p.142
(Goldsworthy 2001) p.36; (Lazenby 1996) p.26; (Scullard 1990) p.487; (Warmington 1969) p.134
262
(Connolly 1981) p.150 fig.11, 12,14; (Cunliffe 1997) p.143 fig.114,115; (Quesada Sanz 1997b) P.257,259, 262-266;
(Quesada Sanz 2011a)pp.140-156; (Quesada Sanz 2011c) pp.214-216, 222, 225, 227; (Salimbeti 2014) p.40
261
60
became the most important theatre for the development of the western Mediterranean
military koine. The frequent conflicts between Carthage and Syracuse drew together
Carthaginian, Celtic, Celtiberian, Iberian, Italic, Greek, Libyan, Libyphoenician, Numidian, and
Sicilian troops. The interaction of these troops facilitated a two way flow of military
equipment, for example the falcata and oblong shield were likely first encountered by
Iberian and Celtiberian troops whilst in Syracuse and gradually begin to appear in Spanish
contexts thereafter. Furthermore, as previously discussed, Italic spongia and Celtic
Montefortino helmets also appear in Carthaginian contexts during this period of interaction.
Moreover, although it is outside of the scope of this paper, Sicily would continue to facilitate
the development of the western Mediterranean military koine with the outbreak of the First
Punic War, which again drew together the same mixture of troops.
Sicily strategically sits between the toe of Italy and North Africa’s Cape Bon. This position
allowed Sicilian communities to profit from any trade passing through to the western
Mediterranean and to increase the island’s already diverse population consisting of native
Elymians, Sicans, and Sicels, in addition to Greeks, Italians, and Phoenicians. Between the
fifth to third centuries these trading links combined with the stream of Balearic, Celtic,
Greek, Iberian, Italic, and Carthaginian mercenaries migrating to Sicily cemented the power
of a number of tyrants. The mercenaries, who were frequently settled among the
communities of eastern Sicily, contributed further to the cultural and military diversity of
the island. This diversity was fostered by the tendency of tyrants to, not only settle their
loyal mercenaries amongst their communities, but also to redistribute the populations of
other Sicilian communities, which themselves were likely to have consisted of more than
one ethnicity. Between 494-288 there were 41 recorded instances of mercenaries being
settled among existing communities, or the transfer of these communities to other Sicilian
cities.263 Moreover, the settlements and transfers of populations were not small-scale
rather they frequently involved thousands of people.264 For example, in 488-84 Gelon
transferred half of the population of Gela to Syracuse, as well granting 10,000 mercenaries
Syracusan citizenship and Dionysius I sold the citizens of Catane as slaves before settling his
Campanian mercenaries in the city (Diod. Sic. 11.72-8 , 14.15; Hdt 7.156). All of this evidence
263
(Lomas 2006) pp.98-100 tbl.7; Diod. Sic. 11.72-8, 11.49, 11.76, 12.53, 12.83, 13.63, 13.89, 13.111, 13.114, 14.7, 14.9,
14.15, 14.16, 14.37.5, 14.58, 14.59, 14.78.3-6, 14.87, 14.96, 15.66.5, 16.69, 16.82-3, 20.69, 20.71, 22.13.2; Herodotus. 6.246, 7.156; Polyb. 1.7-11; Strabo. 6.2.3; Thucy. 6.4.6
264
(Lomas 2006) pp.95-116
61
appears to corroborate Thucydides’ statement that the “Sicilian cities have enlarged
populations made out of all sorts of mixtures and there are constant changes and
rearrangements in their citizen bodies” (Thuc. 6.17.2).265 The ethnic, cultural, and military
diversity in Sicily indicates that it was firmly entrenched in the western Mediterranean
koine. Therefore, its military and political developments should be viewed as part of the
same phenomenon as those occurring at Carthage and Rome. The following chapter will
examine Syracusan tyranny in order to illustrate how the actions of its tyrants contributed
to this diversity and ultimately the development of the western Mediterranean military
koine.
4.2. Syracusan Tyranny:
Politically, Syracuse was dominated by tyrants and literary evidence suggests that between
the fifth and third centuries, it was only under democratic control for just two periods: 460406 and 341-317 (Arist. Pol. 1316a; Diod. Sic. 11.68.6, 16.70.4, 19.1.5; Thuc. 7.55.2).266
However, as this chapter will illustrate, the socio-political dynamics at work within Syracuse
should not be considered as radically different to those in Carthage and Rome. Indeed, all of
the Syracusan tyrants were at first elected to the position of stratēgos autokratōr (General
who rules by himself) by the popular assembly.267 This potentially suggests that Syracusan
tyrants obtained control in a similar way to Roman dictators, who were also elected by the
Senate and given extraordinary powers (albeit temporary) over the state in very similar
conditions that required effective military command.
The characterisation of tyrants ruling as cruel and despotic leaders without the general
support of the demos by ancient writers has resulted in a general misconception of both
tyrants and tyranny (Arist. Pol. 1295a; Pl. Resp. 8.565). A tyrant represented the domination
of the aristocracy by an individual, which makes the line between tyranny and monarchy
blurred (Arist. Pol. 1295a).268 Aristotle also noted that a tyrant “rules despotically and
according to their own judgement,” giving the impression that they ruled without adhering
ὄχλοις τε γὰρ ξυμμείκτοις πολυανδροῦσιν αἱ πόλεις καὶ ῥᾳδίας ἔχουσι τῶν πολιτῶν τὰς μεταβολὰς καὶ ἐπιδοχάς
(Dunkle 1967) p.161; (Hornblower 2011) p.51; (Lewis 2006) p.3; (Lomas 2006) p.95; (Robinson 2000) p.204
267
στρατηγός αὐτοκράτωρ (Lewis 2006) p.4
265
266
268
(Hornblower 2011) p.51; (Lewis 2006) pp 3-14; (Zambon 2008) p.268
62
to the communities’ civic, legal, and political structures (Arist. Pol. 1295a- 19-23).269
However, revisionist studies have shown that under tyrants the civic institutions and
magistracies continued to operate with little or no changes to them or the “constitutional
regimes.” Thus, in many cases a tyrant can be seen as working with the demos not
overriding it.270 Dionysius I addressed the Syracusan assembly for permission to wage war
because they were the people who were going to pay for and physically fight the war for
him (Diod. Sic. 14.45).271 Consequently, despite Dionysius I and Peisistratus providing
examples that the popular assembly was empowered to undertake debates and make
decisions on important issues, it was not effectively in control of state policy and as such
may have been employed as a mollifying façade by tyrants.272 However, this then presents a
political system that was not all that dissimilar to that in Rome and Carthage where the
popular assembly was regularly consulted in order to persuade the citizen body that they
were able to exercise political power, whilst the real power remained in the hands of the
ruling aristocrats and the senate they occupied.
Furthermore, although tyrants are frequently associated with obtaining power with the help
of armed foreign mercenaries, it is unlikely that tyrants were able to achieve this without the
support of other aristocrats and political factions that stood to benefit from tyranny.
These supporters are likely to have been members of the tyrant’s family and other
aristocratic families, or clients, which were likely to have already been aligned with the
tyrant before his rise to power. For instance, Agathocles, Dion, and Dionysius were all
associated with powerful disaffected aristocratic supporters before obtaining power (Diod.
Sic. 13.91.4, 92.6, 96.3; 16.6.1, 9.1; 19.3.1-2; Plut. Dion 22.1-5, 25.14, 49.4).273 Christopher
Smith interestingly noted with regard to Rome that the pre-eminence of Camillus and the
control of the Consulate by the Fabii following the death of the would-be tyrant Spurius
Cassis resembled the triumph of “one individual, or family over another.”274 Consequently,
tyranny can be viewed as the domination of a political faction over its opponents as much as
it was the domination of one man over others. Therefore, the tyrants of Syracuse appear to
have been not all that dissimilar to the Consuls of Rome and suffetes of Carthage who acted
τυραννικαὶ δὲ διὰ τὸ δεσποτικῶς ἄρχειν καὶ κατὰ τὴν αὑτῶν γνώμην
(Lewis 2009) p.125; (McGlew 1993) p.9
271
(Lewis 2009) p.125
272
(Meister 1984) p.717
273
(Parke 1933) p.64
274
(Smith 2006a) p.59
269
270
63
as the heads of state, whilst representing the political and familial factions, albeit for a finite
period.
Aristocrats were heavily involved in both the physical fighting and the recruitment of
soldiers for their respective communities during the archaic and classical periods. Their
money, social status, and patron-client relationships allowed them to muster troops through
their family and its associated clients, as well as contributing money towards the costs of
mercenary recruitment. Consequently the Syracusan tyrants’ ability to raise private
mercenary armies, which bolstered the troops they were able to raise through client,
factional, and familial connections made them similar to the contemporary armies of
Carthage and Rome. However, the employment of mercenaries was not the only way in
which tyrants were able to consolidate their power and they often achieved this with
relationships with powerful foreign aristocrats through a combination of friendships,
marriages, both foreign and domestic in addition to military alliances (Arist. Pol. 1285a,
1311a).275 This shares parallels with Carthaginian and Roman extensions of aristocratic
socio-political power dynamics. For example, Hannibal married an Iberian princess and the
Fabii married into a prominent Campanian and Etruscan families.276
Agathocles and Dionysius I first gained the opportunities to seize power with support of
powerful aristocrats (Diod. Sic. 13.91-92; 19.3.1-2).277 All three marriages of Dionysius I were
to highly influential aristocratic families and Agathocles married his daughter to
Pyrrhus, while he married a Ptolemaic princess (Diod. Sic. 14.44.8, 21.4.1; Just. Epit. 23.2;
Plut. Pyrrh. 9.1). Moreover, Dionysius I came to power and soon received the support of the
Spartans, who in turn allowed him to recruit mercenaries from the Peloponnese, whilst his
second and third marriages allied him with aristocratic families in Lorci and Rhegium (Diod.
Sic. 14.10.2, 44.3, 58.1; 62.1).278 There are also instances where Syracuse provided
mercenary support for her allies, which illustrates the cultural and military exchange
occurring across the western Mediterranean. For example, Dionysius I sent 2,000 soldiers to
275
(Jackson 2006) p.41 p.69; (Trundle 2006) p.75
(Goldsworthy 2001) p.33; (Heurgon 1973) p.192, 217-218; (Scullard 1990) p.505
277
(Meister 1984) p.385
278
(Parke 1933) p.68
276
64
Illyria in an attempt to place the exiled Molossian Alcetas on the throne, whilst his son sent
2,000 foreign mercenaries to Sparta (Diod. Sic. 15.13.2; 15.70.1; Xen. Hell. 7.1.20, 30).279
These previously discussed phenomena helped to not only cement the tyrants’ power base
domestically and abroad, but also promoted a high level of aristocratic, cultural, and
technological inter-connectivity throughout the western Mediterranean. This mixture of
inter-connectivity transcended communal and ethnic boundaries, thus illustrating that the
perceived cultural and political differences between the peoples of Italy, Greece, Sicily, and
North Africa were not significantly dissimilar, but rather they were bound by common
aristocratic relationships and similar socio-political power dynamics.280 Furthermore,
mercenaries were employed under a wide range of political regimes from Hellenistic Kings,
to oligarchies, and tyrannies.281 The relationships created by the recruitment, service, and
settlement of these troops transcended the domestic politics of the entities that hired them,
helping to foster an international system of military connectivity.282 Indeed as Trundle
noted, mercenary service constituted another “way of cementing alliances and establishing
inter-state relationships.”283 Therefore the cultural and political inter-connectivity driven by
aristocratic and patron-client relationships, as well as mercenary service, was likely to have
been a contributing factor to the development of western Mediterranean military koine
during the fourth and third centuries.
4.3. Syracusan Armies:
The following section will isolate and examine the archaeological and literary evidence
pertaining to soldiers that were frequently recorded as serving in Syracusan armies from the
fifth century onwards. Its intention is to illustrate the prominent role that the Celts and
central and southern Italians played in the development of the western Mediterranean
military koine during this period.
279
(McKechnie 1989) p.83
(Jackson 2006) p.41
281
(Garlan 1975) p.100; (Trundle 2004) pp.5-9
282
(Trundle 2004) p.163
283
(Trundle 2004) p.164
280
65
Although literary sources indicated that the Carthaginians relied largely upon the services of
mercenaries to fight their wars, within these sources the Syracusans are recorded as
utilizing mercenaries with a much greater frequency than Carthage. For example,
Timoleon’s army at the battle of Crimisus consisted of 4,000 mercenaries and only 3,000
citizens and Agathocles North African invasion force held 6,000 foreign mercenaries and
3,500 Syracusans (Diod. Sic. 20.11.1; Plut. Tim. 24.4-5). Dionysius I repeatedly hired
mercenaries from across the Mediterranean, indeed Parke noted that mercenaries
constituted between a quarter to a third of his 80,000 strong army in 397 (Diod. Sic. 14.44.12, 14.47.7, 14.58.1; 15.17.3).284 Dionysius II’s reign utilized mercenaries with 3,000
Peloponnesian mercenaries serving him during Dion’s siege of Syracuse and he was able to
send 2,000 mercenaries of various nationalities to aid Sparta against Thebes (Diod. Sic.
15.70.1; Diod. Sic. 16.17.3; Xen. Hell. 7.1.20, 30). Dion overthrew Dionysius II with an initial
force of around 1,000 Greek mercenaries (Diod. Sic. 16.9.5; Plut. Dion 22.8). Consequently,
mercenaries appeared to have been utilized with a much greater frequency than Syracusan
citizens.
The expansion of Syracuse under the tyrants of the late fourth and early third centuries was
inexorably tied to the recruitment and subsequent settlement of foreign mercenaries.
Between 405-284 Syracuse was ruled by thirteen tyrants, in addition to Timoleon, who,
although he returned the city to democracy, was a tyrant in all but name.285 These tyrants
were reliant upon a variety of Celtic, Greek, and Italic mercenaries to first seize and then
maintain their power. Consequently, Syracusan armies during this period consisted of newly
recruited foreign mercenaries and previously settled mercenaries together with Syracusan
citizens, many of whom were former mercenaries.286
Between 488-285 Diodorus recorded eight instances where mercenaries were settled by
Syracusan tyrants both in the city itself and in other Sicilian cities (Diod. Sic.11.72-8; 11.49;
14.15; 14.58; 14.78-36; 14.96; 20.71).287 The tendency of tyrants to settle ethnically and
culturally diverse mercenaries in Syracuse and other Sicilian cities probably contributed to
the gradual development of a shared military koine. For example, an Oscan speaking
284
(Parke 1933) p.68; (Trundle 2004) p.6
(Finley 1979) p.97; (Oost 1976) p.224
286
(Zambon 2008) p.186
287
(Lomas 2006) pp.98-100 tlb.7.1
285
66
mercenary is unlikely to have abandoned his native weaponry and fighting style because he
was now a citizen in Syracuse which had a large ethnically Greek population. Evidence
illustrates that when Italic mercenaries either seized control of Sicilian cities, or peaceably
settled within them, that neither culture completely disappeared, rather they existed
alongside each other adopting and incorporating aspects of each other’s cultures to create a
multicultural community. In the fourth century the civic identity of many Sicilian cities
underwent a transformation which was intended to physically signify the assimilation of the
new mixed citizen population; new temples were built, street patterns were changed and in
some cases new public areas were constructed.288
In Cumae, Entella and Messana the sources recorded that the Italic mercenaries either killed
or enslaved the male populations of these largely Greek and Sicilian cities (Diod. Sic.
12.76.4;14.9; 22.13.2; Polyb. 1.7-11; Livy 4.44.12; Strabo 6.2.3). One would have expected
this to have coincided with a complete cultural overhaul, but epigraphic evidence reveals
that Greek names, vase-ware, and culture remained in use. In Paestum both the Greeks and
Lucanians preserved their particular burial forms and Greek sanctuaries and institutions such
as the bouleuterion were also maintained.289 Messana had a long history of cultural
diversity. Originally a Chalcidian colony (Zancle), in the fifth century its elites were
overthrown by Samian mercenaries, who themselves were ousted by Doric Messenians who
were settled by the Tyrant Anaxilas of Rhegium (Hdt. 6.24-6; Thuc. 6.4.6).290 Then in the
fourth century Messana absorbed a number of Greek settlers before finally being subjected
to a number of Campanian settlements in the city down to 285 (Diod. Sic. 14.78.3-6,
22.13.2; Polyb. 1.7-11; Strabo 6.2.3).
Epigraphic and funerary evidence from Messana further substantiates the presence of a
diverse cultural society; a vase recovered from a chamber tomb at Via. C. Battisti was
inscribed in Greek, naming an Oscan owner Pakia Pompeia.291 Evidence has also been found
in the Greek temple of Apollo, illustrating that a dedication was made on behalf of the
community by magistrates who were recognised under the Oscan term meddices.292
Furthermore, the names of these meddices were Oscan, but were written in Greek στενισ
288
(Lomas 2006) pp.110-11
(Pedley 1990) p.105; (Lomas 2006) pp.111-12
290
(Lomas 2006) p.112; (Tagliamonte 1994) p.196
291
(Lomas 2006) p.113
292
(Lomas 2006) p.114; (Vetter 1953) 197
289
67
καλινισ (Sthennius Calenius) and μαρασ πομπτιεσ (Maras Pontius).293 Additionally, a series
of five tile stamps bearing the name Μαμερτίνων, in its Greek form, have been discovered
among the cemeteries of Via. S.Cecilia, Via. S. Marta and Orto della Maddalena.294
The ability of both Greek and Oscan cultures to coexist, after the community was seized by
Campanian mercenaries, was not isolated to Messana, or Sicily for that matter. When the
Campani overran Campanian cities such as, Cumae, Capua, and Naples, it also appears that
Greek “traditions survived with little outward change.” 295Indeed, in Naples the city seems
to have retained its Greek political institutions, but like Messana, Oscan names eventually
ascend to prominent political positions.296 This evidence suggests that rather than a
complete cultural overhaul, elements of Greek and Italic culture co-existed side by side.
Consequently, it is probable that this was also true of their martial identities.
The numerous instances of demographic reshuffling carried out by the Syracusan tyrants
between the fifth and third centuries, together with the frequent and sometimes large scale
importation of foreign mercenaries, likely to have contributed to the development of a
hybrid military culture in Sicily. As previously discussed these mercenaries and settlers did
not simply abandon aspects of their native cultures when they merged into the
heterogeneous communities of eastern Sicily, rather they co-existed alongside the existing
inhabitants. Therefore, when the citizens of these communities went to war alongside
freshly arrived foreign mercenaries, it is probable that they found themselves fighting with
similar equipment and with similar tactics. With this in mind the armies of Syracuse should
not be viewed as anymore uniformly armed than the Carthaginian armies they frequently
faced.
4.4. Central and Southern Italians:
During the late fourth and first half of the third century, the peoples of central and southern
Italy played an important part in the demographic, military, and political development of
293
(Zambon 2008) pp.46-7
(Institute 2015) PH142463 = IG XIV 2394,2: Stamps A-F. The Packard Humanities Institute, Searchable Greek
Inscriptions. http://epigraphy.packhum.org/text/142463 . Accessed June 15 2015; (Lomas 2006) p.113
295
(Frederiksen 1984) p.139
294
296
(Frederiksen 1984) p.139
68
eastern Sicily. The most prominent of these Italic mercenaries were recorded as the
Campani, who were not as their name suggests indigenous to the Campanian region of Italy,
but were part of a larger Oscan speaking community. Oscan speaking Italians, had originally
occupied the central and southern Apennines, but had gradually expanded outwards and by
the end of the fourth century had established themselves across central and southern Italy,
as well in north eastern Sicily.297 Although the Campani are the most frequently mentioned
group of Italic mercenaries serving in Sicilian armies they are likely to have contained a
mixture of Apuli, Bruttii, Frentani, Lucani, Marrucini, Marsi, Paeligni, Samnites, Sidicini, and
Vestini, with whom as Oscan speakers, or Oscan related languages, they maintained a
“significant cultural similarity,” and linguistic connection.298 Therefore, when the Campani
are mentioned in the sources they are likely referring to a larger group of Oscan speaking
central and southern Italians.
The frequency with which Campanian mercenaries are recorded seems to indicate that the
Bay of Naples may have been a major mercenary marketplace, where mercenaries would
gather from a range of regions to seek employment, similar to the Peloponnese. This makes
it likely that some of these mercenaries referred to as Campani also included other Italic
peoples and Greeks living in Italy. As previously discussed, evidence indicates that when
these Oscan speaking mercenaries established themselves among the largely Greek
speaking communities of Campania, it is possible that there were some Greek speakers
serving amongst Oscan mercenaries. Therefore, when this thesis refers to the Campani, it
will be referring to a mercenary body, largely constituted of Oscan speaking, Italic peoples,
or those Sabellic speakers whose language was closely related to Oscan. However it should
be recognised that these mercenary bands possibly held among its numbers Greeks,
Etruscans, and Latins.299
Central and southern Italians are first recorded as serving in Sicily as mercenaries during the
ill-fated Athenian campaign against Syracuse, where a group of Campani were recruited by
the Chalcidians (Leontini and Naxos) of Sicily in order to reinforce the Athenian expedition in
414/13 (Diod. Sic. 13.44.2).300 Carthaginian envoys quickly followed suit and these
297
(Salmon 1967) pp.28-49
(Salmon 1967) p.33; (Zambon 2008) p.45
299
(Salmon 1967) p.33
298
300
(Frederiksen 1984) p.106
69
Campanian mercenaries entered the service of Carthage during their conflict with Dionysius
I (Diod 13.44.2). In 406, Carthaginian envoys recruited more Campani, only to witness them
switch their allegiance to the Syracusan tyrant after peace was concluded (Diod. Sic.
13.80.4; 14.8.5; 9.2). Diodorus further noted that the 1,200 Campani recruited by Dionysius
were cavalry and it was these same mercenaries who having been paid and released from
his service went onto seize the city of Entella (Diod. Sic.14.9.8-9).
In 404 Dionysius settled his mercenary forces in Syracuse as citizens which presumably
included at least some Campani. A further band of Campani were subsequently settled at
Catane and then later moved to Aetna (Diod. Sic. 14.7.5, .15.3, 58.2).301 The Campani of 404
further affected the cities of Sicily, when a body of mercenaries, who had apparently not
been settled or chose not to settle in Aetna, Catane, or Syracuse peacefully, asked for
admission to Entella and then forcibly seized the town ((Diod. Sic. 14.9.8-9). This act would
be repeated when another group of Campani seized the city of Messana in 288 (Diod. Sic.
22.13.2; Polyb. 1.7-11; Strabo. 6.2.3). This could represent both a very real fear, or a literary
trope, as it is a recognizable reoccurring theme in the recorded history of the Campani, with
similar events occurring with their seizure of Capua, Entella, and Rhegium when a Roman
force seized control of the city under the command of Campanian named Decius Vibellius
(Diod. Sic. 14.9.8-9; 22.1.2-3; Polyb. 1.7-8).302 Moreover, the seizures of communities
possibly demonstrates that the driving force behind mercenary service, aside from wealth,
was the desire to own land and suggests that the prospect of returning home to central and
southern Italy may have not have held the possibility of owning land. Regardless of their
ambitions, the largely Oscan speaking Mamertines would then dominate the north-eastern
corner of Sicily with a series of fortified garrisons until 264, and from this position prove a
constant threat to Syracusan hegemony over the cities of north eastern Sicily.
It is fortunate that, although there is a relative lack of archaeological evidence pertaining to
military equipment in eastern Sicily and Syracuse, the tombs of central and southern Italy
such as Capua, Cumae, Nola (Campania), Paestum, (Lucania), and Lavello (Samnium) provide
a wealth of evidence from which a conceivable picture of their military equipment can be
constructed. The evidence of central and southern Italian warriors found in tombs can also
301
302
(Frederiksen 1984)p. 143-4
(Zambon 2008) p.104
70
be further reinforced by pottery finds. Central and southern Italy tomb and vase paintings
largely depict infantry equipped with thrusting spears or javelins, together with a variety of
swords being used as a secondary weapon. However, it should be noted these iconographic
representations may at times reflect artistic conventions rather than local practices.
Physical and artistic evidence found in tombs and vases strongly suggest that the primary
offensive weapons of the central and southern Italians were the javelin and thrusting spear.
Images of javelins are clearly depicted in a scene from the ‘Warriors Return’ from Nola,
where two warriors are equipped with two long thin javelins all four of which have the
amentum clearly delineated (Plate 27).303 Further pictorial evidence can be seen in a series
of partially preserved tomb paintings housed in the Naples museum which depict a warrior
equipped with a clipeus being wounded by a javelin in his thigh, together with another
warrior bearing a clipeus, Attic styled plumed helmet, bronze belt, and possibly a linen
cuirass thrusting a spear overhand whilst around him are scattered two javelins both clearly
showing their amenta.304 Tomb 7 from the Gaudo cemetary at Paestum shows two duelling
warriors advancing on each other with thrusting spears, both of whom carry javelins lodged
in their legs.305 Furthermore Tomb 53 at Andriuolo also illustrates two warriors advancing
on each other with thrusting spears, whilst still holding two javelins (Plate 28).306 This
evidence seemingly indicates that central and southern Italic warriors of all classes went
into battle equipped with both javelins and spears.307 Finally a warrior wearing a crested
helmet but no body armour and equipped with javelin and an oblong shield from the north
side of Tomb 114, in the Andriuolo necropolis at Paestum is seen advancing between two
lines of warriors holding thrusting spears crouching behind their clipeus (Plate 29).308 This
scene may illustrate the initial phase of battle where the lightly armed troops skirmished
ahead of the two lines of heavy infantry before they themselves entered the battle and it
would certainly fit with Quesada Sanz’s ‘cloud’ model of warfare.309
Physical examples of javelins discovered alongside the pictorial evidence in Campania and
Paestum has provided a surer picture of the various types of javelins that the central and
303
(Burns 2006) p.376 WP48, WP48a; (Connolly 1981) p.107
(Connolly 1981) p.107
305
(Small 2000) p.228
306
(Burns 2006) p.371 WP2
307
(Small 2000) p.230
308
(Burns 2006) p.374 WP20; (Small 2000) p.229-30
309
(Quesada Sanz 2006) p.251,258, 263
304
71
southern Italians fought with. The most common javelin types were constructed of thin iron
shanks designed with either a square shank with a small pyramidal head which begins to
appear from the late fifth century, or a circular shank with a long thin tapering point akin to
the medieval bodkin arrow which is dated from the mid- fourth century.310 These javelins
bear remarkably similarities to the Celtiberian and Iberian falarica as well as the Celtic and
Italic javelins at Montefortino and Monte Bibele. Examples of the square shanked pyramidal
headed javelin ranging in length from 21-42cm have been discovered in graves from Eboli,
Paestum (Tomb 2/1957), Pescara, and Pontecagnano, whilst the ‘bodkin’ type has been
discovered at Carife (Tomb 9), San Prisco at Capua (Tomb 16), and Paestum and ranges
between 41-42 cm.311 These javelins are characteristic of Italic light javelins in that their
shanks are on average up to “four times the length of the head.”312 These physical examples
seem to corroborate Polybius’ later description of the javelin used by Roman velites; he
describes these as being around three feet in length and a finger’s breadth in diameter
(Polyb. 6.22).
The pyramidal javelin heads discovered at Paestum and Pontecagnano physically taper to a
very thin point about two-thirds of the way down the shank towards the head then flare
out. This could potentially have created a weak point causing them to bend upon impact,
but this feature was a by-product of the primary objective of the design which was to pierce
armour.313 This design which is replicated on later Roman pila seems to corroborate
Polybius’ description that the second century Roman pilum bent upon impact making them
difficult to extract (Polyb. 6.22).
The presence of the bodkin styled heads without the added weight at the head may have
carried more penetrative power, but were less likely to bend upon impact. Alternatively they
may represent a period of experimentation in javelin design between the fifth to fourth
centuries that eventually concluded that the pyramidal headed javelin was more effective
and harder to remove than the ‘bodkin’ styled javelin. The possibility that the pyramidal
headed javelin bent upon impact, may also explain why the warriors illustrated on the walls
310
(Burns 2006) p.184
(Burns 2006) p. 183, 184, 277, 278, 279,353 JS39, 354 JS83 JS88, 355 JS22, 356 JS39 357 JS99, JS100; (Cipriani 1990)
p.135 T37, T40; (Connolly 1981) P.109; (Serritella 1995) p. 65 T4036; 17 and 102 T4435.7; 27 T5755; (Small 2000) P.224
312
(Burns 2006) p.181
313
(Small 2000) p.224
311
72
of tomb 7 at Gaudo are continuing to fight with the javelins still embedded in their legs.314
The image of two warriors continuing to fight with javelins still embedded in their legs
occurs on a number of vases and always as a duel rather than part of a larger battle.315
Interestingly the javelins found at Eboli are occasionally found with heavy armour whilst
those found at Paestum and Pontecagnano are found alongside heavier spears, although
they are the less common weapon. This suggests that like other contemporary warriors in
the western Mediterranean, javelins could be utilized by heavy and light infantry, and
corroborates the pictorial evidence of heavily armed warriors equipped with javelins from
the Naples museum.316
Artistic evidence, in conjunction with physical examples indicates that the dual-purpose
spear (hastae) was light enough to be thrown, but sturdy enough to be used in a thrusting
motion existed as a popular alternative to the specialised javelin or thrusting spear and in
fact may have been the standard offensive weapon. Artistically, the dual-purpose spear is
often depicted in pairs and this may reflect that they were popular because they allowed
the soldier to launch one of his spears, whilst retaining the other which remained suitable
for use in the continuation of skirmishing, or in close combat.317 Physical finds of the dualpurpose spearheads are somewhat harder to distinguish as they resemble the thrusting
spearhead. The dual-purpose spears are usually characterized by their lack of sauroter and
the design of the spearhead itself which featured a low-shouldered tapering head
resembling an elongated leaf shape and range from 45-60cm in length and 2.5-6cm in
width.318 The length of this weapon would have enabled the bearer to inflict a deep
penetrative wound to his enemy, in either a throwing or thrusting capacity, in addition to
the increased opportunity for cutting along both edges of the blade.319 Due to the style of
warfare that was developing in the fourth century in which heavy and light infantry alike
were able to fight with both javelin and spear, the dual-purpose spear would have offered a
versatile alternative to the specialization of the javelin and the spear.
314
(Small 2000) p.228
(Schneider-Herrmann 1996) Pl. 52, 101,127,
316
(Small 2000) p.225
317
(Schneider-Herrmann 1996) Pl. 17,30,61,112, 156, 163
318
(Burns 2006) p.181, 353 fig. 2,4, 355 fig. JS23, JS24, JS31, JS32, 356 fig. JS42, JS45
319
(Burns 2006) p.181
315
73
In central and southern Italy, the spear is the most common offensive weapon throughout
the Late Iron Age.320 The shape and size of the Italic thrusting spear has been shown to
closely resemble the Greek doru in that it was on average 1.8-3 metres in length with an
iron head that ranged from 15-30cm long and 2.5-4cm in width together with a sauroter.321
Physical examples of spearheads are well attested in central and southern Italy particularly
in Pescara, Paestum, and Lavello although at times they are difficult to precisely distinguish
from the variety of dual-purpose and javelin heads.322
Two dominant sword types seem to have been utilized by central and southern Italian
warriors during the fourth-third centuries, the double-bladed antennae typed thrusting
sword with an average length 30-46cm and the machaira a longer Italic counterpart of the
falcata the blade of which could reach 77cm or more.323 The archaeological scarcity of
swords in central and southern Italy illustrates several important points; first that the sword
served as a secondary weapon to the central and southern Italians who seem to have
preferred the javelin and spear. The preference for the javelin and spear also indicates that
the Italic style of warfare was at least partly ranged and therefore was likely to have been
less orderly than the traditional Greek phalanx. The presence of such a large percentage of
physical spearheads in the archaeological record may indicate that the sign of an Italic
warrior was embodied by the spear, or javelin, rather than the sword. Furthermore, swords
were likely expensive items that were not commonly used by all sections of society. This
expense may also have resulted in the sword being too valuable to remove from functional
service and therefore may have seen it recycled for use by surviving members of the family.
The defensive equipment of the central and southern Italians seems to conform to the two
dominant shield types in the western Mediterranean; the circular clipeus and the oblong
shield. The central and southern Italian and Paestum tomb paintings crucially provide a
rough time frame of the “development of shield types in southern Italy.”324 These tomb
paintings reveal that the clipeus is the most popularly illustrated shield between the “late
320
(Small 2000) p.221
(Burns 2006) p.182; (Connolly 1981) p.109; (Matthew 2009) p.400
322
(Burns 2006) p.182, 191, 356 JS38 JS46; (Small 2000) p.221
323
(Burns 2006) p.192, 194; 358 SA2; (Connolly 1981) p.109; (Quesada Sanz 2011b) p.50
324
(Burns 2006) p.161
321
74
fifth to the last quarter of the third centuries.”325 Whereas the central and southern Italian
cities of Capua and Nola witness the appearance of the oblong shield from the last third of
the fourth century, and the shield begins to appear in the tombs of Paestum and vase-ware
from the dawn of the third century.326 This distinct timeline, defining the long lived
popularity of the clipeus together with the gradual spread of the oblong shield, indicates that
by the late fourth century the javelin was developing into the primary weapon of the central
and southern Italians. Furthermore, it appears that by the end of the third century the
oblong shield had largely replaced the clipeus, which offered far less protection against
javelins than its full body counterpart. The dominance of the clipeus in the iconographic
evidence may reflect its expense, which made it a symbol of wealth and social standing and
was therefore a sought after image by the wealthier sections of society. Furthermore, the
clipeus is often shown artistically as the shield of choice for duelling warriors, and often
appears in scenes that could be interpreted as having mythological connotations, which
further strengthens the appeal of the clipeus to the wealthier classes whom sought to attach
themselves to these themes.327
The growth in popularity of the oblong shield also potentially illustrates that warfare in Italy
was becoming increasingly mobile. The central iron boss and horizontal grip of the oblong
shield also potentially represents a shift towards mobile, missile orientated warfare. The
iron boss allowed the warrior to punch his shield out from himself both offensively and
defensively. Offensively, the iron boss could be used like an iron fist to knock the opponent
off balance, whilst defensively it could be manoeuvred easily to take the brunt of an
opponent’s blow thanks to the horizontal grip. The horizontal grip also provided additional
benefits over the porpax and antilabe of the clipeus it allowed the shield to be easily
extended out from the body, a manoeuvre which allowed the warrior to punch away, or
deflect blows, in addition to further extending distance between the shield and its bearer.
This additional distance may have resulted in the development of longer shanked javelins,
which were required to penetrate further through the shield in order to wound the warrior
behind it.
325
(Burns 2006) p.161, 352 fig.1,3, 358 fig.1, 359 fig.5, 369 fig. 1-3, 5, 6, 9, 371 WP1-3, 373 WP7,14, 376 WP3; (SchneiderHerrmann 1996) p.65, Pl.17-22, 27, 28a-b, 51-52, 108-110, 117-120
326
(Burns 2006) p.161, 374 fig WP20, 377 WP50; (Schneider-Herrmann 1996) p.66, Pl. 105, 131, 133, 149
327
(Schneider-Herrmann 1996) Pl. 30,51, 52, 66, 68,101, 103, 109,110,121-23, 126
75
There were a variety of helmets worn throughout central and southern Italy between the
fourth-third centuries. It appears that after 390, the most popular of these helmets were the
Italo-Corinthian and Samno-Attic.328 The Italo-Corinthian helmet originally emerged in
the Italian peninsula sometime during the sixth century as a “clear development of the
Greek form” where it continued in use until the end of the fourth century.329 Constructed of
bronze, the Italo-Corinthian helmet was equipped with set rigid cheek guards that almost
fully enclosed the face with narrow eye holes and a descending strip of bronze that covered
the nose. It was in essence a full faced helmet that severely restricted the wearer’s ability to
see and hear.330 The Italo-Corinthian helmet is better represented in the Etruria and Latium
however, the large Greek influence in the cities of central and southern Italians and
Tarentum makes it possible that it was in use in these regions.
By far the most popularly depicted helmet in central and southern Italy was the Samno-Attic
helmet which appears on all three of the warriors in the ‘Warriors Return’ fresco in
Paestum, a bronze ‘Samnite Warrior’ figurine in the Louvre and features frequently on
central and southern Italic vase-ware (Plates 7, 27).331 Physically the Samno-Attic helmet has
been discovered in tombs from Cumae and Paestum, in addition to 31 examples that date to
the fourth century distributed across central and southern Italy.332 The Samno-Attic helmet
seems to present an example of a direct modification of the Greek Chalkidian without the
nose-guard and it featured a low close fitted bowl with a conspicuous ridge together with a
closely fitted neck-guard and hinged cheek pieces (bucculae).333 In many ways it is similar to
the Celtic Montefortino and Etrusco-Thracian helmets, the main exception being the size
and extension of the neck-guard. The top of some Samno-Attic helmet are equipped with a
either a singular, or pair of sockets which presumably were used to hold a crest (crista) or
aigrettes. The popularity of the Samno-Attic helmet in central and southern Italy with its
similarities to the Montefortino and Etrusco-Thracian helmets is possibly representative of a
wider trend towards armour that facilitated flexible javelin orientated warfare. The hinged
bucculae had the added benefit of being able to be tied up providing the predominantly
328
(Connolly 1981); (Paddock 1993) p. 320-21, 470
(Paddock 1993) p.78
330
(Burns 2003) p.68; (Connolly 1981) p.61 fig.13, 110 fig.5; (Schneider-Herrmann 1996) Pl. 27,40,64a, 114; (Snodgrass
1967) pp.51-58
331
(Paddock 1993) p.406, 749; (Schneider-Herrmann 1996) Pl. 3, 5, 9, 16, 20, 22, 23, 46, 67, 68, 151
332
(Connolly 1981) p.105,107-110; (Paddock 1993) p.400, 402 fig.107, 410 fig.109, pp.413-414 tbl.3, 415 fig.110, 4 18 fig.
111
333
(Connolly 1981) p.111; (Paddock 1993) p.401
329
76
javelin armed skirmisher with the attractive advantages of increased visibility and
awareness. The bucculae could then if the situation warranted it, be tied down giving the
warrior extra protection in close combat.
There are also physical examples of simple conical ‘jockey-cap’ helmets akin to the Greek
pilos and Etruscan Negau helmet which are devoid of bucculae, or neck-guards, an example
of which can be seen on a skyphos now in Brussels.334 These helmets are rarer in the
archaeological and iconographic record, but this may be the result of them being a cheaper
helmet that was popular among the poorer sections of society and thus not deposited or
depicted in the wares and tombs of the wealthy. It was not always financially practical for
military equipment to be buried and thus taken out of circulation so it is possible that if the
pilos type helmets were worn by the poorer citizens, then may potentially explain why they
are less well documented.
Archaeological evidence from across southern Italy indicates that body armour of the central
and southern Italians conforms to three major categories; bronze disc-shaped
cuirasses and Greek, and Italic anatomical cuirasses, together with the linothrorax. A leather
belt covered with bronze is present in practically every depiction of central and southern
Italian and southern Italic warriors; these belts were 7-12cm in width, 70-110 cm long and a
thickness of between 0.5-1.5mm.335 Additionally the appearance of elaborate decorations
on some belts seems to indicate that they held important cultural significance to the central
and southern Italians; belts are occasionally depicted as the only body armour worn by
some soldiers and are frequently depicted as a trophy in tomb paintings and vase-ware.336
The single disc, or plate (cardiophylax), and the triple disc (spongia) cuirasses are widely
represented artistically and physically in the archaeological record (Plates 15-18). The
cardiophylax seems to have been the earliest model of the two types. The cardiophylax
could be in the form of either a bronze disc or rectangle averaging between 20-25cm that
was suspended over the shoulder by a either a simple single, or a number of hinged leather
straps which were reinforced by iron hinges and trimmings and were mirrored on the back
334
(Connolly 1981) p.110 fig.4; (Paddock 1993) pp.366-367; (Schneider-Herrmann 1996) Pl. 13,69,122,123, 124
(Burns 2006) p.132;(Connolly 1981) p.109; (Schneider-Herrmann 1996) Pl.44a, 45; (Salmon 1967) p.109
336
(Burns 2006) p. 131, 334 fig. 1, 3-5, 335 fig.2-5; (Connolly 1981) pp.108-110; (Schneider-Herrmann 1996) Pl. 11, 17-25,
47,39,50,67,101,105-106, 113, 116, 118 (Salmon 1967) p.109
335
77
by an identically shaped counterpart.337 The Capestrano warrior provides the clearest
example of how complex this suspension system could be (Plate 17).338 The leather straps of
the cardiophylax seems to have undergone a further transformation by the fourth century,
in which the leather straps are replaced by bronze straps and eventually shoulder plates
which can be seen on a Lucanian krater now in Vienna.339 There seems to be a clear line of
development between with the earliest models of the cardiophylax originating in the sixthfifth centuries and becoming “increasingly rare” in artistic depictions by the fourth century,
as the spongia began to supersede it from the fifth century onwards.340
Although the three discs of the spongia provided a larger area of protection for the warrior
its harness system was less complicated than its predecessor. The main reason for this
development is that, despite it being described as having three discs, they are actually
embossed shapes joined together as one triangular bronze plate that tapered downward
from the shoulders towards the navel. This allowed a less complicated hinge system, which
consisted of four reasonably thick bronze straps, two extending over the shoulders and two
wrapping around the torso from underneath the arm pits.341 Nine examples of the spongia
have been discovered Paestum and importantly on the ‘Samnite Warrior’ statuette that was
found in Sicily and can be seen on a number of Central and southern Italians vases.342
The numerous physical examples and artistic depictions of the cardiophylax and the spongia
likely indicate that the central and southern Italians were fighting a highly mobile, missile
dominated method of warfare that could descend into melee combat if necessary.
Therefore, the development of the cardiophylax and spongia provide tangible evidence that
they were seeking a flexible and light form of armour that facilitated rather than hindered
their ability to utilize their javelins, whilst still providing adequate protection in close quarter
combat. A soldier fighting at close quarter against enemies equipped with heavier Greek
and Italian anatomical cuirasses would have had considerably more upper body flexibility
and manoeuvrability. The advantages of the cardiophylax and spongia were in their ease of
repair, since if the discs became badly damaged they could be simply disconnected and
337
(Burns 2006) p.58, (Connolly 1981) p.101; (Salmon 1967) p.109; (Schneider-Herrmann 1996) p.46-49, Pl.22,23, 67, 7275, 85a-b
338
(Connolly 1981) pp.101 fig.13-14
339
(Burns 2006) p.59; (Trendall 1983) pl.413
340
(Burns 2006) p.59
341
(Salmon 1967) p.109
342
(Burns 2006) p.295 T4, 300 T23 T24, 305 T44; (Connolly 1981) p.108, 110 (Salmon 1967) p.109,
78
exchanged with a newly constructed one, whereas the Greek and Italian bronze cuirasses
would have required considerably more skill to repair. Furthermore, the highly decorated
spongia discovered at Ksour-es-Sad (Tunisia) is “undoubtedly of southern Italic
manufacture,” which illustrates that between the fifth-third centuries, military technology in
the western Mediterranean was subject to a high level of interconnectivity and that a large
part of this was due to the movement of Italic mercenaries.343
Two types of anatomical cuirasses are also attested in central and southern Italy, the Greek
muscled cuirass and the shorter Italic anatomical cuirass, both of which were composed of a
solid bronze breast and back-plates (Plates 19-20). The differences between the two
cuirasses can be roughly separated into two dominant features. Firstly the Italic cuirass is
generally shorter measuring 29.5-37cm in height and 25-30cm in width extending down to
just above or below the navel. This is probably a consequence of the importance of the Italic
belt which served to protect the stomach and provided the wearer with greater flexibility. It
is important to note that whilst the Italic cuirass was generally shorter than its Greek
counterpart, there are examples that show that the Greek cuirass could be produced in a
longer form 42-53 cm high and 31.2-42.7cm wide, as well as a shorter version measuring 3544cm in height and 33-37 cm in width.344 The shorter version of the Greek cuirass might
have been an attempt to tailor it to an Italian market which preferred the belt as a lower
protection. The second difference is how the cuirasses were fastened. The Greek styled
cuirass was fastened together directly at the shoulder and waist by a variety of hinges and
rings.345 Examples of the Greek cuirass are rare in representational sources when compared
to the frequency that the Italic cuirass or the spongia appear.346 Alternatively the Italic
cuirass was connected at the shoulder and torso by bronze straps similar to those that held
the spongia in place in addition to the armour worn by two warriors on the ‘Warriors
Return’ tomb from Nola and the restored panoply from Cumae now in the Royal Armouries
at Leeds.347
343
(Connolly 1981) p.111
(Burns 2006) p.84, 94
345
Burns 2006) p.83, 86, 88, 307-311
346
(Burns 2006) p.91
347
(Burns 2006) p. 94, 315-319; (Connolly 1981) p. 105, 108;
344
79
The linothorax is less well represented in the iconographic evidence from central and
southern Italy than the previously discussed variety of metallic cuirasses.348 However, there
are instances where it is discernible, for instance the bronze statue of Mars of Todi wears a
plated linothorax and it can also be seen on a small number of tomb-paintings and vases.349
The apparent artistic unpopularity of the linothorax may reflect that metallic cuirasses were
more expensive, and thus potentially were given a greater amount of prestige that was may
have appealed to those wealthy enough to commission tomb-paintings and purchase vaseware. Livy describes the linothorax as being worn by the Samnites, although his description
of the Linen Legion is fanciful, it does possibly illustrate how later Romans perceived the
linothorax as being of central and southern Italic provenance (Livy 9.40.1-4).
The evidence from the central Apennines and southern Italy suggests that there was a wide
variety of influences on body armour from the fifth to third centuries. These influences are
reflective of the larger Mediterranean wide trend towards more flexible, lighter, less
restrictive armour that facilitated manoeuvrability and speed without impeding the wearers’
upper body to the point that they were unable to effectively launch javelins.350 Furthermore
the body armour portrays the image that warfare in central and southern Italy, primarily
consisted of a small number of heavily armed soldiers, fighting alongside a large number of
lighter armed troops all of whom were able to fight as javelin wielding skirmishers.
4.5. Celts:
The Celts potentially played a pivotal role in the development of the western Mediterranean
military koine. This can be most clearly seen in the dispersal of military equipment that was
either of Celtic provenances, or was spread by their interaction with contemporary western
Mediterranean peoples. For example, the spread of the Montefortino helmet, heavy
shanked javelin, and the oblong shield to the Celtiberians, Italians, and North Africans can all
be plausibly argued to have originated in some way or another as a result of their interaction
with the Celts.
348
(Burns 2006) p.104
(Burns 2006) p.103, 374 WP20a, WP22, 377 WP50; (Schneider-Herrmann 1996) p.49, Pl. 5, 33, 51
350
(Hannah 1990) p.272
349
80
Celtic mercenaries were recorded as serving Agathocles, Dionysius I, and Dionysius II, and
Pyrrhus between 385-275 in Africa, Italy, Greece, and Sicily and although they are not
mentioned in the service of Timoleon, or other Sicilian tyrants, it is highly probable that they
were found in their service (Diod. Sic. 15.70.1, 20.11.1, 64.2, 22.12.1; Plut. Pyrrh. 26.1, 30.1,
32.1-2; Xen. Hell. 7.1.20, 31).351 The archaeological evidence pertaining to Celtic military
equipment is at times largely corroborated by the literary descriptions of Celtic warriors
(Diod. Sic. 5.30; Polyb. 2.28-31; Plut. Cam. 40.1-3). These descriptions seemingly correspond
to the large periods of time between La Tène I (400-285) and La Tène II (285-100) in which
developments in military technology can be discerned.352
Livy implies that Dionysius I was in some part responsible for the Celtic sack of Rome in 390
(Livy 7.23.15). This implication may have been derived from the fact that in 389/8 Dionysius
had looked to extend his hegemony over northern Italy by founding colonies on the Adriatic
coast in addition to owning a stud farm in cispadana which was occupied by the Veneti
tribe, as well as launching a campaign in southern Italy that saw Croton, Rhegium, and
Thurii, captured (Diod. Sic. 14.106.1-3, 15.13-14).353 The Syracusan relationship with the
Celts of the Po valley continued under Dionysius II who sent a force 2,000 strong that
included Celtic mercenaries in aid to Sparta (Diod. Sic. 15.70.1; Xen. Hell. 7.1.20, 30). It is
very likely, that in keeping with Dionysius I and his son’s tendencies to grant citizenship to
their mercenaries, this included Celtic warriors, although no direct evidence of this has been
found.
Diodorus and Polybius both describe the Celts as fighting primarily with a long sword
however; archaeological evidence has shown his account to be mistaken on a number of
levels (Diod. Sic. 5.30; Polyb. 2.28-31). The majority of Celtic swords recovered from La Tène
during the period 400-250 were constructed with double sided pointed blades suitable for
cutting and thrusting and measuring 55-65 cm in length which is of a similar length to the
Celtiberian, Iberian, Italic, and Greek antennae types for the same period.354 The longer
bladed Celtic slashing sword with a rounded edge did not come into widespread existence
until the La Tène II period (c.250/225-100) and finds from La Tène illustrate that the blades
351
(Bridgman 2003) p.49; (Cunliffe 1997) p.76; (Ellis 1997) p.52, 63; (Hornblower 1998) p.243
(Hubert 2006) p.128
353
(Bridgman 2003) pp.48-9; (Purcell 1994) p.387
354
(Connolly 1981) pp.115-16;(De Navarro 1972) Pl.1-3; (Hubert 2006) pp88-89
352
81
continued to increase in length during the La Tène II period to as much as 72.7cm, or
more.355 Therefore, the swords described by Diodorus and Polybius are likely the Celtic
swords of their period and anachronistically applied as the weapon used by Celtic warriors
in earlier periods (Diod. Sic. 5.30.3; Polyb. 2.28-31).
Polybius’ description of the Celtic defeat at the battle of Telamon in 225 was possibly based
upon the account of Fabius Pictor, who is recorded as being present at the battle (Eutrop.
3.5; Polyb. 2.27-32; Oros. 4.13.6).356 Polybius noted that the Celts were unable to utilize
their long swords, as the Roman javelins wrought carnage on them before they could come
within range (Polyb.2.30-31). The gaesatae are mentioned as being present at Telamon,
which indicates that there were specialist spearmen in the Celtic ranks and the presence of
the long swords (if they were utilized) may reflect the realization of a developmental trend
towards long swords that had begun in the La Tène II period. However, the intention of this
thesis is to focus on the period before the First Punic War, so whilst Polybius’ account may
be accurate for the later third century it may not be so during the La Tène I and the early
years of La Tène II period where the dominance of the spear, javelin, and short sword is well
attested.
Like their western Mediterranean contemporaries, the primary Celtic weapons seem to
have been the thrusting spear and the javelin (Strabo. 4.4.119-20). In fact it is clear that the
spear is the most common Celtic weapon in the Late Iron Age.357 Archaeological finds of
Celtic spearheads discovered from La Tène in Switzerland present a variety of forms ranging
from elongated and broad short leaf-shapes to flame shaped blades measuring as long as
45-60 cm and suggest that in overall length the Celtic spear conformed to the standard
western Mediterranean length of between 2-2.5m.358
Polybius mistakenly referred to the gaesatae as a tribe of Celts living in Alpine regions of the
Rhône (Polyb. 2.22). Gaesatae is derived from the Latin stem word gaesum (a heavy
spear/javelin) and modern studies have concluded that the term gaesatae was used to
355
(Connolly 1981) p.116; (De Navarro 1972) p.387 fig.51 1a-b, Pl.13, 20, 23, 29, 42; (Hubert 2006) p.89
(Bispham. E.H. & Cornell 2013a) p.33
357
(Allen 2007) p.33; (Small 2000) p.226
358
(Allen 2007) p.126; (Allen 2001) p.60; (Connolly 1981) pp.117-18 fig. 25-36; (Cunliffe 1997) p.94 fig.64; (De Navarro
1972) Pl. 97, 111, 117
356
82
describe a band of spear armed mercenaries not a tribe as Polybius recorded.359 If the
gaesatae were a band of mercenary Celtic spearmen, then like the Celtic cavalry described
by Xenophon they fought with similar weapons to their Mediterranean contemporaries to
the south and as such would have been easily incorporated into Italic, Greek and
Carthaginian armies (Xen. Hell. 7.1.20). Furthermore, if Celtic mercenaries were recruited as
spearmen, it strengthens the argument against the literary descriptions that depict Celts
fighting primarily as swordsmen.
The Celts developed a shanked socketed javelin that tended to be heavier than its southern
Italic counterparts, which shares common characteristics with the later Roman pilum and
the falarica from the Spanish peninsula.360 Examples from Montefortino and Monte Bibele
illustrate that pyramidal javelin heads with long shanks have also been found in the Celtic
cemetary of Montefortino.361 This potentially illustrates that the increased Celtic military
interaction with the peoples of the Italian and Spanish peninsulas from the fifth century
onwards led to them adopting a shanked javelin. However, a bronze shanked javelin has
been dated to the eight century from Marino in Latium, so it is unclear whether the Celts
had developmental primacy.362 The ‘bodkin’ headed javelin that appears in Italy, does not
seem to have reached the same level of popularity among the Celts, who whilst their javelin
heads varied widely in shape and size they tend to be elongated version of the small
pyramidal head found in Italy, or a peculiar flame shaped head which, Diodorus describes as
being designed to break along its length in order to inflict not only cut, but also to tear at the
wound (Diod. Sic. 5.304).363
During the La Tène I and II periods in a similar parallel to the Celtiberians, and Iberians,
Celtic body armour appears to have been relatively rare, with the Montefortino helmet and
oblong shield being preferred. Furthermore, archaeological and iconographic evidence
suggest that whilst the shield was common among warriors that the helmet was much less
prevalent. For example, a sculpture from the arch at Orange in southern France portrays a
procession of cavalry and infantry in which the all of the cavalry and only one infantryman
359
(Cunliffe 1997) p.99; (Ellis 1990) p.35; (Ellis 1997) p.42
(Connolly 1981) p.118;
361
(Brizio 1899) pl. IX fig.17-19; (Lejars 2008) pp.127-128, 140-142, 146-147, 167-157 fig. 5A, 6,9; (Small 2000) p.226;
(Tomcazk 2012) p.56 fig.9, 57 fig.10
362
(Connolly 1981) p.92 fig.14
363
(Allen 2007) p.126; (Connolly 1981) p.117 fig. 46, 47; (Cunliffe 1997) p.94 fig.64
360
83
who is without a shield are equipped with helmets, whilst the remaining infantry all carry
shields and spears but no helmets.364 This may reflect that helmets were primarily worn by
aristocrats, whilst the bulk of the infantry fought without them.
Diodorus describes the Celtic helmet as being constructed of bronze with sizable embossed
figures extending out from them in the shape of animals and horns (Diod. Sic. 5.30.2).
Although these helmets have been confirmed by archaeological finds, such as the horned
helmet in the Thames Museum, the majority of Celtic helmets do not conform to this
style.365 The most dominant helmet of Celtic origin was the Montefortino helmet which has
been archaeologically dated to the fifth century where it first appears with a crested knob in
the tombs of central European Chieftains.366 It consisted of a rounded conical bowl with a
crested knob, that had its rear rim drawn out to form a protruding neck guard, together
with hinged cheek pieces that could be tied up on the sides of the helmet when not required
(Plates 9, 30).367 Therefore the Montefortino helmet shares common
characteristics with the Etrusco-Thracian helmet (discussed in detail in the following
chapter) and the Samno-Attic. The similarities that the Montefortino shared with these
helmets suggests that there was a common style of warfare developing in which Celtic and
Italic warriors were seeking to protect themselves with helmets fitted with flexible check
pieces (bucculae) which maintained a high degree of peripheral vision and could also be
effective in melee combat if necessary. Presumably, this also suggests that Celtic and Italic
warriors were facing similar threats. Thus, when viewed in conjunction with the dominance
of dual-purpose spears, and javelins, these helmets appear to address the concerns of
warriors who were participating in flexible missile orientated skirmishes where threats could
come from all angles and in which melee encounters remained a possibility.
The appearance of the Montefortino helmet in Italy coincides with the Celtic incursions at
the end of the fifth century, where it first appears in the graves of Montefortino (Ancona),
before spreading southwards to become the most common form of Italic helmet hereafter
and later it became the standard issue infantry helmet of the Roman army until the first
364
(Connolly 1981) p.114 fig.1
(Brizio 1899) pl. IX fig.15; (Connolly 1981) p.121 -122 fig.5,6,9,18
366
(Paddock 1993)p.482; (Stary 1979) p.198
367
(Bishop 2006) pp.65-66; (Connolly 1981) p.100 fig,1,4, 121 fig.8,9; (Paddock 1993) p.470, 472 fig.123, 489 fig.126; (Stary
1979) pl.25
365
84
century A.D.368 The Montefortino helmet has also been found in the graves of Iberian
mercenaries that presumably were in Carthaginian service, as well as on the Braganza
brooch found in a Celtiberian context.369 Furthermore, it also appears on a depiction of the
Carthaginian war-god Adad.370 Consequently the increasing interaction of Celtic and Italic
warriors within and against Carthaginian, Roman, and Syracusan armies likely facilitated the
rapid adoption of the Montefortino helmet across the western Mediterranean by the end of
the third century.
Shields recovered from the Montefortino cemetary and the lake at La Tène illustrate that
Celtic shields were oblong shields with a horizontal handgrip and a variety of iron bosses
ranging from circular, to trapezoidal.371 The shields recovered from La Tène were 1.1m high
and 1.2 cm thick, and are of similar dimensions to the Celtic mercenary oblong shield from
Kasir al-Harit.372 The oblong shield also appears on the Braganza brooch and it shares
remarkable similarities with examples from the La Tène deposits as well as examples from
southern France and the Italian peninsula (Plate 31).373 This likely suggests that the oblong
shields appearance in Celtiberia was connected with the Celts, with whom they shared
ethnic and cultural ties.374 Furthermore, the Celtiberian geographical proximity to the
Iberians may also have led to the oblong shield, Montefortino helmet, and shanked javelin
being transmitted to them through this interaction. Thus the spread of the Montefortino
helmet when viewed in conjunction with the spread of the shanked javelin and oblong
shield in Italy and the Spanish peninsula, illustrates that the Celts played a pivotal part in the
development of the western Mediterranean military koine
Celtic battlefield tactics are traditionally though to have consisted of a single massed charge,
which quickly disintegrated into a series of furious individual combats. During the fourththird centuries, as previously discussed the Celts fought primarily as spearmen, not as wild
slashing swordsmen. This carries important implications regarding their fighting methods
368
(Campbell 2013) p.429; (Connolly 1981) p.99; (Bishop 2006) p.65; (Goldsworthy 2001) p.47; (Paddock 1993) pp.469-470
(Salimbeti 2014) p.40
370
(Connolly 1981) p.96 fig. 1-3, 103 fig.12-13, 114, 118 fig.1-4 (Cunliffe 1997) p.93; (Quesada Sanz 2011a) pp.138-143;
(Stary 1979) p.187, 198-200, Pl.26
371
(Connolly 1981) pp.118-120 fig. 1-17; (Cunliffe 1997) p.p.96-97; (Hubert 2006) pp.92-93
372
(Bishop 2006) p.61; (Connolly 1981) p.119
373
(Connolly 1981) p.118 fig.3-4; (Cunliffe 1997) p.93; (Quesada Sanz 2011a) p.137, 140, 151-152; (Quesada Sanz 2011c)
pp.215-216, 221-225
374
(Cunliffe 1997) pp.141-145; (Ellis 1990) pp.44-46; (Koch 2006) pp.364-365
369
85
and formations. Complex Celtic unit formations and tactics seemingly did not exist and it
appears increasingly likely that they were fighting in the same ‘cloud’ type units as their
western Mediterranean contemporaries. As previously discussed this conjecture is further
strengthened by the adoption of Celtic military equipment throughout the western
Mediterranean.
Whilst there is no evidence that suggests that the Celts ever adhered to a rigid phalanx
system, they are not alone in this; the Iberians and some Libyan tribes also fought as
spearmen without body armour and helmets. Therefore it is conceivable that the Celts did
not fight in a manner that was different to that of their tribal contemporaries in the western
Mediterranean. If the Iberians and Italians fought in flexible ‘cloud’ formations that allowed
for the constant use of javelin armed troops surging forth from a base of more heavily
armed spearmen, then the archaeological evidence pertaining to the Celts suggests that they
also fought in a similar formation. Furthermore, the tribal social structure of the Celtic tribes
was similar to that of the Iberians, in which the status of the aristocracy was in a large
part defined by how many clients and retainers they were able to command.375 These clients
and retainers would then have presumably provided warriors to the greater war
band. The tribal ties within the mercenary bands make it probable that when the Celts
served foreign paymasters they were commanded by a Celt. For example, the 4,000 Celtic
cavalry recruited from all over Gaul by Caesar were commanded by their own leaders (Caes.
BGall. 5.5).376
The preference of the spear and javelin as primary weapons and the existence of the shorter
Celtic sword, which carries important implications for our perception of how the Celts
waged war in the fifth-third centuries. If the Celtic warrior was equipped with a spear, or
javelin and no body armour then it would suggest that the short sword was a secondary
weapon, making them primarily spearmen, or skirmishers, not swordsmen as Polybius
described them at Telamon (Polyb. 2.28-31).377 Secondly, the javelin, antennae sword and
spear illustrate that the methods in which the Celts were using their weapons was similar to
their Carthaginian, Celtiberian, Iberian, Italic, and Greek contemporaries.
375
(Cunliffe 1997) pp.107-08
(Cunliffe 1997) p.108
377
(Connolly 1981) p.118
376
86
4.6. Greeks:
Many of the Greek mercenaries mentioned as fighting in the service of Syracuse under
Agathocles, Dion, Dionysius I, and Timoleon were likely amongst those settled in Sicily as
rewards for their loyalty by these commanders (Diod. Sic. 14.10.1-4, 44.2, 16.66.2, 78.3,
20.11.1, 40-43; Plut. Dion. 22.4, 28.4; Tim. 7.3-9; Polyaenus Strat. 5.8.2).378 After his victory
over the Carthaginians at Crimisus (341) Timoleon embarked upon a policy of repopulating
eastern Sicily, resulting in as many as 60,000 settlers taking up his call, of which some
10,000 were from mainland Greece and the balance consisted of mixed populations from
central and southern Italy (Diod. Sic. 16.82.3-5; Plut. Timo. 35).379 The influx of Greek
mercenaries into Sicilian affairs between the late fifth to late fourth centuries conceivably
played a major role in the military development of the island and its cities, particularly
Syracuse. Consequently, in order to understand how these Greek mercenaries and migrants
equipped themselves and fought it is important to look at the contemporary military
developments in Greece.
Tarn noted by the mid 330’s the “majority of mercenaries were probably armed as
peltasts.”380 However, what holds true for the eastern Mediterranean may not have held
true for the west. Tarn was commenting on the Hellenistic armies of the east, for whom the
hoplite was the standard soldier. Therefore, when light troops were required they were
forced to recruit those people largely accustomed to fighting with such weapons. Hence, the
prevalence of the Thracian peltasts, along with Cretan archers, and Rhodian slingers,
mentioned as mercenaries in Greek and Hellenistic armies. In the west however, the
situation seems to have been different as; the hoplite and phalanx tactics were not as fully
developed. Thus, as the mercenary peltast in the eastern Mediterranean fulfilled a military
need, so the Greek hoplite potentially filled a similar need in the armies of the west whose
infantry appears to have been largely suited to skirmishing rather than direct melee
encounters.381
378
(Champion 2010) p.15, 101; (Finley 1979) p.96, 103; (Meister 1984) p.709
(Champion 2010) p.64, 68; (Finley 1979) p.99; (Talbert 1975) p.146; (Meister 1984) p.716
380
(Best 1969) p.134; (Tarn 1984) p.10
381
(Trundle 2004) p.30
379
87
The Greeks are mentioned by Plutarch as fighting in a closed formation with locked shields at
the battle of Crimisus (Plut. Tim.27.10). However, this does not necessarily mean that they
were fighting in a phalanx or that they were all uniformly armed as hoplites. The
phalanx at times seems to have been applied as a universal term for any dense body of men
in battle. Therefore, it is a possibility that there were enough Greek mercenaries armed as
hoplites to man the front few lines, whilst the majority of the phalanx was possibly armed as
peltasts, who supported the front ranks with their javelins and maintained a physical
presence which was not that dissimilar to the flexible ‘‘cloud’s’ that the Celts, Celtiberians,
Iberians, Italians, Libyans, and Libyphoenicians fought in.
The Greek thrusting spear (doru) remained essentially unchanged throughout the Classical
period. It differed little from the previously discussed Italic and Carthaginian counterparts,
measuring between 1.8-3m in length.382 The key features were the iron/bronze leaf shaped
spearhead and the spiked butt (sauroter) which counterbalanced the weight of the head,
whilst at the same time adding a secondary head if the primary head was broken and also
served to protect the wooden butt of the spear from the ground.383 It is likely that the
javelin, or dual-purpose spear was always used in Greek warfare, and although it may have
for a time been excluded from the standard hoplite panoply in the wealthier Greek citystates, it seems to have remained the weapon of choice in the perceived primitive peoples
of Greece such as the Aetolians, Akarnanians, Amphilochians, and Ozolian Lokrians (Thuc.
3.98.1-2; 7.31.5, 60.4; 3.107.4, 112.6; 95.3, 97.2)384 Dion, Pyrrhus, and Timoleon are all
mentioned as having received javelin wounds, illustrating that the javelin was in widespread
use in an age dominated by references to phalanxes (Diod. Sic. 16.12.4; Plut. Pyrrh. 21.9;
Timo. 4.3).385 The fourth century saw a marked increase in the employment of light troops
in Greece and there were a number of incidents where the heavily armed hoplite were
mauled by light troops.386For example, the Athenian defeat of Spartan forces at Lechaeum
(390), Sphacteria in (425) , as well as similar incidents at Aegitium (426), and Piraeus (403),
382
(Connolly 1981) p.63; (Matthew 2009) p.400; (Snodgrass 1967) p.96
(Connolly 1981) p.63 fig. 8,9; (Snodgrass 1967) p.46, 96; (Matthew 2009) p.402, fig.3, 403, fig.4
384
(Best 1969) p.16
385
(Champion 2010) p.19, 42;
386
(Connor 1988) p.27; (Van Wees 2004) p.65
383
88
(Thuc. 3.97-8, 4.32-36; Xen. Hell. 2.4.33, 4.5.11-18).387 Therefore it is probable that these
events acted as the catalyst for the gradual evolution toward the lightly armed hoplite.388
There is no archaeological or literary evidence to suggest that the Greek javelin ever
developed the thin iron shank that characterised Celtic, Iberian, or Italic javelins. Xenophon
noted that javelins should be of “every variety, the blades broad and keen and shafts
strong” (Xen. Hunt. 10.3).389 An image of a Thracian peltast on a Greek vase depicts
weapons that are similar to the central and southern Italic dual-purpose spears with sturdy
shafts, devoid of both shanks and sauroter together with leaf shaped heads and are often
portrayed in pairs.390 This suggests that the iron shanked javelin was a development
confined to the western Mediterranean.
Archaeological evidence from across the western Mediterranean suggests that the mark of a
warrior in the funerary context was the spear, and/or javelin, not the sword. Therefore
during the fourth-third centuries it is also probable that the sword was considered a
secondary weapon in Greece, as it was amongst contemporary western Mediterranean
cultures. Additionally, the evidence of Greek swords illustrates that like the thrusting spear
they were very similar in size, shape and function to other swords across the Mediterranean.
For example, the crescent shaped slashing sword (kopis) that remained
popular among the Greeks and Macedonians is markedly similar to the Iberian falcata and
the Italic machaira.391 The cut and thrust antennae sword was also seemingly utilized by
Greek soldiers with a variety of forms developing from the Bronze Age onwards.392 By the
conclusion of the Bronze Age, the evolution of the Greek antennae sword concluded with
the Naue ii type sword with a blade measuring 55-60cm, which is of a similar length to the
antennae swords in the western Mediterranean during the Iron Age.393
387
(Lendon 2005) p.93;(Rawlings 2007a) p.86; (Tarn 1984) p.6; (Williams 2004) p.268,269
(Connolly 1981) p.49
389
τὰ δ᾽ ἀκόντια ἔστω παντοδαπά, ἔχοντα τὰς λόγχας εὐπλατεῖς καὶ ξυρήκεις, ῥάβδους δὲ στιφράς
390
(Connolly 1981) p.49 fig.1,6
391
(Connolly 1981) p.63, 77, 78. Fig. 2, 98 fig.12; (Quesada Sanz 2011b) p.50; (Snodgrass 1967) p.97, Pl.50
392
(Molloy 2010) p.404 fig. 1, 405 tbl. 1
393
(Molloy 2010) p.421
388
89
By the mid-fourth century Greek shields largely conformed to the standard shield types
across the western Mediterranean like the hoplon with its distinctive antilabe and porpax in
addition to the oblong shield (thureos).394 In function, shape and weight the thureos
resembled the oblong shield, and it seems to have been a development of the Thracian
pelte which was originally a crescent shaped rimless wicker shield, and was later developed
into the eponymous shield of peltasts (Diod. Sic. 15.44.1-4; Nep. Iph. I).395 By the beginning
of the third century the thureos had become widespread in Greece and Macedonia,
although it never fully replaced the hoplon, which was the dominant Greek shield from at
least the mid-seventh century, where it first appears on the Chigi Vase and Macmillan
aryballos.396
By the fourth century there were two dominant helmet types emerged in Greece, the pilos
and the Thracian. The pilos seems to have been the most widely used helmet among both
the Greeks and Macedonians by the fourth century and appears frequently on Athenian and
Boeotian tombstones as well as in Magna Graecia (Plate 11).397 Additionally, the pilos can be
seen on a Spanish mercenary’s tombstone in Tunisia and in a Numidian grave at Es-Soumaa,
which possibly suggests that this helmet type was transmitted via military interaction in
Sicily.398 The pilos was a simple conical bowl that was held in place by a chin strap attach,
creating a light helmet with unencumbered peripheral vision. Archaeological evidence from
Pulgia and Sicily revealed that the height of the pilos range between 20-26cm.399 The simple
design of the pilos would have enabled it to be produced cheaply and this likely contributed
to its widespread adoption. Its appearance on the Adriatic coast of Magna Graecia may
suggest that it was brought to Italy by Greek colonists and mercenaries.
The Thracian helmet also appears to have been popular in Greece as a heavier alternative to
the pilos.400 The additional bronze and craftsmanship required to construct the helmet
probably carried a greater amount of status and likely therefore to have made it popular
394
(Snodgrass 1967) p.110, 123
(Connolly 1981) pp.48-49 fig. 1,6; (Snodgrass 1967) p.78, 79, 95
396
(Lorimer 1947) p.80, 84; (Quesada Sanz 2011c) p.222; (Salmon 1977) p.89
397
(Connolly 1981) p.70;(Paddock 1993) pp.365-67 fig. 99, 370; (Sekunda 2012) p.20;(Snodgrass 1967) p.94 Pl.56; (Van
Wees 2004) p.48
398
(Connolly 1981) p.150 fig.11
399
(Paddock 1993) p.378, 391-94, 396, 398
400
(Connolly 1981) p.63, 70; (Snodgrass 1967) p.95, Pl.53
395
90
amongst the wealthier warriors after the decline of the Corinthian in the fifth century. The
Thracian helmet was constructed of a conical “somewhat bulbous bowl with a small
protruding brow-band slightly extended neck guard and fixed cheek-pieces”401 The design of
the Thracian helmet resembles the Celtic Montefortino and the Samno-Italic helmet, albeit
without the hinged cheek-pieces, which suggests that the development of helmets with
cheek-pieces was occurring across the western Mediterranean from the fifth century.402 A
variation of the Thracian helmet appears in Etruria as the Etrusco-Thracian helmet, differing
slightly with the original in that it has no cheek-pieces and the area around the ear is cut
out.403 This suggests that there was a high level of adoption and adaptation of military
equipment occurring between the Italians and Greeks from the fifth century onwards. The
adoption of the lighter, open faced helmet carried important implications for both warfare
and the warrior. A lighter helmet which was physically was both less exhausting to wear and
allowed greater mobility suggesting that battles lasted longer. This is likely as a result of an
increase in skirmishers during the fourth century, who prolonged battles with a series of
skirmishes as opposed to an army of hoplites who fought purely melee battles that tended
to be decided quickly. Furthermore, an open faced helmet provided the wearer with greater
peripheral vision, denoting that the threats were coming from a variety of directions and
thus warfare was fluid and open.
By the fourth century Greek cuirasses were divided into two major forms; the bronze
anatomical cuirass and the linothorax. The linothorax, as previously discussed, was in
widespread use across the entire Mediterranean and by the fourth century due to its
functionality and the restrictive cost of the anatomical cuirass, was the most popular form
of cuirass amongst the Greeks.404 In Macedonia, the linothorax was adopted as the standard
body armour of the phalangites, if they in fact wore any at all, illustrating that the
development towards lighter body armour was not confined to the western
Mediterranean.405 Evidence suggests that cuirasses were the exception not the norm
amongst Greek mercenaries during the fifth-fourth centuries.406 For example, Xenophon
401
(Connolly 1981) p.61 fig.20, 63; (Paddock 1993) p.322; (Snodgrass 1967) p.95
(Paddock 1993) p.320
403
(Paddock 1993) p.320, 323 fig.87
404
(Connolly 1981) p.57 fig. 1,3,6, 58; (Snodgrass 1967) Pl. 42,44,45,46, 90-92; (Van Wees 2004) p.48
405
(Connolly 1981) p.70, 80; (Snodgrass 1967) p.117, 119, 123
406
(Hanson 2000) pp.57-59; (Van Wees 2004) p.48
402
91
noted that of his famous 10,000 only a small number of cuirasses could be gathered
together and in the army of Dionysius I only one in ten men bore them, which likely means
only the officers and cavalry (Diod. Sic. 14.43.2-3; Xen. Anab. 1.2.15-16; 3.3.20).407
Consequently, Greek mercenaries in Carthaginian and Syracusan service likely fought with a
variety of cuirasses in a similar manner to their Italic and North African contemporaries.
4.7. Summary:
In conclusion, the evidence discussed in this chapter suggests, that from the fifth century
onwards, the frequency with which Syracusan tyrants hired Celtic, Iberian, and Italic
mercenaries, who were also contemporaneously serving in Carthaginian armies, helped to
facilitate the transmission of similar military equipment across the western Mediterranean.
Moreover, the common military equipment attested in the archaeological record from
across the western Mediterranean, further suggests that these soldiers were fighting with
similar flexible missile orientated skirmishing tactics that held the potential to escalate into
melee encounters, but that this was not the primary objective. This argument is
strengthened by evidence indicating that the various foreign units in these heterogeneous
forces retained their own commanders and natural tactics and although this appears only in
Carthaginian and Roman contexts, it is highly likely that this was also true in Syracusan
armies.408 Indeed, it appears as though the Celts and central and southern Italians fought in
a similar ‘cloud’ based tactical unit which it has been argued was what contemporary
Celtiberians, Iberians, an various Italic peoples utilized.409 Furthermore, the frequency and
scale with which these soldiers were recorded as serving in Carthaginian and Syracusan
armies potentially indicates that the flexible ‘cloud’ unit was the most commonly employed
tactical unit in the western Mediterranean between 350-264. Consequently, the preceding
investigation suggests that Syracuse was not only firmly entwined in the development of the
western Mediterranean military koine, but that it, like Carthage and soon to be seen with
Rome, was a major driving force in it.
407
(Van Wees 2004) p.48; (Hanson 2000) p.58
Carthaginian contexts: Livy 28.18-19, 35-36; 35.34.3-6; 37.5.30
Roman contexts: Diod. Sic. 19.12.1; Plut. Pyrrh. 16.10
409
(Lendon 2005) pp.179-191; (Quesada Sanz 2006) pp.245, 258-263
408
92
Chapter Five: Rome
5.1. Overview
Whilst Rome did not engage in any military activity against Carthage or Syracuse between
350-264, it nonetheless appears to have played an important role in the development of the
western Mediterranean military koine. This can be seen most clearly in the role that Rome
played in facilitating the transmission of equipment such as the Montefortino helmet and
shanked javelin throughout the western Mediterranean. For example, although the
Montefortino helmet and heavy shanked javelin appear to have been of Celtic origin, they
first appeared in the Italian peninsula in Etruria and Latium. Therefore, it appears likely that
as Rome came to dominate the Italian peninsula during the fourth century, it acted as the
conduit for this military equipment to be transmitted to other Italic peoples. The evidence
discussed in the following chapter will illustrate that Rome's military interactions within Italy
and the eventual absorption of its manpower worked together with the presence of Celtic
and Italic mercenaries in Carthaginian and Syracusan armies in the transmission of the
similar military equipment across large parts of the western Mediterranean. Additionally,
this following chapter will demonstrate that, by fielding armies filled with similar troops,
who utilized similar equipment and tactics, Roman armies from the fourth century onwards
were very likely fighting in a comparable manner to their Carthaginian and Syracusan
contemporaries.
The first half of the fourth century was turbulent for Rome. In 390/387 she had been sacked
by a marauding war-band of Celts (Diod. Sic. 14.113-117; Dion. Hal. Ant. Rom. 13.6-12; Livy
5.34-39; Plut. Cam. 22; Polyb. 2.18). Rome then spent the immediate years consolidating her
position in Latium against other Latin communities together with the surrounding Hill tribes
(Aequi, and Volscians) and some Etruscan communities to the north (Tarquinia) (Frontin.
Strat. 2.8.4; Livy 6. 6.6.4-6, 21.2, 32. 4-11, 33.1-3;).410 However, the period 350-264 was for
Rome characterised by rapid territorial expansion, which by 264 had resulted in their
domination of the entire Italian peninsula below the Po Valley. This was facilitated by near
410
(Alföldi 1971) pp.374-375; (Salmon 1953) p.130
93
annual warfare, which combined with inclusionary foreign and domestic policies, hastened
their demographic, political, and military development.411
As Rome expanded its hegemony over the peoples of the Italian peninsula through the
establishment of a network of alliances and colonies, it allowed these communities to retain
their local autonomy and civic institutions.412 In this light Roman hegemony appears to have
shared close characteristics to Carthaginian hegemony. However, unlike Carthage, Roman
hegemony predominantly forwent financial revenues opting instead for access to the
military manpower of its allies. Indeed, the treaties issued by Rome after 338 dictated that
allied troops would be required to serve in Roman armies.413 Consequently, by the outbreak
of the First Punic War in 264, the Roman army commonly consisted of up to fifty percent
allied soldiers, many of whom were central and southern Italians who were also recorded as
serving in Carthaginian and Syracusan armies from the fifth century onwards (App. Hann.
8.31; Dion. Hal. Ant. Rom. 9.22; Polyb. 3.107.12, 6.26, 30.2, 6.26.7; Livy 2.49.4, 9.30.3).414
Furthermore, as was the case with Carthaginian and Syracusan armies, this military service
did not mean adoption of Roman equipment, and integration into existing Roman units.415 It
thus appears that, in a similar manner to Carthaginian and Syracusan armies, allied troops
and mercenaries served in their own distinct units and retained their own commanders. For
example, at the battle of Heraclea, Oblacus /Oplax the commander of unit of Frentanian
cavalry is recorded as leading a charge against Pyrrhus (Diod. Sic. 19.12.1; Plut. Pyrrh.
16.10).
Following 350, the geopolitical interests of Rome and the Oscan speaking peoples of the
Samnite League collided and resulted in the three Samnite wars (343-290) during which all
of the major Italic ethnic groups, as well as the Celts, were recorded as either fighting for or
against Rome at some point. Consequently, by the outbreak of the First Punic War, the
411
(Cornell 1990a) p.365; (Eckstein 2006) p.248, 251-53; (Goldsworthy 2001) p.38; (Harris 1992) p.180; (Lomas 2014) p.203207; (Oakley 2014) p.18; (Serrati 2011) p.24
412
(Cornell 1990c) p.368; (Eckstein 2006) pp.251-251; (Forsythe 2011) p.37; (Heurgon 1973) p.200, 203; (Lomas 2014)
p.203,207-208; (Pallottino 1991) p.144; (Salmon 1970) pp.13-14,16-17;(Scullard 2013) p.201
413
(Cornell 1995) pp.366-367 (Drogula 2015) p.31; (Goldsworthy 2001) p.35; (Harris 1985) p.61; (Rosenstein 2004)
p.63;(Sherwin-White 1980) p. 46
414
(Cornell 1990c) p.386; (Eckstein 2006) p.230, 254; (Gabba 1989) p.222; (Keppie 1998) p.22; (Rawlings 2007b); (Sage
2013) p.52; p. 218; (Serrati 2011) p.9,24
415
(Eckstein 2006) p.254
94
armies of Carthage, Rome, and Syracuse had all frequently fought with or against Celtic and
Italic warriors since at least the fifth century. This prolonged cultural and military interaction
with Celtic and Italic soldiers, who utilized remarkably similar equipment, very likely led to
the military development of Carthage, Rome, and Syracuse being commonly influenced.
5.2. The Roman State: Political Structure Extension of Hegemony.
The following chapter will examine the Roman political system and its extension of
hegemony in order to further illustrate the operational similarities between those utilized
by Carthage and Syracuse and to also identify how these affected Rome’s military
development from the fourth century onwards.
Polybius noted that the by the Second Punic War the Carthaginian political system differed
from Rome’s in that the people’s assembly were the dominant political force, whereas in
Rome this role was filled by the senate (Polyb. 6.51). However, as previously discussed, the
Carthaginian political system, like its Roman counterpart was also heavily directed by the
senate and as such both systems appear strikingly similar (Polyb. 6.11-18, 51). Furthermore,
like Carthage, the Roman political system consisted of a series of annually elected
magistrates, with two Consuls acting at the heads of state, as well as its supreme military
commanders.416 In this aspect Rome differs from Carthage, whose suffetes were denied
military commands; whereas in Rome military command was intrinsically linked to political
office.417 Following the Licinio-Sextian laws of 367, plebeians appear to have been granted
the ability to obtain the consulship and in the subsequent years Rome began to gradually
expand plebeian access to the other major magistracies of the political system (albeit only
the wealthy plebeians were ever likely to enter). Therefore it appears the Carthaginian and
Roman political systems experienced similar changes to the entry requirements for political
offices between the fourth and third centuries. For example, the Carthaginian Senate was by
416
417
(Drogula 2015) p.2; (Goldsworthy 2001) p.39
(Ameling 2011) p.48; (Lazenby 1996) p.20; (Warmington 1969) p.140
95
also by the beginning of the third century opened up to new men of sufficient wealth and
power like the Barcids.418
Aristotle’s description of the Carthaginian government can also be largely applied to Rome
(Arist. Pol. 1272b-1273b; Polyb. 6.51-6). Indeed, they both shared a similar mixture of
monarchic, aristocratic, and democratic elements. The Consuls, like the suffetes represented
the monarchic element with their powerful executive powers. The Senate, which acted as a
deliberative council, provided the aristocratic element. Moreover, in a similar operational
manner to its Carthaginian counterpart, the Roman senate first raised and deliberated laws
and foreign policy before then passing them to the comitia centuriata to vote and ratify
them. Finally the comitia centuriata (people’s assembly) added the democratic element.419
The comitia centuriata encompassed all adult male Roman citizens and timocratically
divorced class membership from residence or familial ties, whilst also outlining the military
equipment that they were required to present themselves with when the army took the
field.420 It was also equipped with the powers to elect officials empowered with the right of
imperium (the legal right to raise, and command troops) and legal jurisdiction such as;
consuls, praetors, censors, curule aediles, and military tribunes in addition to having the
deciding vote on decisions of war and peace (Livy 7.6.7).421 Consequently, the comitia
centuriata represented an army with the power to vote and was one of the most important
political bodies of the Roman Republic.422
The military obligations of the five economic classes outlined in the comitia centuriata
theoretically represented the basic troop types of the Roman army, and although Dionysius’
and Livy’s accounts differ slightly, the general picture remains constant (Dion. Hal. Ant. Rom.
4.16-18; Livy 1.42-43).423 The richest class the equites were required to provide cavalry,
whilst the first class were to present themselves with what amounted to the panoply of the
classical hoplite; cuirass, helmet, greaves, shield, and spear. As the classes descended so did
418
(Scullard 1990)p.492
(Goldsworthy 2001) pp.39-49
420
(Forsythe 2011) pp.24-26; (Heurgon 1973) p.193
421
(Boatwright 2012) p.68; Staveley 1955 p.29; Forsythe p.26
422
(Forsythe 2011) p.24
423
(Cornell 1995) p.179 tbl.2,181-183; (Forsythe 2011) pp.24-26; (Heurgon 1973) p.193; (Rosenstein 2010) p.290; (Smith
2006b) pp.282-286
419
96
the amount of military equipment a citizen was required to present themselves with. The
second class were required to bear the same equipment of the first with the oblong shield
replacing the clipeus, and the cuirass being omitted. The equipment of the third class
mirrored that of the second class, without the greaves. The fourth class required only the
spear and javelin, whilst the fifth classes were merely required to present themselves with
slings. The military equipment detailed in the Servian reforms illustrates that the majority of
Roman citizens were lightly armed warriors that appeared most suited to skirmishing roles.
Consequently, the equipment examined in the following chapter when viewed with the
Celtic, Celtiberian, Iberian, and central and southern Italic weaponry suggests that Roman
armies were armed in a similar manner to their western Mediterranean contemporaries.
Whilst the evidence from the comitia centuriata appears to presents a rough outline of the
military equipment used by early Roman armies, it should be treated with caution for three
major reasons. First; the accounts of Livy and Dionysius do not agree on the weaponry,
which Cornell rightly noted “almost certainly” indicates that they were using different
accounts which were derived from the anachronistic inventions of antiquarians and
annalists.424 Second, the weaponry listed by Livy and Dionysius does not provide specific
evidence of the weapons used. They do not reveal if the type of javelin required of the
fourth class was a shanked javelin or the shankless javelin described by Xenophon (Xen.
Hunt. 10.3).425 Furthermore, it is possible that the spears of the first two classes may not
have been the heavy thrusting spear equipped with a sauroter, but rather a dual-purpose
spear (hasta). Third, it does not reveal whether the cuirass of the first class was a bronze
Italic muscled cuirass, or the simpler cardiophylax, linothorax, or spongia. Consequently,
whilst the military equipment outlined in the centuriate organization seems at first glance to
be uniform, the variety of weaponry archaeological evidence throughout the Italian
peninsula suggests that there were variations within these parameters. Thus, the centuriate
organization of the Roman army is seemingly at odds with the archaeological evidence.
Whilst the Carthaginian and Roman political systems shared common characteristics it is
important to note that they retained differences. The major difference between them was
424
(Cornell 1995) p,180
ὰ δ᾽ ἀκόντια ἔστω παντοδαπά, ἔχοντα τὰς λόγχας εὐπλατεῖς καὶ ξυρήκεις, ῥάβδους δὲ στιφράς (Connolly 1981) p. 49
fig.1,6, 150; (Salimbeti 2014) p.168; (Warry 1980) p.50
425
97
that the Roman political body was inherently militarized. The comitia centuriata was
essentially a civilian army empowered with the vote and was reflected by the fact that it
was required, as an army was, to meet outside the city limits (pomerium) (Cass. Dio.
37.28.3).426 Furthermore, to qualify for quaestor, the first rung on the political ladder, a man
was required to have served a minimum of ten years in the army.427 What was also unique
was the Roman willingness to integrate allied aristocrats into the highest echelons of its
political system. For example, by 264, Consuls would be elected from Campania (P. Decimus
Mus), Caere (Ogulinii), Praeneste (Metelli, and Fabrici), and Tusculum (Coruncanii, Mamilii)
something which although there is lack of evidence does not seem to have occurred in
Carthage..428 The Roman willingness to assimilate, not alienate its former enemies, both
politically and militarily, whilst at the same time allowing them to maintain their local
autonomy and leaving their civic institutions unchanged, renders it probable that the same
level of non-interference was extended to their military equipment and battlefield tactics.
The foundation of Roman expansion in the fourth and third centuries lay in the use of
inclusive, but not civically intrusive alliances. These alliances bound former enemies
individually to Rome, but generally allowed them to remain in control of their own internal
affairs whilst in return Rome extracted the military manpower of their allies.429 Indeed, the
ratio of Roman to allied troops following 338 could be as high as fifty percent.430 Rome,
however, did not require these soldiers to serve in Roman units, but rather in a similar
manner to which Rome allowed the defeated to retain their civic institutions and
governments whilst allied troops served in their own units, with their own commanders, and
ultimately with their own equipment.431 This in turn enabled Rome to wage annual warfare
with larger armies, whose allied citizens then shared in the profits, which consequently
further tied them to Roman military success.432 In this way, Rome differed from Carthage
and Syracuse; lack of evidence aside there is no indication that the allies and communities
defeated by Carthage and Syracuse were given shares in their territorial conquests.
426
(Cornell 1995) p.195; (Forsythe 2011) p.26
(Goldsworthy 2001) p.40
428
(Forsythe 2005) p.344
429
(Boatwright 2012) p.82; (Cornell 1990c) p.368;(Eckstein 2006) p.252; (Forsythe 2005) p.308; (Harris 1985) p.61
430
(Cornell 1995) p.366;(Rawlings 2007b) p.52; (Serrati 2011) p.224
431
(Eckstein 2006) p.251
432
(Cornell 1995) p.367
427
98
Syracusan mercenaries were at certain times granted citizenship and given lands in other
Sicilian communities, but there is no evidence to suggest that this was extended to allied
communities. Furthermore, this sustained military co-operation and contact with the
various Italic peoples makes it plausible that Rome adopted, adapted, and ultimately
assimilated some aspects of their military equipment and tactics (Livy 8.8).433
Although the seeds of Rome’s integrative policies and military interaction with its allies
were, according to literary tradition, laid in the foedus Cassianum, it was the defeat of the
Latin League in 338 and the subsequent network alliances that were established that laid
the foundation for Rome’s rapid expansion henceforth. The settlement of 338 isolated the
defeated communities from each other with bi-lateral treaties that prevented any political
contact between them and bound them individually to Rome.434 In dealing with the
defeated communities Rome, utilized two important features, municipia (self-governing
communities) and civitas sine suffragio (citizens with full legal rights, but without the vote)
which would become crucial factors in facilitating its increased military manpower and
hegemony in the fourth century.435 The majority of Latin communities such as; Lanuvium,
Aricia, Nomentum, and Pedum were granted citizenship and became municipia (Livy
8.14).436 The communities that geographically lay outside of the Latium vetus became
municipia with civitas sine suffragio such as; Capua, Cumae, and Suessula (Livy 8.14).437
These communities although denied the right to vote, remained liable to the same legal
rights and military obligations as full citizens.438 Furthermore, the communities established
as municipia together with those granted civitas sine suffragio were not only required to
provide troops for Roman armies, but also to cover expense of maintaining them in the field
(tributum) which significantly lightened the financial burden of war for Rome.439
Alongside the utilization of the municipia and civitas sine suffragio, Citizen and Latin
colonies played an important part in Roman expansion from the fourth century onwards.
433
(Cornell 1995) p.300; (Erdkamp 2006) p.283; (von Arnim 1892) pp.119-122
(Cornell 1995) p.348
435
(Serrati 2011) p.9,24
436
(Cornell 1990c) p.365; (Forsythe 2005) p.290; (Oakley 2014) p.25
437
(Sherwin-White 1980) p.40
438
(Sherwin-White 1980) p.46
434
439
(Cornell 1995) p.366; (Harris 1985) p.62; (Salmon 1970) p.49
99
Colonization had been frequently utilized by the Latin League during the fifth century, but
there had been no new colonies established between 380-340.440 After 338 colonies were
regularly founded on the confiscated land of defeated enemies and in cases such as Cales
(334), were actually founded in existing settlements in which Roman colonists were
settled.441 Each colony was administered by an elected Senate, together with annually
elected magistrates, and was headed by a board of two (duoviri) that reflected the dual
Consuls at Rome.442 However, the view promulgated by the words of Aulus Gellius that,
colonies were essentially miniature Rome’s has been questioned and although they did bear
some resemblance to Rome especially in their physical layout, it highlights the anachronistic
problems when attempting to interpret the early Republic (Gell. NA 16.13.8-9).443 As
discussed previously, this appears similar to the recent reappraisal of the extent of
Carthaginian influence over its allied communities and colonies.444
Between the late fourth to early second centuries Rome reportedly established 54 colonies,
which by the outbreak of the Second Punic War amounted to an area of at least 9,000 km
sq.445 Furthermore, during the period 334-263 as many as 70,000 adult male colonists and
their families were distributed around the Italian peninsula.446 Many of these colonies were
located on strategic military and trade routes.447 Cales was established in the valley
protecting the Pomptine plain from the Sidicini which formed a militarized buffer between
the Romans and Samnites.448 Fregallae (328) blocked the north-western entrance to the
middle Liris plain from Samnite raiding, whilst in the north, Sutrium and Nepete (382) were
founded by the Latin League on the “barriers and gateways to Etruria” (Livy 6.9.4).449
Colonies were divided into two types; Citizen (coloniae civium Romanorum) and Latin
(coloniae Latinae). Citizen colonies were small consisting of around 300 families and were
440
(Oakley 1993) p.19
(Cornell 1995) p.352; (Frederiksen 1984) p.207; (Salmon 1970) p.14, 41
442
(Lomas 2014) p.207
443
(Bradley 2006) pp.161-162, 164; (Bispham 2006) p.74,79; (Salmon 1970) p.18
444
(Bispham 2006)pp.74-78
445
(Harris 1985) p.60; Rawlings p.49
446
(Afzelius 1942); (Cornell 1995) p.380, 381 table 9; (Oakley 1993) p.19; Rawlings p.49
447
(Boatwright 2012) p.81; (Oakley 1993) p.19; (Salmon 1970) p.15
448
(Cornell 1995) p.352; (Frederiksen 1984) p.207
449
(Cornell 1995) p.303; (Cornell 1990b) p.312; (Eckstein 2006) p.127 (Scullard 2013) pp.119-120
441
100
governed by Rome itself, in addition to retaining full Roman citizenship.450 Generally citizen
colonies secured a Romanised presence in a region from which the ideas, language and
customs of the Latins could co-exist and ultimately penetrate the surrounding culture.451
Whilst, Latin colonies were numbered between 2,000-5,000 families and were intended to
bring the urban culture of Rome to rural areas such as Samnium and the far north of Italy
and to regenerate cities.452 Thus, Latin colonies may have been utilized in a similar way to
Carthaginian military garrisons and trading posts. Indeed, Latin colonies were largely
organized along Roman lines, each had a senate, similar administrational structures and
they retained civic autonomy.453 The clever distribution and utilization of colonies enabled
Roman culture to co-exist among other Italic peoples, whilst at the same time providing
benefits in terms of free land allotments. Furthermore, as Citizen and Latin colonies existed
as outposts of Roman expansion they interacted with the surrounding communities on
numerous levels, which plausibly helped the development of a common military koine.454
This process of cultural and military integration was likely to have mirrored the outcomes of
Carthaginian colonies and trading posts and the settlement of mercenaries in Sicily, which
consequently helped facilitate a common military koine.
5.3. The Roman army: Etruscans and Latins
The following chapter will examine Etruscan and Latin military equipment and tactics in
order to illustrate that when it is viewed in conjunction with the prolonged military
interaction between the Italic peoples and the equipment previously discussed that soldiers
in Roman armies maintained common military tactics and broadly similar military
equipment as their Celtic, Celtiberian, and Iberian contemporaries.
Although the evidence pertaining to the Roman army is exponentially greater than that of
Carthage or Syracuse, tracing the evolution of the Roman army during the fourth and third
centuries remains very problematic. First there are no direct contemporary literary
450
(Cornell 1990c) p365; (Lomas 2014) pp.207-209
(Cornell 1990a) p.365; (Lomas 2014) p.p207-209; (Salmon 1970) pp.15-16; (Staveley 1990) p.428
452
(Cornell 1990c) p.388; (Forsythe 2005) p.308; (Lomas 2014) p207
453
(Cornell 1995) p.352; (Forsythe 2005) p.308; (Lomas 2014) p.207
454
(Cornell 1995) p.352; (Cornell 1990c) p.368; (Lomas 2014) p.207; (Wallace-Hadrill 2008) p.100
451
101
accounts, Polybius, the best source on the Roman army of the mid-republic, does not begin
his account until 264, and wrote his account during the third Punic War. The manipular army
described by Polybius is unlikely, for reasons that will be discussed, to have existed in this
form during the fourth and third centuries (Polyb. 6.21-23). Livy provides the most complete
narrative of the period, but his account was written in the first century, and although it can
be relied upon for the broad outline of events, relies heavily on annalistic sources which
scholars such as Luce, Miles and Walsh believe cannot be trusted.455 Indeed, Walsh argues
that Livy illustrates “ignorance over military matters,” and in particular his work pertaining
to weaponry.456 For example, Livy recorded that the Romans experienced a complete
overhaul of military equipment and their tactical formation after they began to receive pay
(stipendium) around 340 (Livy 8.8). In his description Livy, appears to be describing the
army of the second century depicted by Polybius, with its distinct units the velites, hastati,
principes, triarii, rorarii, and accensci each discerned by their equipment and role of the
battlefield (Polyb. 6.40-42).Livy also states that during this military overhaul the Romans
exchanged their circular shields for oblong shields and adopted the radically different triplex
acies (checkerboard) formation. However, as this thesis has argued such changes were
unlikely to have occurred during a period where it was the individual’s responsibility to arm
themselves and where there was no centralised armoury. Furthermore, Roman hegemony
did not interfere with the civic institutions and local autonomy of its allied communities who
provided troops in large numbers. Thus, it is hard to see Rome being able to enforce radical
military reforms on such allies. Therefore, the changes noted by Livy appear descriptive of
the fully developed manipular legion, which again as this thesis has argued was unlikely to
have occurred at the beginning of the fourth century. Consequently, Livy’s description of the
weaponry and tactics are unlikely to accurately represent the Roman army of the fourth
century (Livy 8.8).
The Inedtium Vaticanum, a work of unknown provenance from the second century
attributes the Samnites with introducing the pilum, and oblong shield to the Roman army.457
However, the physical archaeological and iconographical record in Etruria and Latium
455
(Miles 1997) p.13, 220-226; (Luce 1977) p.26; (Walsh 1961) p.153
(Walsh 1961) p.197
457
(von Arnim 1892) pp.119-122
456
102
indicates that the oblong shield can be traced back to the eighth century, and may have
initially been an Etruscan innovation.458 Whilst, as previously discussed, the shanked
predecessor of the later Republican pilum is arguably of Celtic origin. However, the earliest
Italic example from Marino in Latium is dated to the eight century and is, like the oblong
shield, continuously attested to in the archaeological and iconographic records from the
fifth century onwards.459 Regardless of its origin, the shanked javelin was almost certainly
utilized by some Etruscans and Latins before they encountered the Samnites.
Plutarch attributes a military reform to Marcus Furius Camillus during the beginning of the
fourth century, in which, Roman soldiers were equipped with helmets similar to the Negau
type, and trained to fight with iron rimmed oblong shields in order to counter the Celtic
sword strokes (Plut. Cam. 40). As discussed previously, the archaeological record of the
Celtic La Tène I culture illustrates that the sword was not the primary weapon for the vast
majority of Celtic warriors. Furthermore, this evidence also indicates that between 400-250
Celtic swords measured 55-65cm, which was similar in length to the Gladius Hispaniensis,
and was thus suited to cutting and thrusting, not the overhead slashes attributed to the
longer Celtic sword that gradually appeared after 250.460 If the Celts were not using the long
sword then Camillus’ attempt to reinforce the rims of the Roman shield would seem an
unnecessary innovation.
Moreover, the Etruscans, with whom Rome spent the majority of its military interaction up
until the outbreak of the first Samnite war (343), are recorded as fighting in a Greek style
phalanx in the Ineditum Vaticanum, which Livy appears to have also applied to the Romans.
However, there are numerous problems with this narrative (Livy 8.8).461 Additionally,
although there are examples similar to the classical Greek hoplite panoply found the
Warrior tombs at Lanuvium and Vulci they are expensive panoplies in wealthy graves and
have not been found outside of these contexts. Furthermore, Momigiliano has raised
serious questions over whether the structure of Etruscan society “with their social structure
founded on a sharp distinction between nobles and clients” ever permitted them to field an
458
(Connolly 1981) p.95; (Stary 1979) p.184 fig.3, 187
(Connolly 1981) p.98 fig.14
460
(Hubert 2006) p.128
461
(von Arnim 1892) pp.119-122
459
103
army of hoplites.462 Questions have also been raised over whether these panoplies
represent actual battlefield equipment, or in the case of the bronze cuirass from Tomb 43 at
Narce, a “conspicuous display not advanced military technology.”463 The Etruscan system of
aristocratic patronage was also central to Roman society.464 Therefore, if the picture of the
Roman army cannot be trusted before the fourth century, where there is considerably more
archaeological evidence, then the image of the Roman army during the fourth century,
where there is little archaeological evidence, and problematic literary accounts written
centuries later, should also be called into question.
Archaic and classical Italy is presented by the literary sources as being embroiled in almost
constant warfare; be it raiding, skirmishes, or set-piece battle. Indeed during the period 350264 Rome itself was not at war for only six years (347, 344, 328, 288-7, 285).465
Consequently, the literary evidence for the Roman military during the fourth and third
centuries illustrates that the writers of the mid-late Republic and Empire did not know the
exact details of how the army developed and, as such, attribute the changes to a variety of
sources that do not fit with what is now known about the armies of the early Republic.
The picture presented to modern readers of the Roman army during the fourth century
indicates that it retained elements of the Servian army. The comitia centuriata still formed
the basis of recruitment for the Romans themselves, but as Rome did not interfere with the
internal structures of its allies, it is likely that they retained their own levy systems and these
may not have mirrored the comitia centuriata. The Roman army particularly after 338
consisted of up to fifty percent allied troops, and after 311 Rome began to continuously raise
two Legions of citizens which equated to between eight to ten thousand infantry with
six hundred cavalry. These were joined by two alae of allied infantry equal to the number
raised by Rome, and accompanied by as many as nine hundred cavalry (Polyb. 6.26.7; Livy
9.30.3).466
462
(Momigliano 1963) p.119
(Spivey 1990) p.129
464
(Wallace-Hadrill 1989) p.68
465
(Rawlings 2007b) p.47
466
(Cornell 1995) p.366; (Erdkamp 2006) p.283;(Goldsworthy 2001) p.49; (Rawlings 2007b) pp51-52; (Sage 2013) p.224
463
104
The variety of archaeological evidence pertaining to arms and armour discussed in this
thesis suggests that Rome did not force its allies to adhere to the homogenous equipment
and they were not integrated into existing Roman units, rather they fought with their
equipment according to their regional preference, in their own units with their own local low
level commanders.467 It is unlikely that citizen-militias levied from largely non-urbanised
communities like the Aequi, Hercini, Volscians, as well as the peoples of central and
southern Italy were able to be utilized in radically different and more complex fighting styles
than they were accustomed to. Furthermore, Rome’s conquest of Italy, particularly after
338 occurred within a century, which makes it unlikely that during this short period it was
able to implement wide-scale military changes upon a seasonal, self-equipped citizen militia.
It is more tenable to argue that, as Rome’s hegemony extended southwards, the increasing
frequency with which Apulian, Etruscan, Latin, Oscan, and Umbrian fought alongside each
other led to individual soldiers at various times adopting similar weapons to those they
fought beside. The archaeological evidence illustrates, that the gradual standardisation of
Italic military equipment did not involve a radical adoption of hitherto unknown arms and
armour; rather there was a wide range of military equipment in use throughout the Italian
peninsula, as well as the wider western Mediterranean. The ever increasing cultural and
military interaction that occurred between Rome and the Italic communities from the fourth
century onwards, particularly the establishment of colonies and the wars that preceded
their establishment probably provided an important conduit for the development of the
western Mediterranean military koine.
Colonies brought together a wide range of Roman and allied peoples in a new community
typically situated in a region surrounded by their defeated enemies. Consequently,
prolonged multi-dimensional interactions between Rome and the other Italic communities
likely resulted as the gradual standardization of military equipment was not achieved purely
by “Roman design.”468 A Volscian living alongside an assortment of Etruscans, Latins, and
Umbrians in what was formerly Samnite territory would be more likely to gradually adopt
the similar weaponry of his fellow colonists that he fought alongside, or the surrounding
Oscan speakers if it offered advantages over his traditional weaponry. For example, the
southern Italic predilection for a lighter shanked javelin was eventually replaced by a
467
(Burns 2003) p.66,70; (Rawlings 2007b) p.52; (Small 2000) p.231
(Burns 2003) p.61,63,76
468
105
heavier shanked javelin.469 However, this change would not have occurred instantaneously,
nor would it immediately have been adopted by other colonists, who for a variety of
reasons may have chosen to retain their existing equipment. Consequently, this change was
unlikely to have uniformly occurred between 350-264.
Moreover, a gradual uniformity of equipment does not automatically translate to
standardization of tactics. For example, citizens from Fregallae serving in the Roman army
were not quartered with the army for the entire year, nor were their commanders required
to attend a Roman military academy to instil the tactics of the manipular system. Therefore,
it is plausible to argue that the individual units of the Roman army during the fourth to midthird centuries fought according to the tactics that their weaponry dictated, and that they
were accustomed to, and that this was common throughout the western Mediterranean
According to Livy, when Rome increased its number of Legions from two to four in 311, the
number of military tribunes was increased to sixteen, which Gary Forsythe associated with a
tactical re-organization of the Roman army (Livy 9.30.3).470 However, the evidence to
support these views rests on the general assumption that an increase in the total number of
legions, and accordingly the number of military tribunes automatically translated into a
tactical reorganization is weak.471 Furthermore Forsythe noted, that the recent defeats
suffered by Rome at the Caudine Forks (322) and Lautulae (315) contributed to the reforms
of 311 (Livy 9.2-6; 9.23.3-5).472 However, Rome suffered ninety defeats during the Republic,
and not all of them resulted in wholesale tactical changes.473 It is plausible that the
manipular reforms occurred sometime during the Second Punic War, when the defeats
inflicted by Hannibal removed an immense amount of military equipment from circulation.
This then resulted in Roman armies having to be largely equipped with new arms and
armour produced en masse from workshops. Furthermore, during Hannibal’s seventeen
years in Italy soldiers were required to stay in the field for longer periods than they had
previously become accustomed to, and this likely provided the continuity needed to train
469
(Burns 2003) p.66
(Forsythe 2005)p.304
471
(Potter 2004) p.72
472
(Forsythe 2005) p.304
473
(Eckstein 2006) p.219
470
106
units and entire armies in the complex tactics of the manipular system described by Livy and
Polybius (Livy 8.8; Polyb. 6.21-23).
The majority of Roman battles of the fourth century are portrayed by Livy as drawn out
skirmishes not decisive melee encounters therefore it becomes difficult to argue that, when
larger battles were fought during the same period, they then radically altered their battle
tactics (Livy 22.6; 23.40; 2 4.15; 25.19; 27.2; 27.12).474 There are several occurrences where
Roman officers were struck by javelins, not struck with spears or swords, suggesting that
skirmishing was a regular occurrence, as the javelin was a skirmisher’s weapon (Livy 8.9;
24.42; 25.19;.29.2; 41.18).475 When viewed in conjunction with the accounts of Dion,
Pyrrhus, and Timoleon also being hit with javelins this seemingly suggests that warfare in
the western Mediterranean was likely javelin based (Diod. Sic. 16.12.4; Plut. Pyrrh. 21.9;
Timo. 4.3).
Due to the prevalence of javelins and dual-purpose spears previously discussed in regard to
central and southern Italy, and later in this chapter pertaining to Etruria and Latium, it
appears much more creditable to argue, that when larger set piece battles did occur such as
Allia (390) and Antium (338), these encounters unfolded as a series of skirmishes between
individual units at different times, and at different points across the battlefield until one side
was sufficiently motivated to engage at close quarters to seek a decisive victory (Livy 5.3738; 8.13).476 Furthermore, as Rome’s conquest of Italy continued they absorbed the peoples
of central and southern Italy with whom they had previously fought in these skirmish
orientated engagements. Consequently, it is highly likely that the reason why the various
Italic peoples, like the Celts, Celtiberians, and Iberians in Carthaginian armies, were able to
be so rapidly integrated into Roman armies was because they fought with similar
equipment, and employed similar tactics, and unit command structures.477 Certainly, the
archaeological evidence supports the views held by the author of the Ineditum Vaticanum
474
(Koon 2011) p.90; (Sabin 2000) p.4
(Sabin 2000) p.12
476
(Goldsworthy 2001) p.56; (Sabin 2000)
477
(Quesada Sanz 2011c) p.228
475
107
that the Samnites were a people who employed javelins, and oblong shields as their primary
weapons.478
This skirmish orientated warfare, when viewed together with the archaeological evidence
dominated by javelins and spears, appears to corroborate Quesada Sanz’ ‘cloud’ theory,
where a smaller number of heavily armed troops, mixed together with lighter armed troops
to form a ‘cloud’ which he argues remained the basic battlefield unit for both Iberian and
Roman armies during the second century.479 This model appears to corroborate both, Van
Wees’ view of the Archaic Greek phalanx, where aristocrats went into battle surrounded by
their retainers, the majority of whom were not heavily armed, and the views of several
Roman scholars on early Roman clan warfare.480 It is interesting to note that Van Wees
believed that the end of this mixed formation coincided with the rise of the Greek states’
ability to exert the collective power of the people over these powerful aristocrats or clan
leaders.481
The relationship between the growth of state control and the development of tactical
military reforms in Greece appears to have occurred at a later date in Rome, where such
patronage and its resulting private war-bands were also a cornerstone of archaic society. It
appears that the Roman state did not develop enough power to gain control over these
private war-bands until after the Licino-Sextian rogations of 367.482 Consequently, as the
Greek states and Rome developed politically, it resulted in the development of the classical
phalanx and the beginnings of the manipular Legion, which separated specialist heavy
troops from the lighter troops each with a defined battlefield role. Therefore, the ‘cloud’ of
mixed troop types may have represented a common embryonic phase of battlefield tactics
in the western Mediterranean, from which the phalanx and manipular army with their
specialised troop types evolved, as the state began to exert more power over the private
armies of powerful individuals.
Within the ‘cloud’s, the heavy troops due to their wealth, social status, and armament held
their ground at the rear of a cluster consisting of their clients and fellow clan members,
478
(Salmon 1967) p.105; (von Arnim 1892) pp.119-122
(Quesada Sanz 2006) pp.245-263
480
(Drogula 2015) p.80; (Rich 2011) p.15; (Rosenstein 2004) p.292; (Van Wees 2004) p.182, 233
481
(Van Wees 2004) pp.233-235;
482
(Drogula 2015) p.42, 375; (Wallace-Hadrill 1989) p.68
479
108
which were primarily armed with javelins and oblong shields, in addition to a variety of body
armour of which they could afford, or had plundered.483 These lightly armed troops would
then surge forward in order to hurl their javelins, expanding outwards like fingers from a
fist, in order to obtain the room required to launch their javelins effectively, whilst at the
same time presenting a less densely packed target for their similarly armed enemies to
hit.484 The rear echelon of heavily armed troops would hold their position to create a
steadying influence on those surging forward, as well as providing a rallying point behind
which the light troops could retire between volleys. If the morale of the light troops broke
they could retreat behind the heavily armed troops, who would theoretically hold their
ground, creating a wall of spears in a similar manner to the triarii of the later manipular
Legion (Polyb. 6.21).485 From this point the light troops could rally, and potentially either reengage in the melee, or resume launching their javelins over the heads of the heavily armed
troops.
If the Roman army of the fourth to mid-third centuries fought in such a manner, the
eventual development of the manipular Legions described by Polybius in the second century
would appear to be a logical tripartite specialisation of the existing ‘cloud’ system into
skirmishers (velites), dual-purpose spearmen (hastati/principes), and heavy spearmen
(triarii), not a radical tactical reform (Polyb. 6.21-23). With the outbreak of the First Punic
War in 264, Roman armies were for the first time called upon to serve overseas for an ever
increasing amount of time. These extended tours of duty, and the large amount of
accompanying downtime would have provided the Roman commanders with sufficient time
to train their men in the more rigid separation of troop types, and battlefield roles that the
manipular system required. Therefore, as the archaeological evidence discussed below
illustrates, the Roman armies between 350-264 should not be seen as fighting in a distinct
and radically different method from contemporary Carthaginian and Syracusan armies.
Possibly the sole Roman exception in terms of military equipment is that they potentially
utilized the shanked javelin on a greater scale than the Carthaginian and Syracusan armies.
For example whilst they both employed Celtic, Celtiberian, Iberian, and Italic troops who
483
(Drogula 2015) p.22; (Drummond 1989) p.99; (Quesada Sanz 2006) p.251
(Quesada Sanz 2006) p.251
485
(Bishop 2006) p.53; (Connolly 1981) pp.128-129; (Keppie 1998) p.22,34,39
484
109
used shanked javelins, they also utilized Greek and North African troops who appear to have
maintained the use of shankless javelins.
Spears are the most commonly depicted weapons in the Etruscan iconographical record,
and whilst the wealthy funerary context in which they were found carries problems of
interpretation they appear to have been a standard symbol of a high status warrior. Painted
fourth century images of warriors with spears have been found on the walls of the François
Tomb a Vulci, and the Tomba del Orco II, and on the Amazon Sarcophagus in Tarquinia.486
The most common representation of spears however, appears in reliefs such as two Warrior
slabs from Orvieto and Castigioncello in addition to the Certosa situla, and two bronze
sheets from Marsiliana.487 These spears are similar to the spears found throughout the
western Mediterranean, appearing in a variety of leaf shaped heads. It is interesting to note
that spears are rarely depicted with a defined sauroter attached which may indicate that the
majority of Etruscan and Latin spears were dual purpose hastae, or alternatively that
Etruscan artists consciously omitted them. This may explain why the warriors depicted on
the Väce Clasp and Arnoaldi situla carry two spears, with large leaf shaped heads that at first
seem too large to be javelins (Plate 6).488 The utility of the hastae would certainly have
provided the warrior with an increased ability to involve themselves in both the skirmishing
and melee phases of a battle. Physical examples of spear heads have been discovered in
funerary contexts at Chiusi, and the tomb of the Warrior at Lanuvium. These spearheads are
in accordance with the great variety of spearheads found across the western
Mediterranean; the example from Chiusi is a thin elongated head which suggests that it
could be thrown, whilst at Lanuvium the spear head is a broader leaf shape and was found
alongside a sauroter, which suggests that it was purely a thrusting spear. Despite these
examples being discovered in expensive tombs, they are of similar shape and size to the
spear heads previously discussed in Carthaginian, and Syracusan contexts. Therefore,
because thrusting spearheads are found in wealthy funerary contexts across the western
Mediterranean, it is tenable to argue that the thrusting spear was utilized by the upper
echelons of society on the battlefield, and in turn symbolised their status in death.
486
487
488
(Briguet 1986) p.162 fig.96; (Gelba 2012) p.51 fig.5.5-6, 52 fig.5.7,
(Stary 1979) pl.20b, pl.26a,b
(Connolly 1981)p.103 fig.12-13
110
The expensive panoply from Lanuvium with its apparent thrusting spear likely supports the
‘cloud’ theory in which the heavily armed warriors were withheld from the skirmishing
phases of battles only engaging the enemy during the decisive melee. This then fits in with
Polybius’ description of the Roman triarii who occupied the last line of the Roman manipular
system (6.23). Furthermore, as thrusting spears are not as common as hastae and javelins in
Etruria and Latium, it is then conceivable to argue that military encounters in this region
were more likely to be orientated towards missile skirmishes that held the potential to
culminate in decisive melee engagements.
Javelins are widely attested in the both the archaeological and iconographic evidence in
Etruria, and Latium, and although they are rare in physical form, they illustrate in
conjunction with evidence from across the western Mediterranean that the javelins and
spears constituted the primary offensive weapons of fourth and third centuries. Socketed
javelins which bear similarities to the later pila of Numantia and Renieblas (Spain) first
appeared in the fifth century, and have been discovered in a tomb from Vulci, whilst a
similar javelin with a shorter shank has been found at Telamon.489 These socketed pila show
shared characteristics with a series of socketed Celtic javelins from Montefortino, and
Monte Bibele, in addition to an Umbrian example from Montericco near Imola, as well as an
early bronze version found at Marino in Latium.490 The similarities of these javelins are the
long thin iron shanks that were fitted to a wooden haft by a socket that was forged in one
piece with the head and shank. The heads of these javelins range from small pyramidal
points to longer leaf shapes, with some examples from Monte Bibele in particular having
barbed arrow -like heads.491 Shanked javelins are depicted on the wall of the Giglioli tomb,
where they are portrayed as very thin long objects with oval bugles three quarters of the
way up the weapon, which is likely an attempt to distinguish the shank from the haft,
although Small viewed these as amenta.492 The numerous examples of the shanked javelin
489
Vulci see: (Connolly 1981, Bishop 2006) .98 fig.9, 100 fig.8. Numantia and Renieblas see: (Bishop 2006) p.51 -53 fig.13,5, 9; (Connolly 1981) p.131 fig.7-9
490
Monte Bibele see: (Lejars 2008) pp.127-128, 140-142, 146-147, 167-157 fig. 5A, 6,9; Montefortino see: (Tomcazk 2012)
p.57 fig. B-E Montericco see: (Small 2000) p.225; (Tomcazk 2012) p.57 fig.10; Latium see, (Connolly 1981) p.92 fig.14; Vulci
see, (Connolly 1981) p.98 fig.9; (Tomcazk 2012) p.56 fig.9 A
491
(Lejars 2008) pp.127-128, 140-142, 146-147, 167-157 fig. 5A, 6,9; (Tomcazk 2012) p.56 fig 9, 57 fig.10
492
(Connolly 1981) p.100 fig.5; (Small 2000) p.226
111
from northern Italy and particularly the regions inhabited by Celts (Montefortino, Monte
Bibele) when compared to the previously discussed evidence from central and southern
Italy, indicate that the socketed javelin is likely to have been introduced through Celtic
interaction. Socketed javelins without shanks have also been discovered but are, on the
whole, rarer than their shanked counterparts both artistically and physically in Etruria and
Latium.493
The added penetrative power provided by the shanked javelin may have initially been
developed as a counter to the oblong shield with its horizontal handgrip, which enabled the
defender to hold the shield further away from his body than the hoplite shield. The Celts did
not develop a shield similar to the hoplite shield and appear to have adhered to variations
of the bossed oblong shield instead. This then may have resulted in the Celts being the first
peoples of the Mediterranean to experiment with a shanked javelin in order to gain an
advantage over the defensive capabilities of the oblong shield type shield against javelins.
Certainly the dynamics of a shorter but broader headed javelin without a shank would have
been less successful against a oblong shield that enabled the warrior to both hold the shield
further away from his body, while maintaining the ability to punch outwards with the shield
in an attempt to ward off a javelin. Therefore, the continued series of cultural and military
interactions between the Celts, and the Etruscans, and Latins would have likely given the
Italians enough time and reason to gradually adopt the shanked javelin as their primary
missile weapon sometime during the fourth century. This argument is strengthened by the
archaeological timeline that traces the shanked javelins presence in Latium as far back as
the Villanovan period, and then appearing with increased frequency in Etruria, and the Po
Valley from the fifth century onwards.
There is strong evidence indicating that there were two dominant sword types in Etruria and
Latium; the curved machaira, and the antennae sword, which is not only typical of central
and southern Italy but also of the wider western Mediterranean. The majority of this
evidence has been derived from wealthy warrior graves of Etruria (Tomba del Guerriero,
Tomba Giglioli), and Latium (Tomb of the Warrior). The evidence from these tombs
493
(Connolly 1981) p.98 fig.5
112
illustrates a continuous chronology of use pertaining to both the machaira, and antennae
type swords dating back to the seventh century.494
The machaira was a single edged sickle shaped sword similar to the falcata and kopis495. A
fifth century machaira was discovered in the Tomb of the Warrior at Lanuvium measuring
81.7cm long and 7cm wide at the head, and at Alalia.496 A similar, but far older machaira
dating to the Villanovan period was also unearthed in Este and a sixth century example from
Populonia illustrate that the weapon was subjected to little change from the Bronze Age to
the Iron Age.497 The machaira has been attributed as being an Etruscan invention, which
was then transferred to Greece, most probably through the same koine which made Greek
styled vases so popular in Etruria.498 This same koine which saw Etruscan and Greek
mercenaries serving together in Carthaginian and Syracusan armies may have led to the
Iberian adoption of the falcata.499
The antennae sword seems to have been by the fourth century the most common type of
sword in Etruria, and Latium. A physical example of these have been discovered at Tomb of
the Warrior c.525 (Vulci) and Alalia (Corsica) with blade lengths ranging between 60-70cm
and places the swords of Etruria and Latium on a par with other contemporary cultures in
the western Mediterranean who also utilized the antennae type sword. 500 Whilst artistic
representations have been discovered at the Tomba Giglioli and the François Tomb both of
which, date to the fourth century, as well on a third century cinerary urns from Chiusi, and
the Capestrano warrior.501 Furthermore, antennae swords are also represented on late fifth
to early fourth century stela from Bologna, illustrating what appears to be a naked Celtic
warrior duelling with an Etruscan cavalryman both of whom carry antennae swords, whilst
the left cheek piece of a helmet discovered at Todi illustrates two hoplites fighting with
hoplite shield and antennae swords.502
494
(Stary 1979) p.192, 198
(Connolly 1981) p.63,77, 78 fig.2, 98 fig. 12,13, 107 fig.7; (Quesada Sanz 2011b) p.50; (Quesada Sanz 1997b) p.254 fig.2
496
(Connolly 1981) p.98 fig.13; (MacMullen 2011) p.103;
497
(Connolly 1981) p.98 fig.12; (Stary 1979) p.192 fig.5
498
(Connolly 1981) p.99; (Stary 1979) p.192
499
(Quesada Sanz 2011b) p.49
500
(Connolly 1981) p.98 fig. 3; (George 2014) p.743;
501
(Connolly 1981) p.100 fig. 5, p.101 fig.13; (Briguet 1986) p.162 fig.96; (Weir 2010) pl.31
502
(Pallottino 1991) Pl. 24; (Stary 1979) Pl.23, 27a,
495
113
The Celtic and Italic preference for the antennae sword may have also developed out of the
more prolific use of the oblong shield. In order to successfully slash at an opponent a
warrior was forced to use an over headed diagonal movement, which requires the shield to
be swept away from the body and out of the weapons arch. The vertical handgrip (antilabe)
and forearm sleeve (porpax) enabled this movement to be carried out with much greater
ease than the horizontal handgrip of the oblong shield As Italic warfare became more
orientated towards the use of missile, it is likely that the oblong shield correspondingly
became the shield of choice as it offered superior protection against javelins (Livy 9.19;
Polyb. 6.23).503 Consequently, a sword type like the antennae may have become favoured
because it facilitated thrusting which could be achieved without moving the shield away
from the body and thus exposing the soldier’s body. Therefore, although the antennae
sword could still be used in diagonal slashing motion, the vertical handgrip and greater size
of the oblong shield would require more skill to execute without leaving the body vulnerable
to counterattack.
A sword wielding warrior was physically restricted by his weapon to close quarter combat
and his killing zone was dictated by the length of the sword itself, consequently this acted as
a severe disadvantage when fighting an enemy equipped with a thrusting spear, or a ranged
weapon like the javelin. A swordsman, in order to physically inflict wounds upon enemies
armed with spears and javelins, needed to close this gap as quickly as possible.
Furthermore, the physicality of utilizing swords in a continuous melee does not appear to fit
with the prolonged battles described by Livy, which could last several hours (Livy 22.6;
23.40; 24.15; 25.19; 27.2).504 Indeed, Adrian Goldsworthy noted that it would be very
unlikely that a melee encounter would last longer than fifteen minutes before the soldiers
would physically and mentally exhaust themselves.505 Whilst, Livy’s battlefield narratives
cannot be relied upon for the finer details, the perception that battles could be drawn out
affairs seems to be corroborated by Vegetius who noted that battles usually lasted two or
three hours, which would have been an unsustainable if fought as a continuous melee
503
(Burns 2006) pp.151-152; (Rawlings 2007b) p.58
(Goldsworthy 2001) pp.56-57; (Sabin 2000) pp.4,11
505
(Goldsworthy 2001) pp.56-59; (Sabin 2000) pp.11-14
504
114
encounter (Vege. Mil. 3.9). It is interesting to note, that Plutarch recorded that the battle of
Pydna was won in under an hour at a time when the primary offensive weapon of Roman
soldiers was the sword (Plut. Aem. 22). As a result it appears conceivable that swords were
only utilized to quickly decide the outcome of a battle, in a manner similar to an eighteenth
century bayonet charge.506 This conceivably occurred after a series of repeated javelin
skirmishes which had sufficiently weakened the enemy line.507
The relative scarcity of swords in the archaeological evidence from Etruria and Latium
suggests that, like contemporary cultures across the western Mediterranean, swords were
expensive items not readily utilized by the vast majority of soldiers during the fourth and
third centuries. Moreover, the lack of physical examples in burial deposits suggests that they
were far too valuable to be taken out of circulation, and were much more likely to be
recycled by family members of the deceased. The literary evidence, albeit from the first
century, further indicates that the sword was not the dominant weapon of Italic battlefields
in the fourth and third centuries. For example, the most common weapon to kill Roman
officers was the javelin, and Livy records five instances where they inflict mortal wounds
(Livy 8.9; 24.42; 25.19; 29.2; 41.18).508 This seems to be corroborated by the accounts of
Dion, Pyrrhus, and Timoleon, who also received javelin wounds whilst fighting in the western
Mediterranean (Diod. Sic. 16.12.4; Plut. Pyrrh. 21.9; Timo 4.3).509 Consequently, the
greater evidence pertaining directly to spears and javelins likely indicates that warfare in
Etruria and Latium was primarily skirmish orientated and fought javelins and spears. This
illustrates that between the fifth and third centuries Roman warfare was not exceptional,
but rather it was operating according to a common western Mediterranean military koine.
There is an abundance of helmets in the archaeological and iconographical record. The most
common helmets can be distilled into three categories; the Negau, Etrusco-Thracian, and
Montefortino. The most commonly attested to physically is the Negau helmet with 112
examples, although it is very rarely depicted in iconographic contexts (Plate 10).510 The
506
(Sabin 2000) p.13
(Sabin 2000) p.14; (Tomcazk 2012) p.42
508
(Sabin 2000) p.12
509
(Champion 2010) p.19, 42
510
(Paddock 1993) p.174, 178-184 tbl.1
507
115
archaeological record reveals that the Negau helmet was an indigenous Etruscan
development, which first came into use sometime during the sixth century remaining
virtually unchanged until the fourth or possibly third centuries.511 The Negau represents the
most common native Italian helmet and archaeologically continues to be attested in Etruria
and a large region of central and southern Italy between the Bay of Naples and Pulgia until
the first century.512 Furthermore, the Negau has also been attested in the Celtic regions of
the Po Valley bearing Etruscan inscriptions, which illustrates that there was a high degree of
exchange occurring in regard to military technology among the variety of cultures of the
entire Italian peninsula from the sixth century onwards. 513
The surviving examples of the Negau helmet show that in typology it belongs to the pot
helmet family, which included the pilos.514 It was constructed of bronze, and shaped in a
tall, slightly bulbous angular bowl with a ridge that rises sharply towards the apex providing
two opposed surfaces designed to glance blows.515 Iconographic representations of the
Negau are rare, but crested examples can be seen on the Certosa situla and the Väce Clasp,
in addition to a non-crested Negau portrayed on the Arnoaldi situla516 The sheer volume of
Negau helmets discovered throughout the Italian peninsula indicates that it was probably
the helmet of choice for the majority of Italic warriors due to its simple design, which likely
made it affordable to most sections of society. The Negau was devoid of both cheek and
neck guards, which indicates that warriors were concerned about maintaining a high degree
of visibility when fighting which one would require during a fluid skirmish. Moreover, the
absence of cheek and neck guards also suggests that defence against close quarter injuries
to the face did not constitute a major concern as it did for Greek hoplites and their closed
faced Corinthian helmet. Consequently, this proffers strong evidence for the majority of
Italic warriors acting as skirmishers, who were not primarily equipped for melee combat.
During the fourth and third centuries the Etruscans, and Latins appear to have begun
adopting and experimenting with helmet types such as the Etrusco-Thracian, and later Celtic
511
(Connolly 1981) p.97,99; (Stary 1979) p.196
(Paddock 1993) p.174; 188 fig.37; (Stary 1979)
513
(Ellis 1998) p.41; (Rawlings 2007b) p.54
514
(Connolly 1981) p.99
515
(Connolly 1981) p.98 fig. 2,3; (Paddock 1993) p.176, 177 fig.38; (Pallottino 1991) pl.17
516
(Connolly 1981) p.96, 103 fig.12,13
512
116
Montefortino that could offer neck, and flexible cheek protection (Plates 8-9). Although the
Montefortino helmet was of Celtic origin and later became the standard Roman helmet until
the first century A.D. The development of the Etrusco-Thracian helmet illustrates that the
Etruscans, and possibly the Latins were developing helmets that were relatively similar in
design and function to the Celtic Montefortino, and the Samno-Attic helmet of central and
southern Italy. The Etrusco-Thracian helmet is similar visually, and in typology to the SamnoAttic helmet with a “high conical bowl issuing from a well fitted but slightly concave brow
band which is everted at the front and drawn down at the rear to form a neck-guard.”517
The primary difference between the Etrusco-Thracian and Samno-Attic helmet is that the
former is not always equipped with cheek pieces like its southern counterpart (Plates 78).518 The Etrusco-Thracian helmet appears to represent a midway point in the development
of Etruscan and Latin helmets between the Negau and Montefortino helmets, as warriors
were seeking to obtain added melee protection without compromising their vision and
hearing. Furthermore, the movement towards helmets with bucculae suggests that even the
wealthy troops were possibly engaging in skirmishing as well as melee combat when called
upon.
Examples of the Italic muscled cuirass have been discovered in the Warrior’s Tomb at
Lanuvium, and the Tomb of the Seven Rooms at Orvieto.519 Whilst artistic representations
of the cuirass are present on some of the soldiers depicted on the wall of the François tomb,
and is worn by one of the duelling brothers on the cinerary urns from Chiusi, it is depicted
with far less frequency than the linothorax.520 This suggests that the Etruscans and Latins by
the fourth century had largely abandoned the heavy bronze cuirass. As warfare became
more flexible, and skirmish orientated, the cuirass would have provided its wearer with
severe mobility disadvantages when fighting against enemies equipped with the lighter
cardiophylax or linothorax.521 The physical rigidity of the armour, especially around the
shoulder would have also hindered the warrior’s ability to hurl a javelin, and likely resulted
in it becoming unsuitable for Italic warfare. Furthermore, the original Greek version of the
517
(Connolly 1981) p.100 fig.3; (Paddock 1993) p.322, 323 fig.87
Etrusco-Thracian see (Connolly 1981) p.100 fig 3; (Paddock 1993) p.330 fig.1-3; Samno-Attic see (Connolly 1981) p. 108
fig.10, 112 fig. 1,4; (Paddock 1993) p.402 fig.107
519
(Connolly 1981) p.99, 100 fig.4; (MacMullen 2011) p.103
520
(Briguet 1986) p.162 fig.96; (Weir 2010) pl.31
518
521
(Aldrete 2013) pp. 142-143
117
bronze cuirass, upon which the Italic cuirass was undoubtedly modelled, was initially
designed for quick decisive hoplite encounters. Therefore as Italic warfare was orientated
towards skirmishing, which potentially lasted several hours, the weight and heat of the
bronze cuirass would have rendered it uncomfortable and energy sapping when worn for
long periods.
The cardiophylax like the muscled cuirass is rather sparsely attested to in the physical record
and is almost entirely absent in the iconographic evidence from Etruria and Latium.
However, when viewed in conjunction with Polybius’ account and the ample evidence of its
existence provided in central and southern Italy, it is probable that it saw greater use than is
archaeologically recorded (Polyb. 6.23.14). What evidence has been discovered illustrates
that the use of the cardiophylax can be traced back to the eighth century, with a series of
physical examples illustrating that the circular or square cardiophylax remained in use in the
following centuries onwards, whilst it is also artistically represented on a warrior from Ceri
(Plate 32).522
As a result of its bio-degradable construction material no physical specimens of the
linothorax have yet been discovered in Etruria or Latium. Fortunately in Etruria, there are
numerous artistic representations of the linothorax. Indeed they constitute the dominant
cuirass type in Etruscan iconography in the fourth century. For example, painted images of
the linothorax appear on the walls of the François tomb (Vulci) and the Tomba del Orco II, as
well as on the sarcophagi of the Amazon, and the Priest all of which date to the fourth
century (Tarquinia).523 The linothorax is also represented on numerous reliefs such as the
sarcophagus from Torre San Severo at Orvieto, and on the cavalryman depicted on a stela
from Bologna, both of which date to the fourth century, in addition to several cinerary urns
depicting the duelling Eteocles and Polyneices from Chiusi.524 Depictions of the linothorax
are not confined to a funerary context in Etruria and can be seen on both Vibenna brothers
depicted on an engraved bronze mirror from the third century.525 The abundant fourth
century evidence in Etruria pertaining to the linothorax when viewed with its popularity
522
(Connolly 1981) p.93 fig.7-8, 98 fig. 14-17; (Stary 1979) p. 183 fig.4, 188 fig.4, 189
(Connolly 1981) pg.69; (Gelba 2012) p. 50 fig. 5.2-4, 51 fig. 5.5-6; 52 fig. 5.7
524
(Gelba 2012) p.53 fig.5.8; (Pallottino 1991) pl.24; (Weir 2010) pl.31
525
(Bonfante 1986) p.247 fig.20
523
118
among the peoples of central and southern Italy demonstrates that by this period it had
become the dominant form of cuirass over the entire Italic peninsula. This evidence
subsequently suggests that the most common panoply among the Italic peoples of the
fourth and third centuries consisted of spears and javelins together with a oblong shield,
and either a linothorax, cardiophylax, or spongia. Furthermore, the functional aspect of this
panoply indicates that Italic warfare was heavily orientated towards mobility and
skirmishing rather than densely packed continuous melees.
As in central and southern Italy, and North Africa, the Etruscan and Latin shield types
conform to two types; the clipeus, which seem to have been a popular shield for those
wealthy enough to afford lavish tombs, and the oblong shield which gradually entirely
replaces the clipeus. The clipeus has been traced back to at least the sixth century in Etruria,
with physical examples discovered at the Warrior’s Tomb at Vulci, and a clipeus which now
resides in the Vatican Museum.526 Artistically the clipeus is well represented particularly in
Etruria appearing on the walls of the François and Giglioli tombs which date to the fourth
and third centuries respectively. Clipei also appear on series of reliefs dating between the
fifth to third centuries, such as above the sarcophagus of the tomb of Reliefs at Cerverti, the
tombstone of Aule Feluske, as well as on the Certosa situla (Plate 33). 527 The Certosa situla
is of particular importance, as it illustrates warriors equipped with both clipei and oblong
shields indicating that both shield types were being utilized together by the end of the sixth
century.
Whilst the clipeus provided adequate protection from spear and sword blows, its circular
shape did provide suitable leg protection against javelins. Therefore, as Italic warfare
progressed towards a javelin orientated skirmishing which required a greater degree of
upper and lower body protection and mobility, the oblong shield gradually replaced the
clipeus as the shield of choice even for the wealthy. However, the continued appearance of
the clipeus in the archaeological and iconographical record is likely due to its status being
with associated wealth, power, and a connection to a mythological Greek past. An example
of this is the continuation of the clipeus in cinerary urn reliefs dating to the second century
526
(Connolly 1981) p.53 fig. 1-4, 98 fig.3; (Stary 1979) p.188,192 fig. 3
(Connolly 1981) p.98; (Briguet 1986) p.162 fig.96; (Pallottino 1991) Pl. 18,32; (Steingräber 2006) p.254
527
119
which appear in wealthy chamber tombs at Volterra and depict the duel between the
brothers Eteocles and Polyneices, as well as the death of Oenomaus.528 Therefore, whilst
the archaeological evidence suggests that the clipeus was a popular shield type down into
the second century, it must be approached with caution as it has the potential to be
misleading.
The oblong shield is not as well attested in a funerary context as the clipeus precisely for the
above mentioned reasons. Tradition ascribes that is was not the shield of the aristocracy,
and consequently held less prestige among those wealthy enough to afford a chamber tomb
(Dion. Hal. Ant. Rom. 4.16-18; Livy 1.42-43). Archaeological evidence suggests that the
spindled bossed oblong shield first appeared in Etruria during the eight century with
examples being found in the necropolis of Poggio alia Guardia at Vetulonia, and Veii.529
Indeed, Stary attributes this as an indigenous invention which was then transferred to the
Celts, who after the rise of the clipeus re-introduced it during their invasions of the fourth
century.530 However, the complete disappearance of the oblong shield is unlikely and it may
be more tenable to argue that it was no longer favoured by wealthy Etruscans, who appear
to have adopted aspects of the Greek hoplite panoply. Further evidence supporting the
existence of the bossed oblong shield in Etruria can be found on a seventh century bronze
figurine, in addition to a contemporary relief depiction from Vetulonia (Plate 34).531
Artistically the oblong shield can be dated to the fifth century on the Certosa situla, and
thereafter there appears to be a large gap in the iconographic record until the appearance
of the javelin armed warriors illustrated on the Arnoaldi situla and Väce Clasp. These two
depictions are of great importance as they illustrate that by the end of the sixth to mid-fifth
century the spindled boss oblong shield was associated with javelin armed troops. The
contemporary prevalence of the oblong shield in the archaeological record throughout
central and southern Italy, which favoured the use of the javelin in addition to its
appearance amongst Celts, Celtiberians, Greeks, Iberians, and North Africans, strongly
suggests that by the fourth century it had become dominant shield of the western
528
(Briguet 1986) p.118 fig.33, 119 fig. 34, 121 fig.37
Vetulonia - (Connolly 1981) p.95; Veii - (Stary 1979) p.184 fig. 3
530
(Connolly 1981) p.63; (Stary 1979) p.187
531
(Connolly 1981) p.96 fig.1,2
529
120
Mediterranean. Consequently, if the oblong shield was the shield of choice for the majority
of troops which favoured the javelin across the western Mediterranean, it is then
conceivable that skirmish orientated warfare accompanied it.
5.4. Summary:
In conclusion the evidence examined in the preceding chapter suggests that from the fourth
century onwards the Roman political system and its extension of hegemony shared many
operational characteristics with Carthage. For example, it appears that neither of these
hegemonies enforced radical changes to the civic institutions of those under their sphere of
influence rather they appear to have been light handed, allowing them to retain local
autonomy and civic institutions in addition to extending certain common legal rights.532
Although, there were apparent differences that should not be overlooked, namely the
military obligations that accompanied Roman hegemony, this too may not have been wholly
unique. Indeed, Carthage appears to have levied some of its Libyan troops in a similar
codified manner, and although there is no surviving evidence to offer support it is likely that
many of the former mercenaries settled in Sicilian communities by Syracusan tyrants were
obliged to serve when required.533 Furthermore, it is interesting that the civically
unobtrusive nature of Carthaginian, Roman, and Syracusan hegemony appears to have
replicated itself with regard to the military equipment and tactics that they used.
Consequently, like Carthaginian and Syracusan armies, when the Italic allies fought for Rome
they retained their own equipment, tactics and commanders.
The similarities of military equipment attested to in the archaeological record indicates a
distinct western Mediterranean panoply that was increasingly predicated upon light body
armour, open faced helmets with cheek pieces, oblong shields together with shanked
javelins, and spears (many of which appear to have been multi-purpose). Moreover, the
contemporary development of the Etrusco-Thracian, Montefortino, and Samno-Attic
532
For Carthage see: (Ameling 2011) pp.47-51; (Bridoux 2014) pp.1810182, 200; (Papi 2014) pp.202-218; (Hoyos 2010)
p.49; (Lazenby 1996) p.24; (Wallace-Hadrill 2014) pp.302-304
For Rome see: (Boatwright 2012) p.82; (Cornell 1990c) p.368; (Cornell 1995) p.352; (Eckstein 2006) p.252; (Forsythe 2005)
p.308; (Harris 1985) p.61; (Lomas 2014) p.207
533
(Ameling 2011) p.48; (Goldsworthy 2001) p.29,33; (Lazenby 1996) p.26; (Picard 1994) p.379; (Scullard 1990) p.504
121
helmets, oblong shields and shanked javelins indicates that during the fourth century Celtic,
Celtiberian, Iberian, and Italic soldiers were utilizing remarkably similar military equipment
that appears to have fulfilled a common purpose when fighting.
With regard to the Roman adoption of the manipular legion by 264, the speed of Roman
expansion following 338 together with its light handed hegemony, which seemingly allowed
allied units to retain their own tactics, in conjunction with the seasonal campaigning, left
little time to train units in a complex tactical formation such as the manipular system
described by Polybius (6.21-23). Therefore, it appears increasingly likely that Roman
hegemony was not able to enforce a radical tactical overhaul on its allies during the fourth
century. Consequently, it is increasingly unlikely that the literary narratives portraying
Roman tactical exceptionalism during this period are accurate. Indeed, in this light it is more
tenable to argue that the Roman armies before the First Punic War fought in similar flexible
‘cloud’ based units employed by the Celtic, Celtiberian, Iberian, and Italic soldiers who also
fought in contemporary Carthaginian and Syracusan armies.
Chapter Six: Conclusions
6.1. Carthaginian, Roman, and Syracusan hegemony:
The investigation conducted throughout this thesis of Carthaginian, Roman, and Syracusan
socio-political systems and in particular the methods in which they extended their respective
hegemonies suggests that, although they retained certain differences, they
appear to have shared many common operational characteristics which influenced the way
in which their armies were recruited, equipped, and tactically fought. For example, allied
communities under Carthaginian, Roman, and Syracusan hegemony retained their local
autonomy and civic institutions and it appears that this same degree of non-interference
was also applied when they served in their respective armies. Indeed, as this thesis has
repeatedly demonstrated it is generally agreed that allied troops and mercenaries alike
retained their own equipment, tactics, and unit commanders. In this light it appears that the
hegemonies of Carthage, Rome, and Syracuse operated in comparable ways and
122
consequently it is difficult to conceive that they were able enforce radical tactical changes to
their heterogeneous armies.
The extent of Carthaginian hegemony, which encompassed North Africa and the eastern
regions of the Spanish peninsula in addition to western Sicily, appears to have acted as a
major catalyst in the development of the western Mediterranean military koine. For
example, it is unlikely that without the Carthaginian presence in the Spanish peninsula that
Celtiberian and Iberian soldiers would have been exposed to Celtic, Italic, Greek, and North
African troops with the frequency that they were. Furthermore, the struggles between
Carthage and Syracuse over Sicily which attracted many Celtic and Italic mercenaries
similarly enabled them to frequently fight with and against (and in many cases live
alongside) other Celtiberians, Iberians, Greeks, and North African soldiers Indeed, the
appearance of Celtic and Italic military equipment in North Africa and the Spanish peninsula
probably had its genesis in these frequent interactions. Consequently, it appears highly
likely that the two centuries of military interaction between these culturally and
geographically diverse soldiers who fought in Carthaginian and Syracusan armies from the
battle of Himera (480) to the outbreak of the First Punic War (264) provided the basis from
which the western Mediterranean military koine initially evolved.
6.2. Socio-political power dynamics:
The socio-political power dynamics at work within Carthage, Rome, Syracuse and those
communities under their respective spheres of influence operated in similar ways and very
likely also affected their military systems. For instance, these socio-political power dynamics
primarily revolved around familial ties and client-patron relationships, rather than the
individual’s direct relationship with the state. Thus, when soldiers were recruited it was
largely along these lines and as a result it is likely that these relationships dictated that men
fought in the same unit as those who were responsible for their recruitment. Additionally, it
is highly likely that due to the varying levels of economic prosperity among client, patrons
and even within families in a period when it was the individual’s responsibility to equip
themselves meant that there was a higher proportion of soldiers who would have borne less
expensive equipment such as javelins. Thus, when viewed in conjunction with the large
123
number of javelins in the archaeological record, it appears that the bulk of troops fighting in
the western Mediterranean were primarily equipped to operate as skirmishers. Therefore, it
is tenable to argue that the common tactical unit in the western Mediterranean was the
flexible ‘cloud’ arranged around common socio-political relationships and filled with a
mixture of light and heavy troops. Furthermore, as the heavier troops were more likely to
have been wealthier and thus wielded more power and status, it is probable that they
expected the lighter troops (who were probably the junior partners in the power dynamic)
to engage the enemy first, which as skirmishers would mean expanding out from the ‘cloud’
to launch their javelins. These same troops could then retreat behind the more heavily
armed troops should the encounter escalate into melee combat, a phase which presumably
would not only suit the more expensive equipment of the heavier troops, but also
potentially mirror the protective role of the wealthy patrons and thus potentially would be
in consonance with their ethos.
In conclusion, these common socio-political relationships potentially indicate that the ‘cloud’
was the common embryonic tactical unit across much of the western Mediterranean
from which later more sophisticated tactical systems evolved. Indeed, if this is true then the
‘cloud’ appears to have been the basic tactical unit from which the Roman manipular system
was developed. Certainly, the specialist division of troop types with specific functions of the
manipular legion bears close resemblance to what Lendon and Quesada Sanz, in particular
have argued was already occurring within the ‘cloud’.534
6.3. Military Equipment:
What have been apparent throughout this investigation are the remarkable similarities
between the military equipment among the geographically diverse body of soldiers who
served in Carthaginian, Roman, and Syracusan armies between the fifth and third centuries.
The majority of this equipment appears to have been designed to facilitate flexible missile
orientated skirmishing, although it certainly retained the potential to escalate into melee
combat.
534
(Lendon 2005)pp.179-191; (Quesada Sanz 2006) pp.245, 258-263
124
The physical and iconographic evidence discussed in this thesis indicates that during this
period the most popular offensive weapons among the Celts, Celtiberians, Iberians, and the
various Italic peoples were shanked javelins and spears (many of which can be considered to
have been multi-purpose). These weapons strongly suggest that warfare in the western
Mediterranean prior to Punic Wars was largely conducted by soldiers who intended to
primarily engage in flexible missile orientated skirmish warfare. For example; the
contemporary development of the open-faced Etrusco-Thracian, Montefortino, and SamnoAttic helmets with cheek pieces (which in many cases were flexible). These characteristics
suggest that soldiers were seeking helmets that allowed them to retain their peripheral
vision (when the cheek pieces were tied up), a trait that appears suited to skirmishing,
whilst at the same time could also offer protection when engaging in melee combat (once
they were tied down). Moreover, evidence suggests that during the fourth and third
centuries light cuirasses (cardiophylax, linothorax, and spongia) were utilized by the
majority of troops, rather than the heavy and physically restricting Greek styled cuirass
which was gradually phased out during this same period. This apparent shift in cuirasses
likely indicates that soldiers were seeking body armour, which could still provide adequate
protection, without severely inhibiting their ability to manoeuvre and thus successfully
function in flexible skirmish orientated warfare. With regard to shields, the evidence of
oblong shields from the Italian and Spanish peninsulas, North Africa, and Celtic occupied
Europe strongly supports the argument that by the third end of the third century it had
become the most common shield type in the western Mediterranean.
Moreover, the oblong shield was equipped with three distinct characteristics that rendered
it particularly suitable for skirmish orientated warfare. Its horizontal handgrip provided a
larger degree of manoeuvrability as opposed to the circular hoplite styled shield, whilst its
iron boss enabled the deflection of missiles. Furthermore, the greater size and shape of the
oblong shield provided better protection for the bearers’ legs than the hoplite shield and
this may in turn have led to the gradual decline in the use of greaves.535 These
characteristics, when viewed in conjunction with its widespread adoption across the
western Mediterranean likely indicates that the oblong shield, like the Montefortino helmet
535
(Burns 2006)p.232
125
was widely adopted because it was well suited to use in both flexible missile base skirmishes
and melee encounters.
Finally, evidence strongly indicates that swords were secondary weapons, which further
suggests that melee combat was not the primary aim in western Mediterranean armies.
Indeed, when facing enemies who were primarily armed with javelins and spears, soldiers
wielding swords would have been severely disadvantaged. Consequently, the congruencies
within the archaeological evidence pertaining to Celtic, Celtiberian, Iberian, Italic, and North
African soldiers which has been examined throughout this thesis, strongly suggests that
warfare in the western Mediterranean between 350-264 was primarily fought between
similarly equipped, but heterogeneous armies who engaged each other with common
tactics in what was primarily missile based skirmish orientated warfare.
6.4. The western Mediterranean military koine:
The contemporaneous development and transmission of similar military equipment across
the western Mediterranean between the fifth and third centuries strongly suggests that a
common military koine was in existence. However, there is of course an enormous amount
of further research required in order to fully map out the arguments raised throughout this
thesis. Indeed, this thesis did not set out to comprehensively answer the questions first
raised, but it does demonstrate that with further research this could potentially be
achieved. Specifically, a deeper and more detailed examination of arms and armour is
required in order to better understand the developmental continuum of military equipment
and tactics in the western Mediterranean prior to the end of the Punic Wars. Much of the
current state of research has not been primarily focused on the in-depth examination of
military equipment. Indeed, currently, outside of a few very detailed works on military
equipment namely by Connolly, Burns, Bishop and Coulston (albeit their work is largely
focused on the Later Republican period onwards) Paddock, and Quesada Sanz, this area is
understudied.536 Moreover, many of the studies pertaining to military equipment in the
536
(Bishop 2006); (Burns 2003); (Burns 2006); (Connolly 1981); (Paddock 1993); (Quesada Sanz 2006); (Quesada Sanz
2011c)
Also see: (Aldrete 2013); (Brizio 1899); (Brunaux 1987); (De Navarro 1972); (Gelba 2012); (Lejars 2008); (Saulnier 1980);
(Schneider-Herrmann 1996, Quesada Sanz 2014); (Serritella 1995); (Small 2000); (Stary 1979); (Stary 1981a); (Stary 1981b);
(Tomcazk 2012)
126
western Mediterranean are focused on Italic developments and consequently the important
role that the Celts, Celtiberians, and Iberians increasingly appeared to have played in the
development of the western Mediterranean military koine has been largely neglected.
Quesada Sanz has been particularly important in leading the studies of these peoples within
the Spanish peninsula, but there is little else and particularly in regard to the Celts of
southern France who bridged the Italian and Spanish peninsulas.537
This investigation has attempted to observe the wider trends of military development
amongst the cultures of the western Mediterranean and to study them as inter-connected
entities, rather than view them as occurring independently. Indeed, the Celts, Celtiberians,
Iberians, and Italic peoples in particular appear to have been highly inter-connected and this
appears to have been largely facilitated through their shared military interactions as
mercenaries in Carthaginian and Syracusan armies from the fifth century onwards. Thus, by
264 these geographically disparate cultures had experienced almost 150 years of intense
interactions where they had ample time to develop a common military koine. Indeed, it is
hard to imagine that the frequency and length of these interactions would not have
developed a common way of waging war as was the case in the wider Greek and Hellenistic
worlds. The western Mediterranean needs to be studied as one diverse, but inter-connected
military entity in the same manner that Greece, Epirus, Macedonia, and the Hellenistic
eastern Mediterranean have largely been. If this can be achieved then a more concise
explanation of the manipular legions evolution may be able to be discovered. For example,
the Macedonian phalanx developed rapidly under Phillip II, but only after centuries of
exposure to the military developments occurring within the Greek world. Indeed, it appears
that the Macedonian phalanx was achieved under a centralised state and this may have also
occurred in Rome once they had developed sufficient centralisation to achieve a tactical
reform (Diod. Sic. 16.3; Polyaenus Strat. 4.2.10).538 This lack of centralisation may have been
a factor in the Celts, Celtiberians, and Iberians seemingly not being able to tactically
progress past the embryonic ‘cloud’ and could also have led to the sense of Roman
exceptionalism by later writers who admired Rome’s ability to govern.
537
(Quesada Sanz 1992); (Quesada Sanz 1997b); (Quesada Sanz 1999); (Quesada Sanz 2006); (Quesada Sanz 2011c);
(Quesada Sanz 2011b); (Quesada Sanz 2011a); (Quesada Sanz 2014); (Quesada Sanz 1998)
538
(Cawkwell 1978) pp.151-160; (Ellis 1976) pp.8-9; (Hammond 1980) pp.54-60; (Hornblower 2011) p.202, 277-279;
(Müller 2010) pp.169-171; (Sekunda 2010) pp.446-452; (Worthington 2008) pp.26-33
127
With regard to the Roman adoption of the manipular legion before the First Punic War, it
appears that the arguments predicated upon the Roman-centric literary tradition for Roman
tactical exceptionalism, at least during the fourth century is becoming increasingly weak.
Admittedly, this argument represents a paradigm shift and challenges a host of wellrespected scholarly studies since the late nineteenth century and as such it requires
extensive investigations in order to establish itself. However, if this can be expanded upon,
then the development of military equipment and tactics in the western Mediterranean
(particularly outside of Roman contexts) has the potential to be better appreciated. This is
something I intend to address in my forth coming doctoral studies, where I will continue to
examine the western Mediterranean as an inter-connected military entity.
128
Appendix 1: Cavalry.
Numidian Light Cavalry:
The Numidian horsemen were regarded as the light skirmishing cavalry par excellence in the
western Mediterranean during the span of the Roman Republic, and performed a crucial
role for both Hannibal’s and the Roman armies during the Second Carthaginian war (Livy
29.34.17; Polyb. 3.65, 73-74, 112, 116).539 Mounted on small ponies without saddles,
bridles, or bits they steered their mounts with their thighs and were equipped with light
javelins together a small round caetra like shield, and either a dagger or a short sword (Livy
35.11-12).540 A second century tomb of a Numidian aristocrat at Es-Soumaa in Algeria has
revealed iron javelin heads together with an antennae type sword with a blade of 60 cm.541
Additionally, Numidian horsemen are depicted on Trajan’s Column with mounts wearing
only a simple neck strap together with a third century terracotta statuette from South Italy
showing a Numidian rider with no armour or saddle.542 Third century coins from King Syphax
again show saddleless riders help to reinforce Silius Italicus and Livy’s descriptions of the
Numidian’s riding their horses without saddle or bit (Sil. Pun. 1.215).543
In order to retain their manoeuvrability and speed Numidian cavalry wore no armour
opting for simple tunics that enabled them the flexibility they required to hurl their javelins.
An iron conical pilos style helmet was discovered inside the Es-Soumaa tomb which may
indicate that Numidian Aristocrats were willing to adopt some armour possibly as a status
symbol. The pilos is a simple helmet without any cheek pieces to obstruct the rider’s
peripheral vision therefore it would retain its suitability for a rider who relied on agility and
speed.544 The Numidian cavalry constituted an important arm of the Carthaginian armies;
they were fast and nimble which allowed them to rush forward and engage the enemy with
a volley of javelins then retire before the enemy could close and engage with them. In
addition to their skirmishing duties, their endurance meant that they were ideally suited to
539
(Goldsworthy 2001) p.32; (Scullard 1990) p.495
(Bagnall 2005) p.149,150; (Goldsworthy 2001) p.32; (Lancel 1995) p.61; (Salimbeti 2014) p.38; (Sidnell 2006) p.172
541
(Connolly 1981) p.150; (Salimbeti 2014) p.38
542
(Connolly 1981) p.149
543
Anonymous, 'Syphax', <http://www.livius.org/person/syphax>, Accessed March 24, 2015
544
(Salimbeti 2014) p.34
540
129
the pursuit of a fleeing army, raiding, and to act in both a screening and scouting role (App.
Hann. 6.35, 40; Livy 21.29, 25 9; Polyb. 1.19, 3.44-45, 68.-69, 71-74, 116, 3.71.33-34). 545 The
agility and speed of the Numidian horsemen meant that they were often used as bait in
order to harass and lure their enemy into an early attack or ambush, which is precisely how
Hannibal used them at the battle of the Trebia in 218 (Polyb. 3.71-72).
Carthaginian:
The Carthaginian cavalry was likely filled by those wealthy enough to provide their own
horses, and again parallels can be drawn with contemporary Iberian, Italic, and Greek
societies. This would have probably excluded the majority of the citizen population.546
Archaeological evidence provides some indication of the equipment used by Carthaginian
cavalry. A Terracotta disc dating to the sixth century in the Museum of Carthage (Tunis)
depicts a cavalryman riding a horse with a bridle and bit, but without a saddle and he is
armed with a spear and a round clipeus style shield, although it cannot be proved that this
shield was not a smaller lighter version.547 Additionally, a fragmentary third century stelae
also in the Museum of Carthage shows the Carthaginian war-god Adad on a horse with a
bridle equipped with a Montefortino styled helmet and possibly what is a plumed spear butt
(sauroter). There is no evidence pertaining directly to the length of the Carthaginian cavalry
spears, however the standard cavalry spear of Alexander and the successor Hellenisitc
Kingdoms is referred to as a xyston, the length and weight of which is uncertain. (Arr. Anab.
7.6.5; Strabo 10.1.12).548 The use of the xyston in the eastern Mediterranean does not
necessarily mean that Carthaginian cavalry utilized a similar weapon, but the physical
dynamics of cavalry warfare would seem to dictate that the cavalry spear would need to
reach the infantrymen before their spear could touch the rider of horse. Therefore, a cavalry
spear would be likely to be longer than the hoplites spear of 225cm, and this has been
seemingly corroborated by physical evidence.549 Consequently, the panoply of a mid-fourth
545
(Bagnall 2005) p.8; (Sidnell 2006) p.172
(Salimbeti 2014) p.23
547
(Salimbeti 2014) p.39
548
(Bar-Kochva 1976) pp.75-76; (Sekunda 2012) p.9; (Snodgrass 1967) p.120; (Tarn 1984) p.71
549
(Hammond 1989) p.60; (Manti 1983) p.77
546
130
to early third century Carthaginian cavalryman is likely to have consisted of a thrusting
spear/lance, circular shield, and an antennae type sword, together with a crested helmet,
together with a cuirass made of either linen of bronze. The legs of a cavalryman are the
most exposed, and vulnerable body part when fighting infantry, thus it is possible that some
cavalrymen wore pteryges to provide additional protection.550
Central and southern Italians:
The central and southern Italians were able to produce cavalry in reasonable numbers, of
and held a high reputation. Indeed, the plains of Apulia and Campania did historically
produce effective cavalry and the word Tarentine would become to the Greeks synonymous
with skirmishing javelin armed cavalry.551 Central and southern Italic cavalry are recorded as
first serving Sicilian Tyrants in 414/13, and then later after they were granted civitas sine
suffragio in 338 the Romans would continually utilize them for “over a century.”552 Although
their employment seems to indicate that they were been competent horsemen they were
to be completely outclassed by the Numidian cavalry during the early stages of the Second
Carthaginian war.553
The Italic cavalry are depicted on the Warrior’s Return fresco at Nola, and in Paestum as
riding with bridles and bits, without saddles. In both instances these horsemen are equipped
almost identically with bronze belts, ankles guards, and open faced helmets with aigrettes in
addition to being armed with javelins. The only differences are that the rider from the
Warrior’s Return wears an Italic anatomical cuirass with its distinctive straps in place of the
other rider’s linen tunic. Riders from Tombs of the cavalryman and the Procession Tomb
from Nola are shown wearing a linothorax, and in all probability its extra flexibility is likely
have made this the most effective armour worn by skirmisher cavalry.554 The majority of
cavalrymen are depicted as fighting without shields. However, there are a few instances in
which they appear ranging from the tomb paintings from Capua which illustrate the use of
the oblong shield and the small round shields (pelte) which are associated with Tarentine
550
(Hammond 1989) p.62
(Frederiksen 1984) p. 32 , 69, 74-5, 147; (Sekunda 2008) p.330, 346
552
(Frederiksen 1984) p.224
553
(Connolly 1981) p.112
551
554
(Aldrete 2013) p.142; (Burns 2006) p.376 WP48b, 377 WP49a
131
coinage depicting their cavalry, and should not be confused with the Greek pelte which was
a crescent-shaped rimless wicker shield.555 The scarcity of the oblong shield as a cavalry
shield is probably due to its size which would have made riding and throwing a javelin
cumbersome, whilst the Tarentine pelte may have been more effective, and could be the
same ox-hide covered, caked shaped shield which Polybius attributed to the early Roman
cavalry (Polyb.6.25). This small buckler, resembles the caetra illustrated on a bronze Iberian
cavalry figurine in the Madrid Museum, and may indicate that it was the preferred shield
type of light cavalry across the western Mediterranean.556
These features suggest that the central and southern Italian horsemen were mounted
skirmishers, and may explain why the Oscan speaking central and southern Italians who
were used to fighting as skirmishers were then able to adapt to equestrian warfare so
quickly after descending from the Apennines in 437, so that by 414 they were being
recruited as horsemen in Sicily for the Athenian expedition (Diod. Sic. 12.31.1; 13.44.2; Livy
4.37.1).557 The likelihood that the central and southern Italians cavalry fought as skirmishers
is further reinforced by literary evidence. For instance Livy describes an encounter between
a Roman and Samnite cavalry in which the Samnites respond to the Roman charge by
launching javelins (Livy 9.22). Furthermore, Polybius described the Roman cavalry spear as
being too flimsy to be effective when used in a charge, and devoid of a sauroter, both of
these elements are the features that help to identify a javelin over a spear (Polyb. 6.25). The
arms and tactics of Campanian and Tarentine cavalry were similar to the Numidian and later
the Iberian cavalry serving in the Carthaginian armies thus illustrating that, like infantry,
there was a similarity in cavalry warfare across the western Mediterranean.
Celtic:
The Celtic cavalry sent by Dionysius to aid Sparta is described as launching javelins then
retiring, before returning to launch more, in a manner similar to their Iberian, Italic, and
Numidian contemporaries (Xen. Hell. 7.1.20). The similarity in cavalry equipment and tactics
555
(Burns 2006) pp.171-72
(Connolly 1981) p.151; (Picard 1968) p.336
557
(Frederiksen 1984) p.146
556
132
across the western Mediterranean may account for why the Celtic cavalry would be steadily
employed after this period, particularly by Hannibal during his Italian campaign.558
558
(Cunliffe 1997) p.104
133
Appendix 2:
Balearic Slingers:
The Balearic slingers earned themselves a fearsome reputation. Their weapon was simple
yet could be effective when used by experienced slingers. The direct evidence given in the
ancient sources that pertains to the performance of Balearic slingers in battle is very
general. Fortunately there are numerous examples amongst the Romans and Greek where
the effect of slingers can be assessed. For instance; Athenian archers and slingers
devastated heavily armed Spartan hoplites on the island of Pylos, and Syracusan missile
troops wreaked havoc among the Athenian infantry by deliberately keeping out of range of
the Athenians which suggests that archers, and slingers were probably used (Thuc. 4.32.4,
34.1-2; 7.81-83). Xenophon utilized his archers and slingers together in order to create a
barrage of missiles that covered the advance of his infantry as they assaulted the fortress of
the Drilae in modern Georgia (Xen, Anab. 5.2). Slingers were frequently used in a defensive
manner during the Civil War by both Caesar and Pompey illustrating the potential for the
sling to be used in both defensive and offensive operations (Caes. BCiv. 1.27l 3.44,46, 88,
93).
Diodorus Siculus, Silius Italicus, and Strabo (Diod.Sic. 5.18.8-9; Sil. Pun. 3.363; Strabo 3.5.1)
all record that the Balearic slingers carried three different slings into battle. Italicus in
particular reported that the reason for carrying three different slings was that they were of
different lengths, and thus served different ranges of their targets (Sil. Pun. 3.363). Slings
were constructed of a single pouchless piece of leather, or according to Vegetius (Vege. Mil.
3.14) linen, or bristly hair and fired balls of fired clay, or almond shaped lead.559 Diodorus
records that Balearic slingers fired a ball that weighed a mina (c.500 grams), and remarked
that their impact could be potentially crush armour and bone (Diod. Sic. 5.18.13-14; 19.109).
The sling has been estimated as having an effective range of in excess of 180 m.560
Therefore the sling represented a kind of light artillery which was able to out range
559
560
(Echols 1950) p.227-228; (Salimbeti 2014) p.41
(Echols 1950) p.228
134
contemporary bows as recorded by Xenophon that the Rhodian slingers could reach twice
as far as Persian slings, and further than the standard Persian bow (Xen. Anab. 3.3). 561
The Carthaginians had exercised a form of control over the Balearic Islands since 654, and
likely utilized the Balearic slingers frequently between 350-264, although there is only one
direct mention of them by Diodorus in 311 (Diod. Sic. 19.109.4-5).562 The general disdain of
the bow as an unmanly weapon meant that unless Greek, and North African opponents also
had slingers in their ranks then the Carthaginian armies fighting on open terrain had a
distinct advantage during the skirmish phases of battles over enemies who relied on javelins
as their primary missile weapon which had an maximum range of only about 30m and an
effective range of around 15m.563 When slingers were forced to fight in wooded terrain or
on ground where their opponents held the high ground their effectiveness must have been
significantly reduced. It is unlikely that the slingers ever wore much defensive armour, as
the whirling overhead motion required to generate the force in order to hurl the shot would
have been easily encumbered by anything resembling upper body armour, or a helmet.
561
(Echols 1950) p.228
(Scullard 1989) p.19
563
(Goldsworthy 2001) p.58
562
135
Plates:
Plate 1 : Shanked javelins from Monte Bibiele (After Lejars 2008 pp.183,184, 193, 197, 201,
203, 205)
136
Plate 2: Shanked javelins from Montefortino B-E and Vulci A
( cf. Tomzack 2012 p.56 After Connolly 1997 p.44)
Plate 2: South Italic shanked Javelins (After Burns 2006 pp.355-357)
137
Plate.4 (After Burns 2006 p.345,346)
Plate: 5 (After Schneider-Hermann 1996 Plates 17, 61)
Plate: 6 The Väce Clasp and a warrior from the Arnoaldi situla
(After Connolly1981 p.103)
138
Plate 7 Samno-Attic helmet
Plate 8 Etrusco-Thracian helmets
Plate 9. Montefortino helmet
Plate 10 Negau helmet
Plate 11. Pilos helmet
(All images after Paddock 1993 p. 402,354,330, 489, 191, 373)
139
Plate 12. Oblong shield from La Tène (After Connolly 1981 p.118)
Plate 13. Clipeus/Hoplon (Both after Burns 2006 p.341,342)
Plate 14. Reconstructed caetra (After Quesada Sanz 2011b p.48)
140
Plates 145, 16 Sponiga (After Burns 2006 p.301, 305)
Plate 17. Capestrano Warrior with cardiophylax (After Burns 2006 p.293)
Plate 18. Spongia from Ksour es Saf (After Connolly 1981 p.111)
141
Plate 19.Greek styled bronze cuirass
Plate 20. Italic styled bronze cuirass
(After Burns 2006 p.307, 317)
Plate 21. Linothorax (After Burns 2006 p.321)
Plate 22. François Tomb depicting warriors wearing the linothorax (After Briguet p.162)
142
Plate 23. Linothorax and oblong shield from the monument at Chemtou (After Salimbeti
2014 p.28)
Plate 24.Main types of weapons in the Spanish peninsula. (After Quesada Sanz 2011c p.249)
143
Plate 25. Releif from Chemtou depicting the linothorax and pteryges (After Salimbeti 2014
p.28)
Plate 26. Javelin heads from Es Soumaa (After Salimbeti 2014 p.38)
144
Plate 27. The Warriors return scene from Paestum (After Connolly 1981 p.105)
Plate 28.Tomb 53 Andriuolo, Paestum (After Burns 2006 p.371 WP20)
Plate 29. Tomb 114 Andruiolo (After Burns 2006 p.374 WP20)
145
Plate 30 The Celtic development of the Montefortino helmet (After Connolly 1981 p.121)
Plate 31. The Bragzana Brooch. (After Quesada Sanz 2011a p.138)
146
Plate 32. Warrior wearing a cardiophylax from Ceri (After Connolly 1981 p.98)
Plate 33. A scene from the Certosa situla (After Connolly 1981 p.96)
Plate 34. Seventh century depictions of oblong shield from Etruria (After Connolly 1981
p.96)
147
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